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 Why are men in modern societies so busy and anxious?  Modern, liberal 
democratic society is distinguished both by the unprecedented strength and prosperity it 
has achieved, as well as its remarkable number of psychologists per capita.  Why is this? 
This dissertation explores the connection between restlessness and modernity by 
way of an examination of the themes of liberalism and restlessness in the thought of 
Locke and Tocqueville.  “Restlessness” refers to a way of life characterized by three 
features: limitless desires, mildness, and an orientation towards material goods.   
 Tocqueville argues in Democracy in America that democracy, by way of 
individualism, makes men materialistic and restless (inquiét), or restlessly materialistic.  
The intense, limitless pursuit of material well-being is a historical phenomenon, one of 
the many results of the centuries-long development of equality of conditions.  Modern 
democrats are restless; pre-modern aristocrats were not.   
 Tocqueville is ambivalent about restlessness.  According to him, the incessant, 
energetic movement of American life conceals an underlying absurdity and mediocrity.  
Many of what Tocqueville views as the more undesirable qualities of democratic 
American life are associated with restlessness, but any solution is likely to be worse than 
the problem.  It could be worse: we must tolerate restlessness if we want to remain free.  





Locke by contrast could be described as a partisan of restlessness.  The anxious 
understand the world better than the complacent or vegetative.  There are two dimensions 
to Locke’s teaching on restlessness, an “is” (found in Essay concerning Human 
Understanding Book II Chapter 21) and an “ought” (found in “Of Property,” Chapter 
Five of the Second Treatise).  Our desires are naturally limitless-this we can only 
understand, we cannot change it.  But if we know what’s good for us, we will orient 
ourselves towards a milder and more materialistic way of life. We master restlessness by 
becoming more restless, or restless in a more enlightened way.  Locke’s teaching on 
restlessness in the fullest sense is partly his account of necessity, and partly his 
recommended response to necessity.   
 This difference in their views on restlessness points to certain important 
differences in their liberalisms.  Tocqueville’s liberalism is more pessimistic than 
Locke’s: some fundamental problems have no solutions, and some of the highest goods 
cannot be reconciled with one another.  Lockean liberalism is more confident about its 
ability to find solutions to the fundamental problems of political life, and there is no 





Table of Contents 
 
Introduction (2-35) 
I.1 On “restlessness” (2-5) 
I.2 Problems and solutions: the state of nature, freedom and legitimate government (6-
13) 
I.3 Freedom and legitimacy (13-8) 
I.4 Fundamental principles, greatness and pride (18-31) 
I.5 Conclusion: Locke, Tocqueville and the harmony of the goods (31-5) 
 
Chapter One: Tocqueville on Inquietude (36-139) 
I.1 Introduction (36-41) 
I.2 The intense, limitless pursuit of material well-being (41-3) 
I.3 Material well-being: why does democracy make men materialistic? (43-79) 
I.4 Intensity (79-88) 
I.5 Limitlessness: Tocqueville on worldly asceticism (89-111) 
II.1 The dark side of inquietude (111-3) 
II.1 Neither virtuous nor happy (113-5) 
II.3 Tolerably restless, or conservativism and the teaching of inquietude (116-21) 
II.4 Inquietude and political freedom (121-39)  
 
Chapter Two: The Uneasiness Doctrine and Human Liberty (140-211) 
I.1 Introduction (140-5) 
I.2 “Power” and “Liberty” (145-50)  
I.3 Uneasiness determines the will (before II.21) (150-66) 
I.4 Same subject continued: uneasiness determines the will (II.21) (166-76) 
I.5 Uneasiness and human nature (177-84) 
I.6 Uneasiness and human nature continued: no Summum bonum (184-8) 
II.1 Happiness and freedom (188-98) 
II.2 Judgment and freedom (198-207) 
II.3 Conclusion (207-11) 
 
Chapter Three: Property and Restlessness (212-45) 
I.1 Introduction (212-6) 
I.2 The argument of “Of Property”: the righteousness of restlessness (216-27) 
I.2 The achievement of “Of Property” (227-31) 










Had [our ancestors] been absorbed or amused as we are by the 
inexhaustible trivialities of the day, had their sense been dulled by 
speed, sport, luxury, and money-making, they could never have 
taken consciously the dire decisions without which England would 
not have been preserved.  There were many solid citizens, secure in 
their estates, who pondered deeply and resolved valiantly upon the 
religious and political issues of the times…[T]here were in every 
capital grave, independent men who gave lifelong thought to 
doctrine and policy.  Their business was transacted by long 
personal letters, laboriously composed, in which every word was 
weighed, and conversations, few and far between, the purport of 
which was memorable.  Government was then the business of 
sovereigns and of a small but serious ruling class, and, for all their 
crimes, errors, and shortcomings, they gave keen and sustained 
attention to their task…Above all, they were not in a hurry.  They 
made fewer speeches, and lived more meditatively and more at 
leisure, with companionship rather than motion for solace.  They 
had far fewer facilities than we have for the frittering away of 
thought, time, and life.   
-Winston Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times, Book One 
 
I wake up most mornings very early, and spend the first hour or so 
of each day reading the morning newspapers.  I usually arrive at 
my office by nine, and I get on the phone.  There’s rarely a day with 
fewer than fifty calls, and often it runs to over a hundred.  In 
between, I have at least a dozen meetings.  The majority occur on 
the spur of the moment, and few of them last longer than fifteen 
minutes.  I rarely stop for lunch. I leave my office by six-thirty, but I 
frequently make calls from home until midnight, and all weekend 
long.  It never stops, and I wouldn’t have it any other way….I don’t 
do it for the money. I’ve got enough, much more than I’ll ever need.  
I do it to do it.   
-Donald Trump, The Art of the Deal 







I.1 On “restlessness” 
 This dissertation will examine the relation between restlessness and 
liberalism in the thought of Locke and Tocqueville.  Since the first of these four 
terms is the one most in need of clarification, a brief explanation of it is in order. 
Restlessness refers to a way of life characterized by three features: 
limitless desires, mildness, and an orientation towards material goods. 
• Restlessness implies a disjunction between desire and capacity.  A restless 
man is in constant motion basically because he cannot satisfy his desires.  
His desires are limitless.  A restless person never takes anything for 
granted, nor rests content with what he has.   
• A restless existence is often intense and unhappy, but it is not violent, or 
not in the sense in which the term is being used here.  The restless soul is 
characterized by an overall or effectual mildness.  A restless man is 
uneasy but peaceable.  Restlessness should not be confused with eros or 
vainglory, although they, too, may be seen as conditions of limitless 
desire.  They do lead to violence and are often, for that reason, self-
destructive.  Restlessness however is not, which means it is more 
sustainable and can be perpetuated for a long time.  People, many people, 





can endure it. Unlike eros and vainglory, it is experienced by the many as 
well as the few.   
• Restlessness implies desires which are limitless but not manifold.  Its 
desires are oriented towards “lower” or material things.  A restless way of 
life is one in which material well-being is of paramount concern.   
 
Restlessness is a distinctly modern condition: the contrasting epigraphs 
from the lives of the Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722) and Donald Trump (1946-
) were meant to suggest so much.  When we speak of the difference between 
“modern” and “pre-modern,” many differences come to mind, such as 
orderliness, softness, rationalism, secularism, freedom, democracy, 
individualism, and materialism.  The following dissertation finds its point of 
departure in another difference which is somewhat more difficult to define than 
those themes, but is also familiar.   
 Many debates about modernity turn on the issue of restlessness.  Take 
America.  Americans are famous for their work ethic and “worldly asceticism,” 
but also for their fondness for gadgets, celebrities and insipid forms of 
entertainment.  These perceptions of distinctive superficiality and seriousness 
cannot both be true-which is?  Are we deeper than our forebears or more 
superficial?  Do our incessant efforts at acquisition indicate a prudent realism, or 
a hopeless irrationality?  Does the gap between our capacities and our desires 





mean that we are strong or weak?  Is restlessness good or bad, a sign of strength 
or weakness, enlightenment or ignorance?  These are polemics not only about the 
merits of the American character, but about modernity itself, since America is the 
quintessentially modern nation.  Any response to any of these questions betrays 
a preference for modern or pre-modern life. 
The following dissertation intends to explore this connection between 
restlessness and modernity by looking into its connection with liberalism, the 
predominant political theory of the modern world.  This will provide a useful 
tangibility to the investigation into “modernity,” a genuinely meaningful term 
but one which is overused and almost always used vaguely.  Liberalism is a 
political theory best understood as one that holds that the chief task of 
government is to protect rights and that limited government is the best form of 
government. “How is restlessness a modern condition?” will be addressed by 
attempting to answer “What is the connection between restlessness and 
liberalism?”  All of what will follow is premised on the notion that a greater 
understanding of the connection between restlessness and liberalism will offer 
insight into how restlessness may be seen as a distinctly modern condition, and, 
by extension, into the debate between modernity and pre-modernity. 
  That liberalism is the predominant political theory in the modern world is 
obvious; that restlessness is a characteristic feature of modern life is perhaps not 
as obvious, but is familiar enough.  However, what the connection is between the 





two is, is most unclear. Why do people who live in liberal democracies tend to be 
restless?  Does restlessness cause liberalism or is it the other way around? 
To help to sort through these matters, Locke and Tocqueville have been 
singled out as liberal political theorists of high rank who devoted significant 
thought to restlessness.  Locke does so in his uneasiness teaching in the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (ECHU), Book II Chapter 21, and in Chapter 
Five of the Second Treatise (2T), “Of Property,” and Tocqueville does so in his 
discussion of inquietude in Democracy in America (DA).  There are many thinkers 
who could be said to offer insight into modern restlessness, such as Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, Kierkegaard, Weber and Heidegger.  And of course, there are even more 
who offer insight into liberalism.  But Locke and Tocqueville are the only two 
who may be said to be liberals in a conventional sense and who also offer 
sustained discussions on restlessness. 
The following study, which will consist of one chapter on Tocqueville on 
inquietude, one on Locke on uneasiness and another on Locke on property, will 
treat many themes, including commerce, justice, happiness, freedom, among 
others.  But the two central questions are how do these thinkers understand 
restlessness and what is its connection with liberalism? 





II.2 Problems and solutions: the state of nature, freedom and 
legitimate government1
What are the similarities and differences between Locke and Tocqueville’s 
conceptions of liberalism?  This must be addressed in order to provide a basic 
framework for the discussions and comparison which will follow.  Tocqueville 
and Locke are not in direct, explicit dialogue with each other.  Tocqueville never 
mentions Locke in DA, nor does he give any serious attention to Locke in any of 
his other works or correspondence.
 
2
                                                 
1 All references to Locke’s texts (ECHU, STCE, 1T and 2T, RC) are to chapter and section.  All references 
to Tocqueville’s texts (DA and OR) are to volume, book, chapter and page, except in the case of very short 
chapters or when the intention is to refer to the whole argument of a chapter.  All Tocqueville translations 
are from the Mansfield and Winthrop edition of Democracy in America.   
  Unlike Louis Hartz and many 
contemporary scholars of political theory, Tocqueville believes that it is possible 
to understand everything one needs to know about America without 
understanding Locke’s thought and its influence, because Locke was not that 
important in shaping America.  In the grand “Introduction” to DA, Tocqueville 
ascribes to modern philosophy a negligible influence in shaping the history of 
the modern world (although contrast Rahe 2009, 159).  The purpose of this 
Introduction will be to show that, despite the lack of historical interchanges and 
direct influences between Locke and Tocqueville, there is nevertheless a 
2 Although it is worth mentioning that when ECHU was translated into French, “inquietude” was the word 
used to render “uneasiness.”  For more on this historical point, see Rahe 2009, 41. 





stimulating dialogue between the two thinkers, and to suggest that more could 
be gained by exploring their differing understandings of liberalism.   
Liberalism can be defined as an understanding of either the fundamental 
political problems or of the solutions.  As an understanding of problems, 
liberalism’s founding premises are human freedom and human rights.  No one 
possesses a natural right to rule over anyone else (1T 67, 2T 1, 4, 7 and 54); men 
are equal insofar as they are free.  As an understanding of the solutions, the term 
“liberal” connotes certain political prescriptions, all of which consist of 
protections of individual freedom in civil society: rule of law, religious toleration, 
commercial freedom, the separation between the public and the private. Hobbes 
is an example of a liberal who falls into the first category but not the second.  
Tocqueville falls into the latter but, strictly speaking, not the first, or only in a 
complicated way.  Locke cleanly falls into both. 
Locke proposes the liberal solution to solve what he implies are eternal 
problems of human nature.  Only by recognizing that men are naturally free 
from civil society and authority, and thereby denying the validity of all 
traditional or customary forms of authority, can a reliable, incontestable ground 
for obedience and legitimate authority be established.  This method follows that 
of Descartes’ universal doubt and of course Hobbes.  Men are naturally equal 
and independent and thus no one has the natural right to rule or compel anyone 
else.  This is a problem, for Locke is equally certain that human political life 





cannot do without ruling and compulsion.  As with Hobbes, Locke looks to 
establish legitimate political authority through identifying the most basic threat 
to man’s existence.  However, unlike Hobbes, Locke believes that this threat is 
originally rooted in hunger, not the threat of violent death at the hands of others.  
Violence is an indirect effect of the Lockean state of nature, owing to what Locke 
refers to as the “great inconveniences” of life outside of civil society, when there 
are no common, legitimate authorities and every man is his own judge and 
executioner of the law of nature.  Hobbes is vaguer than Locke on the problem of 
hunger in the state of nature and the role it places it causing violence (aside from 
saying that men are “poor” in the state of nature).  It could even be argued that 
he is, in general, vaguer than Locke on the origins of natural violence altogether 
(Manent 1995, 41).  In any event, although Locke does see life in the state of 
nature as coming to experience a Hobbesian level of violence, this is the effect of 
even more basic, natural qualities of our beings.3
The question-the question-thus arises, how does legitimate authority 
become established and maintain itself?  Men begin, naturally, free and faced 
with certain necessities, and must establish civil government in order to contend 
adequately with these necessities.   
 
                                                 
3 For useful analyses of the differences between the state of nature and state of war in Locke, see Goldwin, 
1987, 452-60, Tarcov 1981, and Zuckert 1994, 230-7. 





In DA, Tocqueville states that he addresses the problems of modern 
democracy, not the problems of the state of nature.4
                                                 
4 On the similarities between modern society according to Tocqueville and the state of nature as conceived 
by modern political philosophers, see Manent 1996, 26-8. 
  The modern world faces 
new political challenges, all resulting from the gradual development of equality 
of conditions over the course of centuries, which has placed modern man in a 
state of freedom relative both to others and to political authority.  Tocqueville 
locates the source of individual freedom in history, not nature, but this is not the 
most important difference between him and Locke.  More significant is the 
purpose of freedom in his political science.  Locke and Hobbes are chiefly 
concerned with legitimacy, partly because, in their view, establishing the most 
legitimate form of government is a more realistic goal for man than that of the 
best form of government, the goal of ancient political science (Strauss 1953, 186-
192).  They employ the state of nature not only in order to discredit all forms of 
traditional authority (clerical, aristocratic), a negative or critical effect, but also to 
provide a new contractual basis for political authority and obedience (Manent 
1995, 39, 84).  All authority is naturally illegitimate but obedience is not 
necessarily illegitimate, provided that it is grounded in a contract between free 
and equal parties.   Thus, the state of nature is a problem from the perspective of 
morality and politics, but from the perspective of political theory, it’s a solution, 





because it provides an “Archimedean point” on which an entirely new and, for 
the first time, right and true, political order may be balanced and supported.   
The equivalent of the state of nature in Tocqueville’s thought is 
individualism, but he presents it in a much different spirit than Locke does the 
state of nature.  Individualism is for Tocqueville a description of the character of 
life in modern democratic society and it is purely a problem.  He does not invoke 
it for the purpose of discrediting traditional authority and establishing a new 
basis for legitimacy.  Rather, he invokes it to explain the fragility of modern civil 
society especially with regard to its inability to prevent the onset of despotism, 
Tocqueville’s foremost concern.  Tocqueville thinks that modern society and 
despotism have a dangerous affinity and the cause of this affinity is 
individualism.  Democracy breeds independence, which leads to isolation and 
weakness, and an inability to resist a determined despotism, especially if it 
professes egalitarian principles.  Tocqueville fears that Hobbes may be right, that 
nothing short of despotism can master a state of radical independence. 
Pre-modern man was spared this dilemma, according to Tocqueville. The 
essence of the difference between modernity and pre-modernity for Tocqueville 
is the difference between democracy and aristocracy.  In pre-modern life, all 
human relations were organized around inequality.  The principle of inequality 
served both to differentiate people from one another and arrange them into 
separate wholes such as families and estates, but also, paradoxically, to connect 





them.  In aristocratic times, there was more natural coherence and intelligibility 
to civil society and the web of duties, privileges and connections that constituted 
it.  Loosely speaking, men were more naturally social in aristocracy, because men 
were viewed not as abstract, free, equal individuals, but rather as members of 
some group, such as family, community, or profession.  Additionally, aristocracy 
did not hide, as democracy does, the fact of ruling, of one individual exerting 
influence over others.  Everyone in aristocracy was understood to be part of 
ruled and ruler relations.  Ruling, like sociality, was natural, and thus obedience 
in aristocratic times did not carry the stigma that Tocqueville says it does in 
modern democratic life. These two features of aristocratic society are related.  
The corps-family, profession, community-existed as a sort of matrix for the 
relations of ruled and ruler.  This gave ruling and obeying a greater tangibility 
than they possess in democratic times, when rule by others is only countenanced 
as some form of indirect rule, and obedience, as much as possible, is only granted 
to abstractions, such as one’s own will, or the general will, or the sovereignty of 
the people.  Because rulers did not have hide what they were doing, and 
everyone knew where they stood with each other, aristocratic society possessed a 
kind of built-in coherence than democratic society must create artificially.5
                                                 
5 “Two individuals are separated and placed side by side ‘without a common bond to hold them.’  That is 
the nature of democracy (Manent 1996, 26).” 
 





The centuries-long decline of all forms of legitimate hierarchy destroyed 
the fabric of aristocratic society without replacing it with anything (DA I.1.3).  In 
democracy, everyone is equal, similar and also independent.  “The man of 
democratic societies, encountering and only wanting to encounter around him 
equal and similar individuals, does not want to submit to the influence of others 
(Manent 1996, 53).”  Modernity means equality and equality implies 
independence.  This is one of Tocqueville’s key insights. 
Tocqueville is ambivalent as to whether or not the rise of democracy is a 
good thing, but he is determined to face up to it as a matter of necessity.  All 
human relations will be arranged somehow in accord with the principle of 
equality in modern times.  The emergence of the modern world over many 
centuries has been effected by the gradual discrediting of the various forms of 
rank and privilege that structured pre-modern aristocratic society, and so men 
are forced to create the whole social order anew.   
In making the point that Tocqueville thinks of himself as addressing the 
problems of democracy, not the state of nature, the implication was not that 
Tocqueville is a historicist, because he isn’t.  Evidence for Tocqueville’s non-
historicism may be found easily in his reliance on the concept of human nature 
when discussing, for example, man’s eternal yearning for the divine (I.2.9, 284, 





II.2.12) or love of freedom (II.2.1).6
In sum, the first important difference between Locke and Tocqueville’s 
respective liberalisms is that Locke believes the fundamental problems are rooted 
in nature, Tocqueville in modernity. 
  Aristocracy and democracy are, for 
Tocqueville, sort of “super-conventions.”  They are the most important norms 
that political science must take account of when studying any particular society 
or government.  Every community will embrace a different set of beliefs, habits 
and desires, depending on whether it is organized around inequality or equality.  
Imputing so much significance to the question of whether the few or the many 
have the upper hand in any given community does not make Tocqueville any 
more of a historicist than it does Aristotle (Politics IV.4-11, esp. 1296a22), Hobbes 
(de Cive I.4), or Machiavelli (Prince IX). 
 
I.3 Freedom and legitimacy 
Liberalism is above all a teaching about human freedom, but in a 
complicated way.  Freedom is a problem for both Locke and Tocqueville.  On the 
one hand, men are too attached to it, and people, especially those in positions of 
authority, tend to fail to appreciate this fact.  For Locke and Tocqueville (in 
modern democratic times), most forms of authority tend to overstate their 
                                                 
6 For other examples of Tocqueville’s recourse to human nature in DA, see I.1.5, 57, II.1.9, 429 and 431, 
II.2.16, II.3.11, 568, II.3.13, and II.3.18, 589. 





influence over men and their mastery of freedom.  Patriarchal authority, 
religious authority, and political authority have, generally speaking, confused 
men, conflicted with one another and have influenced men’s behavior and beliefs 
much less than they think.  As a consequence of their inability to face up to the 
genuine naturalness and intractability of individual human freedom, virtually all 
authorities end up justifying themselves by some mixture of force, fraud, 
accident, and hypocrisy. 
On the other hand, men also seem to be not attached enough to freedom.  
A brief glance at the sad history of republican government confirms that men are 
often willing to trade freedom for ease.  If men are so simply resistant to 
authority, why has despotism been the norm for most of human history?7
So men are both too susceptible to absolute government and too resistant 
to government simply.  The challenge of liberal political philosophy is to bring to 
an end these vacillations between willful naysaying and abject slavishness by 
teaching men what legitimate political authority is, how and why they should 
consent to it, and how to sustain it.
  Why 
does Montesquieu call it the “most natural” form of government? 
8
How should legitimate political authority and political freedom be 
sustained?  First, there must be the right institutions and procedures: rule of law, 
   
                                                 
7 2T 74-6, 105-12; Faulkner 2001, 14. 
8 On balance, both Locke and Tocqueville (at least in the case of modern democrats) seem to think that 
slavishness is a greater problem than naysaying (2T 223, 230 and DA II.4).   





constitutional protections for property rights and freedom of religion, separation 
of the executive and legislative functions of government, and free, fair and 
regular elections.  Locke and Tocqueville differ in terms of how much they are 
inclined to rely on institutions, as is reflected in our own day with Locke’s 
popularity among free-market libertarians and Tocqueville’s amongst 
communitarians.  But Locke’s preference for institutions and Tocqueville’s for 
civil society are in neither case absolute.  Tocqueville does discuss at much 
greater length than Locke the need for extra-institutional protections of 
individual rights such as religion and civic associations.  Through these, 
Tocqueville argues, a certain liberal civil society or way of life may be shaped 
which will more effectively achieve the ends of liberalism than simply the 
parchment barriers of a constitution.  The clearest and most decisive place to see 
this is in Tocqueville’s argument about why mores are more important for 
sustaining democratic republics than laws and physical conditions in DA I.2.9, 
“On the Principle Causes Tending to Maintain a Democratic Republic in the 
United States.”  There is no doubt that the emphasis on mores and civil society is 
one of the chief departures of Tocqueville’s form of liberalism from classic 
liberalism (Ceaser 1990, 33-6).  But we also find in Tocqueville extensive 
explorations of the American constitution, as well as of the writings of Joseph 
Story and the Federalist (not common reading amongst contemporary 
communitarians), and in Volume I of DA especially he emphasizes how much 





the strength of America is owing to the Constitution and its wise arrangement of 
powers and offices.9
 And Locke is more concerned with the private character of the citizenry 
and less trusting of institutional measures than is sometimes recognized.  Locke, 
too, in his own, way, sought to foster a certain liberal way of life, what has been 
described as a “free society of strivers” (Faulkner 2001, 6).  Most obviously, there 
is Some Thoughts Concerning Education (STCE), which argues not only for the 
importance of the right form of education for youths, but also that this can only 
be accomplished in private domestic life.  Finally, there is the undeniable moral 
appeal of the doctrines of property rights and the right to rebellion in the 2T.  
With these doctrines, Locke is not simply enlightening men about their rights 
(“raising consciousness”), but clearly trying to encourage a kind of public-
spiritedness, to protect those rights and sustain legitimate liberal government.
 
10
Liberalism undoubtedly implies a certain lowering of the end of 
government, relative to how ancient political science viewed things.  This may be 
seen in its emphasis on legitimate government instead of the best government 
and in its attempt to structure political orders such that they are less reliant on 
wise and virtuous leaders.  But this does not mean that liberalism, certainly not 
 
                                                 
9 For a good discussion of Tocqueville which stresses his analysis of liberal institutions, see Kraynak 1987. 
10 Faulkner 2001 argues that this popular spiritedness or pride, illustrates a truly radically democratic 
character of Locke’s thought, distinguishing it from many other more moderate voices, such as Blackstone, 
Hume, Montesquieu (and perhaps therefore Tocqueville, too?). 





in the case of Locke or Tocqueville, dispenses with concern for either state or 
society.  
Locke and Tocqueville both devote their political sciences to warning men 
about the dangers of unfree government, but their definitions of “unfree” 
government are different.  Tocqueville is primarily concerned with what he calls 
soft despotism.  This is a form of despotism in which the people are kept in a 
condition of servitude not so much by the open threat of violence as by their own 
weakness and complacency.  Due to the mildness of modern men, soft despotism 
is a greater threat than the hard despotism experienced in the ancient world.  
Hard despotism was violent but restricted; soft despotism is milder but more 
extensive, in the sense that it comes to dominate over men’s minds as well as 
their bodies.  “[I]t would degrade men without tormenting them” (DA II.4.6, 
662).   
Locke is more concerned with violent, hard despotism, defined as any 
government which is not only founded on violence, but under which arbitrary 
violence towards one’s person and property remains a constant threat.  Locke is 
uninterested in drawing distinctions between ancient and modern, “enlightened” 
(Hobbesian) forms of despotism.  Locke believes that men have much more to 
fear from their government than just lassitude and mediocrity.  Unjust, 
illegitimate government necessarily poses a threat to men’s lives and properties.  
More to the point, Locke does not recognize the sort of softening effect on mores 





induced by modernity which Tocqueville, Montesquieu and others claim to have 
observed.  Modern man remains an extremely dangerous animal, according to 
Locke. 
 
I.4 Fundamental principles, greatness and pride 
Perhaps the most illuminating difference between Locke and Tocqueville’s 
liberalisms is the place of pride in them.  The remainder of this introduction to 
Locke and Tocqueville will be devoted to exploring this difference, because not 
only does the issue of pride usefully differentiate between Locke and Tocqueville 
in a general way, it also points to differences in their understandings of 
restlessness. 
The two principles of legitimacy, according to Locke, are right and 
preservation.  Legitimate government is distinguished by its commitment to 
preserving its citizens’ lives and protecting their rights.  The argument of the 2T 
proceeds as a “geometrical proof,”11
                                                 
11 Grant 1987, 7 and 22. 
 similar to Hobbes’ method in De Cive and 
Leviathan.  Locke posits our natural rights to life, liberty and then property, and 
then derives the character of legitimate civil government based on what sort of 
institutions best protect these rights.  For Locke, there is a negligible difference 
between what governments must do to secure right and to secure preservation.  
Once right and preservation are properly construed, we will see that we do not 





need to choose.  At the center of Locke’s political philosophy is an effort to 
reconcile justice and advantage, by redefining them.  Justice, in order to be 
justice, must be advantageous and the same thing goes for advantage, according 
to Locke.  The content of justice is defined by our most natural rights, and our 
most natural rights are our needs: necessity defines both advantage as well as 
justice and thereby reconciles them. 
DA is a very different work than the 2T.  Tocqueville does not present his 
political science as a series of conclusions drawn from certain principles laid out 
at the beginning of the work.  Tocqueville does have what we might call 
fundamental principles, by which he orients his judgments about human things, 
but their basis or origin is somewhat more elusive than Locke’s fundamental 
principles.  The equivalents of right and preservation for Tocqueville are justice 
and greatness.   
The distinction between justice and greatness parallels the distinction 
between democracy and aristocracy in Tocqueville’s thought.  Democracy is 
more just than aristocracy because it is more natural than aristocracy: equality is 
more natural than inequality (II.4.8, 675; Manent 1996, Chapter Seven).  
Tocqueville does not view democracy and aristocracy as two equally 
conventional social orders, but aristocracy as in fact more conventional than 
democracy.  The hyper-conventional character of aristocracy does violence to 
human nature and leads to pervasive injustice in aristocratic society.  The most 





important form of this injustice for Tocqueville seems to be inequality of 
opportunity.  In democracy, equality of conditions produces equality of 
opportunity.  In democracy, an individual’s opportunities for distinction are not 
contingent on the arbitrary fact of rank.  Family relations, order of birth and 
connections at court, are factors over which an individual has little to no control, 
but which nonetheless exerted immense influence over his prospects in 
aristocratic times.12
But though democracy is more just, more natural and less dependent on 
illusion, this does not decide things in favor of democracy because aristocracy 
was more conducive to greatness than democracy.  Why?  Aristocracy means 
hierarchy and difference.  The entire aristocratic moral outlook is disposed 
towards drawing distinctions about same and other, higher and lower, and 
better and worse.  In Tocqueville’s view, this inevitably tends to encourage a 
concern for human perfection and to produce a certain elevation of spirit 
(Manent 1996, 77-8).  Democracy tends not to develop such an outlook, because 
of its emphasis on the equality and also the sameness of all men.  Not everyone 
was great in aristocracy, but at least a few individuals were.  In democracy, far 
fewer will be.   
 
                                                 
12 “What held together societies that preceded democratic society was a hierarchy of patronage (Manent 
1996, 10).” 





Like Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil 257), and unlike Thomas Jefferson 
(“Letter to John Adams, October 28, 1813”), Tocqueville is uninterested in any 
sort of “natural” aristocracy through which democratic equality of opportunity 
might reconcile justice and greatness.  Democracy is more just than aristocracy 
because of equality of opportunity, and aristocracy is greater because of 
inequality of opportunity (DA II.1.10, 436): “When some men perceive that 
without contest and without trouble they are first, when they daily have before 
their eyes great objects with which they are occupied, leaving the details to 
others, and when they live amid wealth they have not acquired and do not fear 
to lose, one conceives that they experience a sort of superb disdain for the little 
interests and material cares of life, and that they have a natural grandeur of 
thought that their words and manners reveal (II.3.14).”  Though Tocqueville does 
speak of great nations,13 the greatness that truly matters to him is that of great 
individuals.14
                                                 
13 One of the more interesting discussions in DA Volume I is about how America is the first example of a 
great republic-both big and strong and free (formerly only small communities were free). 
  The aspiration to greatness, encouraged by the basic structure of 
aristocratic society, could be seen in many of the more characteristic features of 
aristocratic life such as the high-mindedness or haughtiness of aristocratic 
manners (II.3.14).  It can also be seen in their tastes, in the types of poetry and 
history they favored, both of which ascribe primary importance in human affairs 
14 As Lawler (1993, 188) notes, a good source for what Tocqueville means by greatness may be found at 
the beginning of his Recollections (of the revolution of 1848), when he discusses the character of the 
“bourgeois king” Louis-Philippe, and what qualities he did not possess (Recollections 5-13). 





to outstanding individual men, as opposed to impersonal forces or races, which 
is the tendency of the democratic imagination (II.1.17). 
There is a clear connection between aristocratic greatness and debauchery 
and cruelty (II.2.8, II.2.11, II.2.15, II.3.18, 590-1, and “Introduction to DA,” 9).  
Democrats are more attuned to material necessity than aristocrats.  This exerts a 
chastening effect on democratic morality, and makes democrats less morally 
erratic than aristocrats tended to be (I.2.6, 235, II.2.11, and “Introduction to DA,” 
p. 9).15
 Tocqueville gives his most interesting explanation of the tension between 
democratic justice and aristocratic greatness in DA II.3.19, “Why one finds so 
many ambitious men in the united States and so few great ambitions.”  Through 
  The perceived freedom from necessity encouraged by the structure of 
aristocratic society led to eccentricity, debauchery, but also sometimes 
magnificence.  Democratic morality is lower but more solid; in democracy, men 
are less great, but they are also less depraved.  Democracy stifles the moral 
imagination.  This leads to fewer legendary love affairs and less chivalry; women 
are much less charming, but domestic life is generally more stable.  Aristocratic 
morality was more extreme: idle and warlike, slavery and freedom, tenderness 
and cruelty, intense affection towards semblables and cold indifference to 
outsiders. 
                                                 
15 “[T]he men who are the greatest nuisance to their country are those who are allowed the greatest leisure” 
Hobbes de Cive (V.5; XII.10).  See also Machiavelli, Prince IX, and Genealogy of Morals I.2 on the 
complete absence of any notion of “utility” in master morality. 





the institution of equality of opportunity, democracy secures justice but stifles 
great ambitions.  The effect of the crush of all to rise at once is exhausting and 
discourages men’s aspiration to be the best.  Tocqueville identifies an essential 
similarity between the desire to be the best quickly and the desire to be the best 
simply (II.3.19, 601-2).  Democratic meritocracy stifles great ambition because it 
extinguishes all hope of getting to the top immediately.  Elsewhere, Tocqueville 
does say that impatience is characteristic of democratic ambition, but in the 
context of discussing how democrats are too willing to settle for “easy successes 
and present enjoyments (II.1.3, 414).”  Great ambition is impatient, but it is also 
exacting and unwilling to settle for any instant gratification that it takes to be a 
false gratification.   
The aristocratic system of advancement, one based largely on arbitrary 
connections and patronage, although more unfair, was in fact, more encouraging 
of the moral imagination, of ambition, and therefore of greatness.  (In pre-
modern times, it was possible to become a high-ranking political or military 
official before the age of 25.)  Democracy discourages greatness because 
meritocracy discourages greatness.  The tension between aristocracy and 
democracy is due to the tension between justice and greatness.  Whatever may be 
the case for individuals, the same social order cannot be oriented towards 
producing and securing both greatness and justice, according to Tocqueville. 





 Aristotle says that greatness of soul is the “crown” of moral life (Ethics 
1124a1), meaning it perfects it, meaning it also presupposes all the other moral 
virtues, and not least justice.16  Thus there is no tension: justice is a condition for 
greatness.  In Volume I of DA, Tocqueville seems to agree that a great man must 
necessarily also be a just man (I.2.6, 227); in his own life and actions, he clearly 
aspired to be both great and just.17
But tensions between greatness and justice quickly emerge the more 
Tocqueville explores the conditions required to produce either of them.  What 
sort of mores does democracy produce, and what sort of moral characters are 
democratic mores, in turn, likely to encourage and support?  Although there 
  We could even say that, for Tocqueville, 
greatness is in some sense fundamental to justice because justice is defined by 
greatness.  Why does he believe democracy is more just than aristocracy?  Not 
because of its superior respect for universal human rights, but because of 
equality of opportunity, which for Tocqueville primarily means the opportunity 
to rise and achieve distinction.   Democracy does not forcibly constrain and 
frustrate ambition for many people as aristocracy did.  In France, the violent 
destruction of the old order at the end of the 18th century led directly to one of 
the most intense surges of passionate ambition and love of glory in world 
history. 
                                                 
16 See also Strauss, 1953, 140, Faulkner 2007, 7, and 16-25, and Collins 2004. 
17 Compare also Tocqueville’s assessment of Napoleon, that he “was as great as a man can be who lacks the 
least shred of virtue” (quoted in Herrold 1958, 214). 





sometimes will be examples of great men in democracies and just men in 
aristocracies, on the whole, democracy tends to support justice more than 
greatness, and aristocracy greatness more than justice.  This implies that justice is 
not absolutely necessary for greatness, or at least that the greatest man might not 
also be the man most distinguished for his justice.  He may be just, but there 
certainly are men more just than he.  If greatness required justice in the most 
complete sense, aristocracy would clearly be superior to democracy, because it 
would be superior both in terms of greatness and the justice implied by 
greatness.  But Tocqueville is reluctant to say that aristocracy was superior to 
democracy or vice versa.  In any event, the most important point for Tocqueville 
is that it is impossible for any society to be distinguished for both its greatness 
and justice, and for this reason, Tocqueville is doubtful about any final or 
completely satisfying political solution. 
The fact that democracy discourages greatness is problematic not only 
because greatness is a moral end in itself, but also for very practical political 
reasons.  The fact that democracy discourages great ambition in general does not 
mean that no one wants to be a tyrant.  A few most certainly will, and Tocqueville 
thinks that democracy will have difficulty accommodating soaring ambition 
because it is so unaccustomed to it.  The result will be soft despotism.  So what to 
do to prevent great ambitions from destroying freedom in democratic times?  
Find ways to encourage more greatness:  





I avow that for democratic societies I dread the audacity much less than 
the mediocrity of desires; what seems to me most to be feared is that in the 
midst of the small incessant occupations of private life, ambition will lose 
its spark and its greatness; that human passions will be appeased and 
debased at the same time, so that each day the aspect of the social body 
becomes more tranquil and less lofty.  I think therefore that the heads of 
these new societies would be wrong to put citizens to sleep in a happiness 
too even and peaceful, and that it is good to give them difficult and 
perilous affairs sometimes in order to elevate ambition and to open a 
theater for it. (II.3.19, 604)   
 
Tocqueville is making no “devil’s bargain” in promoting greatness in modern 
times, for, from his perspective, he is doing so partly for reasons of genuine 
political necessity.  Promoting the cause of greatness in democratic times does 
not mean promoting disorder. 
Aristocracy is totally dead, and much of DA is intended to drive home this 
point and root out any nostalgia for the ancien régime. Tocqueville is far more 
inclined to emphasize the enormous gap between aristocracy and democracy 
than the possibility of any sort of “best of both worlds” mixture of them.  But at 
the very least, there is a benefit in simply appreciating the tension between 
greatness and democracy, in that it produces a healthy skepticism towards the 
promise of the modern world.  As Pierre Manent puts it: “[according to 
Tocqueville], To love democracy well, it is necessary to love it moderately 
(Manent 1996, 132),” and a good way to cultivate a moderate love for democracy 
is to appreciate the ways in which aristocracy was superior. 





Tocqueville’s appreciation of greatness may be understood as an integral 
part of his liberalism and helps explain a number of differences between him and 
Locke, such as his sympathy both for aristocracy and the French Revolution (in 
its initial stages), his greater fondness for imperialism and part of why he 
believes strengthening religion is so important (II.1.5, 418, II.2.15, 520, Manent 
1996, 86-7, and Lawler 1993, Chapter Eight).18  We also see it in Tocqueville’s 
manner of political action and how it differed from Locke’s.  Like most 
philosophers, both Tocqueville and Locke were involved in politics at a high 
level.  Tocqueville for his part was a very ambitious man from early on in life 
and sought to satisfy his ambition by influencing the direction of political affairs 
directly and in such a manner that others would recognize.19
                                                 
18 “[T]he spiritual hero or great man was the most intense concern of [Tocqueville’s] life (Salomon 1935, 
406).” 
  Locke may well 
have been equally ambitious (it goes without saying that only an intensely 
ambitious individual could have written the ECHU, DA or 2T), but he was more 
content to be the voice behind power, to influence affairs indirectly.  Tocqueville 
wanted to be loved and famous.  Locke was more influential than Tocqueville, 
both with respect to his thought and his actions, but he seems to have had little 
interest in fame.  Locke was a much colder fish than Tocqueville. 
19 On Tocqueville’s political actions, see Jardin 1988 in general, Drescher 1964 Chapter One on the relation 
between his actions and his thought, and Watkins 2003 is extremely thorough.  On Locke’s, see Cranston 
1957. 





What does all this have to do with pride?  Because only proud men are 
concerned with greatness.  It is not enough that democratic societies aspire to be 
fairer than aristocratic societies.  They, or at least some individuals within them, 
must also be concerned with moral excellence, which means Tocqueville’s 
liberalism truly depends on pride.  Pride is Tocquevillian liberalism’s most 
important non-institutional element.  A society without any prideful individuals 
is one on the verge of soft despotism, the greatest evil to be feared in democratic 
times.20
The place of pride in Locke’s liberalism is much more complicated.  In the 
Lockean state of nature, it is not quite true to say that men are concerned only for 
material goods: there is also liberty, as well as life and property.
 
21  Locke places 
much importance on the self-consciousness of a free individual, and the desire to 
have one’s consent solicited and to have one’s way, all of which seem to be 
concessions to pride.  And, if popular spiritedness is part of the political solution 
for Locke, how can there be spiritedness without pride?  This natural right to and 
desire for liberty can only be understood as a form of pride, and one which 
Locke wants to rely on, not eliminate.22
                                                 
20 The best discussion of the importance of pride to Tocqueville’s liberalism is found in Mansfield and 
Winthrop 2000. 
 
21 See also STCE 41, 73-4, and 148. 
22 See also 1T 10, 106, 2T 93, 111, 222, and 175.  Pride is addressed even more directly and thoroughly in 
the STCE (35, 103-5, 109-10, and 119).  





But what is Lockean pride?  What are we expected to take pride in for 
Locke?  The first option would have to be freedom.  Montesquieu defines the 
political liberty of the citizen as “that tranquility of spirit which comes from the 
opinion each one has of his security.”23  There are many passages in Locke that 
suggest that he, too, shares this fairly reductive conception of freedom, and by 
extension, pride.24  “The idea of liberty is, the idea of a power in any agent to do 
or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the 
mind, wherby either of them is preferred to the other (ECHU II.21.8).”  As will be 
discussed in Chapter Two, ECHU II.21, entitled “Power,” holds that individual 
freedom is nothing more than a form of power, which would seem to imply that 
the desire for freedom is indistinguishable from the desire for power.25
                                                 
23 Spirit of Laws XI.6.  Hobbes is, of course, even blunter: “Liberty…is simply the absence of obstacles to 
motion; as water contained in a vessel is not free, because the vessel is an obstacle to its flowing away, and 
it is freed by breaking the vessel” (de Cive IX.9).  “When private citizens…demand liberty, what they are 
demanding in the name of liberty is not liberty but Dominion (de Cive X.8).” 
  Is there 
any genuinely moral dimension in the natural desire for freedom?  Does it differ 
from the desire for life or property?  Do we want to be recognized as free because 
it affirms our sense of our own virtue or dignity, or because it affirms our 
strength, our sense of security?  Is pride the satisfaction that comes from an 
individual’s recognition of others’ recognition of his power, or of his excellence 
of character? 
24 Faulkner 2001, 19. 
25 STCE 103, Tarcov 1984, 8. 





In Locke, freedom and restlessness are closely connected.  “Power” is the 
title of the chapter in which Locke gives a lengthy analysis of the concepts of 
uneasiness, and freedom.  The desire for freedom is the desire to find relief from 
uneasiness, which means the desire for power.  If we then connect the concepts 
of power and property, then the best way to satisfy the desire for freedom and to 
find relief from restlessness, according to Locke, is through possessing and 
acquiring property.  The desire for freedom, when thought through, reveals itself 
to be the desire for power, which, when it, in turn, is thought through, reveals 
itself to be the desire for property. 
If we cannot take pride in liberty, what about virtue?  Locke expresses 
grave doubts about any understanding of morality which makes moral character 
an end in itself (ECHU I.3.5, II.28.10-2, STCE 143, and RC 241-5).  At the very 
least, virtue is politically insignificant for Locke, having little to do with the 
question of legitimate government (2T 124).  To the extent that virtue is 
preserved at all in Locke’s philosophy, it seems to reduce to nothing more than 
an elevated and enlightened concern for reputation (Pangle 1988, 223).  Pride 
without virtue (or with virtue, when it is defined simply as “the Law of Opinion 
or Reputation” (ECHU II.28.10-2)) reduces to socialization.26
                                                 
26 See ECHU II.28.13.  Pangle even goes so far as to accuse Locke of fostering tyranny of the majority 
through the stiflingly conformist teaching of the STCE (Pangle 1988, 227-9).   
   





The difficulty we come to in trying to understand the place of pride in 
Locke’s liberalism is that, although it does not seem possible to have spiritedness 
without pride, neither does it seem possible to have pride without virtue.27  This 
ambiguity does not exist in the case of Tocqueville.  Tocqueville makes even 
greater use of pride in his practical teaching and nowhere submits greatness or 
liberty to the sort of searching theoretical critiques to which Locke submits 
liberty and virtue.28
Pride helps to anticipate Tocqueville’s views on restlessness and how they 
differ from Locke’s.  Someone for whom greatness has such a high place is not 
likely to be but so fond of a way of life which is moderate and peaceable, which 
the many partake of as well the few, and which places so much importance on 
material goods.  And if pride is possible, then self-satisfaction and perhaps even 
contentment, is possible.  But restless men experience little self-satisfaction and 
even less contentment. 
 
 
I.5 Conclusion: Locke, Tocqueville and the harmony of the goods 
There are three main differences between Tocqueville and Locke with 
respect to their fundamental principles.  The principles themselves are different 
(right and greatness vs. right and preservation), Tocqueville’s are also partially 
                                                 
27 The best account of the ambivalence of pride in Locke is Mansfield 1987, 197-211. 
28 “Do not ask me to analyze this sublime desire [for liberty], it must be felt” (OR I.3.3; see also Manent 
1996, 117-20).  





historically-influenced, and Tocqueville’s are in some tension with one another 
whereas Locke’s are not.  Tocqueville devotes much of his work to solving the 
problems of democracy, but there is no such thing as a genuinely satisfying 
political solution for Tocqueville, because no society can accommodate and 
promote both justice and greatness.  There is therefore a certain tragedy to 
political life for Tocqueville. 
The case is very different with Locke because right and preservation are so 
conceptually similar.  Locke’s whole enterprise is founded on the premise that 
justice rightly understood (as natural rights) and advantage rightly understood 
(as preservation) are in perfect harmony with one another (1T 86-8, 92).  Leo 
Strauss famously argues that Locke posits this harmony out of an intention to 
establish effective standards of right.  Like Machiavelli and Hobbes, Locke 
“limit[s] his horizon to get results” (Strauss 1953, 178; see also Ibid. 183, and Cox 
1982, 68, and 87-9).  Prior political theories had left morality and justice 
“unendowed,” which caused Locke to doubt their very status as morality or 
justice.  How to make morality effective is a central concern of Locke’s political 
philosophy: many of his more famous doctrines and discussions stem from it, 
such as the executive power of the law of nature29
                                                 
29 On the executive power of the law of nature, see Zuckert 1994, Chapter Eight. 
 and the question of the need 





for divine rewards and punishments to support morality.30  Hence he looked to 
base his own theory on an undeniable moral fact, something that is always 
effective.  This must be some form of natural desire, and not just any natural 
desire, but our strongest and most persistent one, which exists in all societies and 
even prior to society itself.  He settled, of course, on the desire for self-
preservation.31
The relation between right and advantage (desire) is perhaps the most 
challenging and interesting problem in Locke’s philosophy.  For instance, the 
moral ambivalence of the attachment to private property, so essential to what is 
often referred to as “bourgeois morality,” may very well find its roots in Locke.
     
32  
We stand up for what is ours in order to survive and to protect ourselves, but 
also, to some extent or in some cases, simply because it is ours.33
                                                 
30 RC 241-3, ECHU IV.13; on this point more generally, see the unpublished writings “Of Ethick in 
General,” “Morality” “Voluntas” and “Ethica B” in Political Essays. 
  But does this 
attitude, so obviously attractive to many people, hold up to theoretical critique?  
Can Locke succeed in equating justice and preservation so closely with each 
other without collapsing them?  If right is redefined to be more in accord with 
our desire for self-preservation, is it still right?  The best commentators on Locke 
31 “Natural right does not accept that anything that arises from the need for self-preservation is a vice” (de 
Cive “Epistle Dedicatory”); Strauss 1953, 227. 
32 “[T]wo hundred years before Queen Victoria he was a Victorian in essence (Santayana 1967, 4).”  Marx 
characterizes Locke’s political thought as “the classical expression of bourgeois society’s ideas of right as 
against feudal society” (Theories of Surplus Value, quoted in Dunn 1969, 204). 
33 See Mansfield 1987, 197-8, 208-10 and Mansfield 1979.  





recognize not just the importance of these questions, but also how difficult it is to 
answer them.34
An equivalent controversy does not exist in Tocqueville’s thought, for 
Tocqueville is genuinely grappling with a “harmony of the goods” problem.  We 
find in Tocqueville, through all his works, a constant vacillation between a love 
of freedom, greatness and nobility, and a respect for bourgeois order, fairness, 
equality and stability.  The best way to account for this and absolve Tocqueville 
of charges of inconsistency is to say that he appreciated all of these qualities as 
goods, and lamented the fact that we can’t have it all.  Greatness and justice are 
both goods, but we can’t have them both, or not at the same time and to the same 
degree.  The tragic character of Tocqueville’s liberalism is one of its most 
important differences from Locke’s liberalism.  Locke’s view of things is not 
tragic: realism is the opposite of tragedy.
  
35
Let’s bring this to a close and return to the theme of restlessness.  Locke, 
we could say, endorses restlessness, and even promotes it.  Locke believes that 
there is a certain moral-intellectual superiority to the restless individual, that 
only the restless understand the world as it is.  An anxious disposition is an 
enlightened one.  Tocqueville’s attitude towards restlessness would be better 
  From Locke’s point of view, only 
ineffective moral teachings recognize a problem of the harmony of the goods. 
                                                 
34 See Myers 1998, Chapter Five (esp. 138), Josephson 2002, Chapter One, Blitz 2005, Chapter Eight, 
Grant 1987, 88-98, and Pangle 1988, 18-20. 
35 Strauss 1958, 292.  





characterized as qualified toleration.  “It could be worse”: Tocqueville believes 
that restlessness is useful, that it wards off greater evils such as soft despotism, 
but in itself a restless soul is hardly praiseworthy.  Unlike Locke, Tocqueville 
does not think the restless soul is morally or intellectually superior.  The 
difference between their two outlooks on restlessness is rooted, ultimately, in the 
differences between the fundamental principles which define their liberal 
political philosophies.   
Let this suffice as a general introduction to the theme of restlessness and 
the liberalism of Locke and Tocqueville.  Having given some flavor of the 
differences between their respective liberalisms, we may now proceed to Locke 
and Tocqueville on restlessness.  Chapter One will treat Tocqueville’s inquietude 
teaching in DA.  Chapter Two will be a reading of Locke’s uneasiness teaching in 
ECHU II.21.  Chapter Three will then connect Locke’s teaching on uneasiness 
with his liberalism by means of a brief discussion of chapter five of the 2T, “Of 
Property.”  The Conclusion will then conclude with a brief comparison between 
the two thinkers on their respective views of the connection between restlessness 
and liberalism.   
 





Chapter One: Tocqueville on Inquietude 
I.1 Introduction 
 This first chapter will explore Tocqueville on inquietude.  It has two parts.  
Part one attempts to explain what Tocqueville means by inquietude and how 
democracy causes it.  How do we know it when we see it, what are its main 
features?  From here, the second part moves into a discussion of Tocqueville’s 
teaching on inquietude: what audience is he addressing, and of what does 
Tocqueville mean to disabuse them?  Also, how does it fit within the teaching of 
DA as a whole? 
 In contrast to Aristotle’s Politics and Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, DA 
does not purport to be a comprehensive work of political science.  To be 
comprehensive, by Tocqueville’s own standards, would mean to give equal time 
for aristocracy, which he does not do.  But DA is a work of impressive breadth 
that is at least comprehensive with respect to modern democracy.  In DA, 
Tocqueville discusses architecture, agriculture, oratory, manners, the theatre, the 
family, the relations between men and women and masters and servants, and 
many other topics.  The common thread running through all these discussions is 





Tocqueville’s concern with distinguishing between the factors that support 
modern democracy and those that undermine it.36
Scholars have struggled to define precisely what Tocqueville means by 
“democracy,”
   
37
                                                 
36 Compare Ethics 1181b16-20, and Politics 1319b33-40.  On this definition of political science more 
generally, and for useful comparisons of Tocqueville’s and Aristotle’s political sciences, see Ceaser 1990 2, 
24, 39, 41 and 73, and Kraynak 1987, 1177-81.  
 but Raymond Aron is surely right when he says that it is a 
“condition of society rather than a form of government (Aron 1970, 9, emphasis in 
original).”  It’s a mode of what Tocqueville calls “the social state,” which is itself 
not so easy to define.  It is closer to “society” than “state,” but it is a more directly 
political term than “society.”  Tocqueville says at one point that the democratic 
social state “has naturally suggested to [the Americans] certain laws and political 
mores,” the subject of Volume I, and it has also “given birth to a multitude of 
sentiments and opinions [the subject of Volume II]…that were unknown in the 
old aristocratic societies of Europe (DA II “Notice”).”  The essential feature of the 
democratic social state, as opposed to the aristocratic social state, is equality of 
conditions, which exerts enormous influence over all aspects of modern life, and 
especially the types of political choices men may make.  Democracy, or the 
democratic social state, is not itself a form of government but it does limit the 
number of possible forms of government to two: despotism and constitutional 
37 See Aron 1998, 185-9, Lamberti 1989, 15ff., Mansfield 1996b, viii-ix, Manent 1996, Chapter One, and 
Manent 1995, 104-5. 





democracy.  “Supporting modern democracy” for Tocqueville means supporting 
the choice of free, constitutional democracy over despotism. 
As discussed in the Introduction, Tocqueville’s ultimate interests are 
freedom, justice and greatness.  However outré some of his topics may seem for a 
work of political science, he only takes any of them up because they have some 
bearing on the health and perpetuation of free government.  He does not discuss 
everything.  Tocqueville does not, for example, discuss food, even though we 
must presume the food he encountered in Jacksonian America was notably awful 
and far inferior to what he was used to.  And why not?  Because he did not find 
the topic of American vs. French cuisine politically significant.   
The question this chapter seeks to answer is what is the political 
significance of inquietude?  If it is somehow a quality intrinsic to democratic life, 
does it undermine or support democracy?  Incidentally, is it democratic or 
American?  This question should be explained. 
After America, nothing else about the nature of democracy need be 
revealed.  The clarity with which the democratic principle manifests itself in 
America justifies Tocqueville, he believes, in speaking as authoritatively as he 
does about the nature of democracy.  Tocqueville is as excited about the example 
of America as a chemist would be about the discovery of a new element or a 
physicist a new law of nature.  The task of modern political science is to 
understand democracy, and America is the best example of a democracy because 





it is the most successful one.  This is not to say that the title’s two terms are 
synonymous.  Tocqueville sometimes uses the example of America to make the 
point that America does not exhaust the possibilities for democracy.  On some 
issues, such as the taste for material well-being that democracy inspires, America 
is an extreme from which a more desirable mean may be measured.  Tocqueville 
would resist calling 1830s America a pure democracy, although neither because 
it is a representative democracy nor for those reasons commonly cited today 
(slavery, the treatment of the Indians, the place of women).  A pure democracy 
for Tocqueville would mean a nation dominated exclusively by the democratic 
principle, wherein geographic, religious, tribal, historical, and natural factors 
play no role whatsoever: a pure abstraction, in other words.  There is no doubt 
that America’s long coast, terrific harbors, limitless expanse of land, religious and 
tribal uniformity, New England’s rocky soil, and other factors have shaped 
America in addition to the democratic principle (DA II “Notice”38
                                                 
38 Tocqueville does say that democratic historians tend to place too much emphasis on “general causes” like 
“the physical constitution of the country” (II.1.20).  See also his discussion of pantheism (II.1.7). 
).  However, 
America comes closer to a pure democracy than any other nation because there 
has never been any significant aristocratic influence on American habits, desires 
and beliefs (I.2.5, 187).  Because America, unlike Europe, has no aristocratic past 





from which to disassociate itself, American democracy is both the purest 
democracy in terms of origin, and at present the most complete.39
Tocqueville does not accord America the status that Locke and 
Montesquieu do Britain or Machiavelli republican Rome.  Nor does Tocqueville 
reinterpret America as they do with their respective exemplars.  Tocqueville is 
truly interested in getting America right as well as looking beyond it to 
democracy itself.  This goes not only for its mores, its constitution and its 
fundamental principles, but even details such as how many ships the American 
navy has, and how much the Governor of Ohio makes.  To get a sense for what 
Jacksonian America was really like, one could do worse than turning to 
Tocqueville.  Historians often read DA in this manner, and with profit.
   
40
   Those contemporary political scientists who look to Tocqueville for 
support of the view that America is “exceptional” in both senses of the word-
unique and the best-are right, because on the most important issue of the day, 
political freedom, America excels.  Tocqueville does find America exemplary. In 
its institutions, in the habits, desires and beliefs of its people, America has met 
the greatest challenge of democratic times, namely how to stay free.  That, more 
  
Tocqueville’s America is not “America,” a stand-in for some philosophical 
project independently conceived of by him. 
                                                 
39 “The only history that remains for the American Republic is its spatial expansion” (Manent 1996, xvii). 
40 See, for example, Meyers 1960, Chapter One and Appendix A.  Tocqueville’s passion for laborious 
research and historical accuracy is also evident in his work on pre-modern France and the French 
Revolution.  See OR “Preface” and Furet and Melonio 1998, 8-12.  





than any other reason, is why Tocqueville thinks America’s example is so vital.  
All that is necessary to know about democracy and the fate of modern man can 
be gained from the study of France, which illustrates the hazards of democracy,41
 So within the context of the overall aims of Tocqueville’s political science, 
the following chapter will try to determine if inquietude is one of the factors that 
support liberal democracy, or that undermine it.   
 
and America, which illustrates its promise. The challenge for Tocqueville’s 
political science is to distinguish between the ways in which democratic society 
and government are the best, better than aristocracy, and the ways in which they 
are simply necessary, preferable to the alternative, which is despotism.   
 
I.2 The intense, limitless pursuit of material well-being 
The surface of American society presents the image of vigorous, ceaseless 
motion, “the moving spectacle of human things” (II.1.5, 422). 42
                                                 
41 Furet and Melonio 1998, 5; Incidentally, the degree to which French history should be seen as somehow 
illustrative for all modern civilized Europe is an important point of debate between Tocqueville and Burke 
about the significance of the French Revolution (Ibid. 16-9). 
   Americans, even 
wealthy ones, work harder and longer hours than other peoples, they are 
constantly moving up and down the social ladder, constantly changing jobs, 
communities, fashions and houses, they are populating the vast American 
continent at an astonishing rate, and they seem to be unbound in their mores by 
42 For other passages which capture the immediacy of the impression of inquietude that Tocqueville tries to 
convey, see I.2.6, 231-4, I.2.9, 285, I.2.10, 387-8, II.1.16, 453, II.3.6, 555, II.3.11, 571, II.3.15, 584, and 
II.3.17, 587. 





the restraints of tradition and form.  No observer can fail to be struck by the 
remarkable busy-ness of American society.  Restlessness infuses their tastes in 
art, their reading habits, how they take vacations, their style of architecture, the 
state of artisanship in democracy and a number of other elements of American 
life. 
Many distinctive characteristics of democratic and American life may be 
described as restless or the result of restlessness, but Tocqueville’s account of 
inquietude in DA begins with the insight that these various forms of restlessness 
of spirit stem from the pursuit of material well-being.  “The taste for material 
enjoyments must be considered as the first source of this secret restiveness 
revealed in the actions of the Americans and of the inconstancy of which they 
give daily examples (II.2.13).”  Most basically, inquietude may be defined as “the 
(1) intense, (2) limitless, (3) pursuit of material well-being.”  This does not mean 
that inquietude applies exclusively to commercial life, but, at its core, the famous 
restlessness of the Americans refers to their desire for a particular type of good or 
end, material well-being, and the character of their efforts at pursuing it, 
limitlessly and intensely.   
The first task in this account of Tocqueville’s teaching on inquietude is 
therefore to explain how democracy causes commercial restlessness.  This will 
explain why democracy causes inquietude, and also why Tocqueville views 





inquietude as a distinctly modern phenomenon.  We will then go into the 
intensity of the pursuit of well-being and the limitlessness of it. 
 
I.2 Material well-being: why does democracy make men 
materialistic? 
Tocqueville contends that the Americans are quite possibly the greediest, 
most materialistic people the world has ever known.  “Love of well-being has 
become the national and dominant taste; the great current of human passion 
bears from this direction; it carries everything along in its course” (II.2.10; see 
also I.1.3, I.1.8, 153, I.2.10, 394, II.1.9, II.3.18, 593, and II.3.21, 610).  He also 
contends that this is connected with the fact that 1830s America is the most 
egalitarian society ever known (II.1.5, II.2.15, and II.3.17).  Many foreign travelers 
who visited America remarked on the American obsession with material goods.43
                                                 
43 Adams 1986, Volume I, Chapter VI, Stiles 2009, 13, and Meyers 1960, Chapter Five. 
  
What distinguishes Tocqueville’s account from that of the Duc de Liancourt, 
Frances Trollope etc., among other things, is the clear connection he draws 
between American democracy and materialism.  “America” the particular 
reveals the true nature of the universal “democracy”: democracy tends to make 
men materialistic.  The difference between democratic and American inquietude 
is a difference of degree, not kind.  All democracies will be distinguished by the 





restless pursuit of material well-being, if not necessarily with the same intensity 
seen in America.  Men in democratic societies tend to be more obsessed with 
material goods than men in pre-democratic aristocratic times and because they 
live in democratic societies. 
Now there is a reason, a principle behind this connection between 
democracy and materialism, which we will get to in a moment, but Tocqueville’s 
argument really begins with the surface.  Tocqueville does not claim that love of 
lucre is an American invention, but that only in democracies is material well-
being a universal concern of entire societies.  There always have been and always 
will be rich, poor and middling (I.2.5, 200), but in modern democracy the poor 
and the rich adopt the beliefs, desires and habits which formerly only 
characterized the middle classes.  Specifically, the rich and the poor possess an 
anxiety about material well-being in modern democratic countries which 
formerly only characterized the middle classes (II.2.10, II.2.19, II.3.7, II.4.5, 653-4;, 
“Preface” to OR, 87, and II.11, 178).  Before the democratic revolution, only the 
middle class of societies were distinguished by a concern for acquisition (II.3.21, 
608).  In democratic times, both poor and rich are overcome by this traditionally 
middle class passion.  The poor begin to wonder whether that necessity keeping 
them poor might not be just a perceived necessity, and the rich wonder whether 





they might not be able to increase their fortune or better secure it against the 
slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.44
Tocqueville’s claim about the Americans’ desire for material well-being, 
and how democracy causes it, is worth dwelling on since so much hinges on this 
connection.  The claim is really two claims.  First, America is the most egalitarian 
country the world has ever known, which, for him, means never has the middle 
class been as dominant as it is in America.  Tocqueville’s account in his 
“Introduction” to DA of the progress of equality of conditions is also the account 
of the rise of the influence of the middle class.  The middle class is politically 
dominant, but more to the point, democratic mores are middle class mores.  
Equality means sameness, and the principle of sameness or homogeneity turns 
out to be middle class mores.  A more traditional understanding of democracy 
would be the dominance of the many poor over the few rich, but to describe 
modern democracy as a rule of a part over the whole would be inadequate, 
according to Tocqueville.  It would miss the true, deep homogeneity amongst 
modern democratic peoples, in addition to the unique dominance of the rule of 
popular sovereignty in America.
 
45  Democracy exerts a powerful homogenizing 
force over all human things such as art, manners, and nationalities.46
                                                 
44 For an especially clear and convincing account of the distinctive modernness (and Westernness) of 
widespread unlimited acquisition, see the “Introduction” and Chapter II of Max Weber’s The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.  
   
45 This is an essential feature of Tocqueville’s understanding of modern democracy, by which he departs 
from Aristotle’s notion of regime.  In modern democracy, there is no part ruling over the whole; there is 





Rigid hierarchical aristocratic society, by contrast, exhibited genuine 
differences of belief, desire and habits (II.4.7, 671-2).47  Aristocratic times were the 
golden ages of human diversity.  In democracy, the situation is entirely different 
because there are no longer separate races of the rich and poor (II.3.21, 607).  The 
rapid changes of fortune characteristic of democracy frustrate the formation of 
separate “corps” or “estates” with their different interests, privileges and duties.  
Tocqueville argues that the main causes of homogeneity in democratic societies 
are, first, the predominance of the passion for material well-being (aristocratic 
society knew of a greater variety of passions) and second, the non-existence of 
guilds, great families and the clergy.  Such “intermediate powers” placed in 
between the individual and the sovereign also served as natural buffers against 
despotism.48
                                                                                                                                                 
just the whole, and either a despot rules over it (OR I.2.8-9), or it rules over itself (in Tocqueville’s phrase, 
“society acts by itself and on itself,” I.1.4, 55).  See Kraynak 1987, 1179 and Manent 1996. 
  It is for this reason that Tocqueville writes in OR: “of all forms of 
society, the one where aristocracy does not and cannot exist is just the one which 
will have the most difficulty escaping absolute government for long (“Preface”).”  
The Americans have been able, through the art of association, to create new 
intermediate powers, which serve the same political purpose as pre-modern 
46 “The mass crushes beneath it everything that is different, everything that is excellent, individual, 
qualified and select.  Anybody who is not like everybody, who does not think like everybody, runs the risk 
of being eliminated (Ortega y Gasset, 1957, 18).” 
47 A good illustration of what Tocqueville has in mind about the vivid diversity of pre-modern life may be 
found in Johan Huizenga’s The Autumn of the Middle Ages, Chapter One, “The Passionate Intensity of 
Life.”  
48 On this point, George 1922 is outstanding. 





estates, but do not seem to be able do anything about the crushing sameness of 
all democratic belief, habit and desire. 
In democracy, both respect and wealth are much more fluid than they 
were in aristocracy.  It is simply a matter of fact that in pre-democratic society the 
distribution of material goods was more regular and fortunes were more stable: 
leases were made for 99 years, primogeniture facilitated that money and land 
stayed with the same family for generations, the same bloodlines stayed in 
service or in some particular trade for generations, and many fewer 
opportunities for advancement were available to those without the right family 
connections.  There are still inequalities of wealth in democracy-indeed, there 
may be great inequalities of wealth-but the beliefs, desires and habits of modern 
democratic societies are derived from the middle class.  In other words, everyone 
in America is middle class, even those who are not.   
The second major claim Tocqueville is making is that the taste for material 
well-being is a middle class passion (II.2.10).  The middle class has always had 
the most immediate sense for the instability of fortunes and the potential for man 
to master them for his own benefit.49
                                                 
49 “[M]en who live in an ease equally distant from opulence and misery put an immense value on their 
goods.  As they are still very near to poverty, they see its rigors from close by and they dread them; 
between it and them there is nothing but a small patrimony on which they immediately fix their fears and 
their hopes.  At each instant they become more interested in it by the daily efforts they make to augment it.  
The idea of yielding the least part of it is intolerable to them, and they consider its entire loss as the 
ultimate misfortune.  Now, the number of these eager and anxious small proprietors is constantly increased 
by equality of conditions (II.3.21, 608).” 
  Putting these two together (everyone is the 





same in democracy because everyone is middle class, and middle class people 
are materialistic), we arrive at the claim that America is unique because the 
pursuit of material goods has never been the primary orientation of a whole 
society.   
Tocqueville believes that America illustrates with special clarity that the 
more egalitarian a society becomes, the more acquisitive it becomes.  Tocqueville 
is not the first to suggest a connection between democracy and acquisitiveness,50 
but his claim calls for scrutiny.  As with all such abstract propositions about 
human things, it is very easy to think of counter examples.  History offers 
numerous examples of aristocratic societies which did not seem so indifferent to 
acquisition, even some which are typically regarded as distinguished by their 
penchant for commerce.  This is especially so if we use Tocqueville’s own 
extremely expansive definition of “aristocracy,” which applies to virtually all of 
pre-modern civilized society.51
Tocqueville takes this challenge up with his concept of the “aristocracy of 
wealth” (endnote XIX (699); see also I.2.7, 240-1 and II.3.2).  Aristocracies of 
wealth resemble true aristocracies, because concerns about honor and rank hold 
  Take for example Carthage, Venice, 14th century 
Flanders, 17th century Holland.  How can Tocqueville seem so oblivious to so 
many instances of aristocratic acquisitiveness?   
                                                 
50 See Faulkner 2007, 205. 
51 Athens for example was an aristocratic republic, not a democracy (II.1.15, 451).  See Manent 1996, xii-
xiii for an argument that dividing up history in this manner is not a crazy idea, at least in the sense that 
many other eminent minds in the 19th century (Marx, Nietzsche) viewed history in a similar way.  





great sway.  However, they are more accurately understood as an unstable 
transition phase between democracy and aristocracy: an aristocracy of wealth is 
really aristocracy in decline and democracy in ascent.  This is not necessarily a 
bad thing; rank based on wealth is at least as absurd as rank based on birth, but 
England’s aristocracy of wealth helped it to avoid the violent extremes that 
afflicted France during its transition from the pre-modern to the modern world.52
Whatever the case with that may be, Tocqueville’s main point in DA about 
aristocracies of wealth is that it’s very easy to mistake an aristocracy of wealth for 
a true aristocracy because people continue to support the notion of rank long 
after rank has lost any sort of substantial, constitutional meaning.  This goes 
especially for parvenus, who are always the most aggressive in protecting the 
meaningfulness of rank.  Tocqueville says that, paradoxically, it is at times of 
such uncertainty that men are even more concerned about honor and rank, 
because it is harder to tell where anyone stands (II.3.2).
   
53
                                                 
52 Himmelfarb 1997, 12-3, and Drescher 1964, Chapters Four, Nine, and Ten. 
  Those who do not 
possess these privileges hate them more and those who do possess them guard 
them with equal zeal.  Hence why, in the 19th century, so many wealthy 
American and European bourgeoisie not only consented to, but actively sought 
out marriages between their daughters and fortune-hunting bounders from old, 
noble but destitute families.  But in real aristocracies, it is not so easy for the 
53 For an application of this thesis to late 20th century America, see Fussell 1983. 





claims of birth to be trumped by the claims of wealth.  In a real aristocracy, the 
ultra-rich bourgeois seethe with resentment over being regarded less highly than 
an impoverished clergyman or knight.  Regardless of how stably standards of 
rank seemed to be established in public opinion, if rank can be bought, then 
behind the aristocratic fiction, democracy is in the offing.  Tocqueville uses 19th 
century England as his example of aristocracy of wealth, correctly predicting the 
eventual decline of the English aristocracy.   
But, with regard to what a “true” or “real” aristocracy” is for Tocqueville, 
it should be made clear that what is most important for him, even more than the 
non-fluidity of rank, is whether or not being a member of the nobility has any 
political significance.  A true aristocracy is characterized more by its exercise of 
political duties than its enjoyment of social privileges (OR I.2.1, 9).54
                                                 
54 In OR, the later work, Tocqueville uses “caste,” not “aristocracy of wealth” as the corrupted version or 
foil of aristocracy.  Furet and Melonio define caste as “a closed group deprived of political power (which 
would have united them with the rest of the French) and possessing privileges that separated them from 
others (Furet and Melanio 1998, 33).”  The difference is that in the passage on aristocracy of wealth in DA, 
Tocqueville is less directly focused on the political significance (or lack thereof) of the aristocracy.   
  This is the 
central theme of OR, in which Tocqueville is focused less on the difference 
between aristocracy and democracy, but between genuine aristocracy and its 
decayed or false forms.  The “ancien regime,” in Tocqueville’s understanding, was 
the period in French history immediately prior to the French Revolution when 
the monarchy had risen to become all-dominant and the nobility politically non-
existent and therefore purely a “caste.”  The pre-Revolutionary French 





aristocracy enjoyed special honors and privileges such as freedom from taxation, 
but had virtually no role to play in the actual politics of France.  This was bad for 
the nation as a whole, because the decline of the aristocracy strengthened 
despotism, and it was bad for the aristocrats themselves because it made them 
weak and frivolous.  Tocqueville argues that when the nobility ruled, 
paradoxically, its relations with the bourgeois and peasantry were less fraught 
with suspicion and resentment.  It actually had to have dealings with them, 
which formed the core of the self-government that Tocqueville admires in feudal 
French society.  Feudal French society was genuinely free in a way that 18th 
century French society was not due to the existence of local government.  Local 
government and aristocracy are naturally connected in Tocqueville’s mind (he 
compares the aristocratic medieval rural parish and the democratic New England 
township in OR I.3.3, 129).55
There are a couple more points to add in defense of Tocqueville’s claim 
about the link between democracy and acquisitiveness, and the lack of one 
between aristocracy and acquisitiveness.  First, there is no companion volume to 
  But by 1789, both local government and the nobility 
were a shadow of their former selves, and this made the nobility’s enjoyment of 
privileges without any corresponding duties or services all the more outrageous 
to the Third Estate.   
                                                 
55 Bizarrely, some have taken issue with Tocqueville’s exaltation of feudal France as a beacon of freedom 
and self-government.  On this controversy, and the important similarity Tocqueville discerned between pre-
modern France and modern America, see Maletz 1998. 





DA which takes up democracy vs. aristocracy from the perspective of aristocracy.  
Although when Tocqueville speaks of aristocracy he clearly has in mind feudal 
Europe prior to the rise of powerful, centralized and absolute monarchies (OR 
I.2.1), he does not go into what the equivalent of America is for aristocracy with 
any real precision or depth.56  Feudal France was clearly superior to the ancien 
regime, but how superior was it simply?  Of course, we need not consider all 
societies in the past as exclusively defined by the aristocratic principle anymore 
than we need consider all societies of the present as animated by the democratic 
one, because they were not and are not.  Physical conditions, differences of 
history, tribe, religion, etc., would still prevent the possibility of a “pure” 
aristocracy as much as they prevent a “pure” democracy.57
                                                 
56 Tocqueville does give an account of the origins of the feudal aristocracy in his “Memoir on Pauperism” 
(see 40-43).  Incidentally, OR is not the equivalent of DA for aristocracy because, like DA, it treats true 
aristocracy indirectly or by contrast. 
  It is also possible that 
“aristocracies of wealth” were the norm throughout the distant past, and the 
world never knew the aristocratic equivalent of America.  Tocqueville’s claim in 
the “Introduction” to DA that democracy has been progressing for at least 700 
years would imply that, at least within that time frame, there were no aristocratic 
equivalents of America.   But none of this conflicts with the notion that the more 
democratic any society becomes, the more acquisitive it becomes.  That 
connection does not change with history.   
57 Furet and Melonio at one point make reference to an “ideal type of aristocracy that governed 
[Tocqueville’s] intellectual life (Furet and Melonio 1998, 25),” which his historical researches into pre-
modern Europe pointed towards but, qua ideal, never quite existed in itself. 





Furthermore, there is a difference between saying that a given city or 
country is uniquely successful at commerce, and saying that the desire and 
pursuit of well-being is the primary desire and pursuit of each level of society, 
rich, poor and middling.  And that is what Tocqueville thinks is unprecedented-
as if the whole society sculpted, cooked or studied the stars.  It is a matter of 
empirical observation that no society has been as universally preoccupied with 
material well-being as American society.  Even those in the lowest, most 
desperate positions are incessantly cooking up get-rich-quick schemes, and those 
at the top, who already possess more riches than they can ever make use of, 
never seem to retire.  The universality of American materialism puts materialism 
beyond the status of a mere “distinguishing feature” as it was for Carthage, 
Venice et al., and raises the possibility that there might be something truly 
unprecedented going on in American society, which then raises the possibility 
that it might be connected to the correspondingly unprecedented level of 
egalitarianism in American society.58
In order to see more clearly what Tocqueville considers to be the 
uniqueness of the universality of American materialism, consider the following.  
Traditional moralists and political philosophers regarded the unrestricted 
  Again, everyone in America is middle 
class, even those who aren’t. 
                                                 
58  As a corollary to this, Tocqueville argues in II.2.13 “Why Americans show themselves so restive in the 
midst of their well-being” that misery amidst abundance isn’t unique, but rather universal misery amidst 
abundance. 





pursuit of wealth with caution, not only from a moral perspective (the simple 
sinfulness or viciousness of greed and luxury) but also from that of political 
advantage.  Commercial prosperity may provide certain benefits to the polis or 
nation, but this must be weighed against commerce’s tendency to fragment 
society along various lines and frustrate the aspiration towards the common 
good: industrialist vs. agrarian, supplier vs. demander, management vs. labor, 
Coke vs. Pepsi, local vs. national, and, most of all, rich vs. poor.  Nothing causes 
factionalism like opposing material interests.59
There’s no doing without money-making, but if not confined to a 
circumscribed, preexisting fragment of the population like the Jews or the metics, 
and/or restrained, old partisan divides will become hardened, new partisan 
divides will emerge, and revolution and civil war will become more and more 
likely.  Tocqueville knows all of this (II.4.21, 607), hence his belief that something 
truly novel is happening in America.  Not only has the Americans’ hyperactive 
commercial activity not produced the effects predicted by the moralists, it even 
serves to unite the society more than before, because of its universalism.  What 
the example of America shows is that, not only is a society not necessarily 
   
                                                 
59 “[T]he most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of 
property.  Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in 
society.  Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed 
interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, 
grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different 
sentiments and views.  The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of 
modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of 
government (Madison, Federalist #10).”  Madison’s solution to this problem may not be traditional but his 
analysis of it is. 





divided by materialism, materialism may serve to unite.  This goes not only for 
the division of labor, and for Americans’ collective adherence to the moral 
doctrine of “self-interest well understood,” but something even subtler and more 
fundamental.  The Americans’ hearts are all moved by the same commercial 
passions, facilitating sympathy; in America, commerce creates community (I.2.10, 
369).  The universality of the desire for well-being serves to unite the numerous, 
indifferent-to-tradition, centrifugally-tending Americans into a people.  In 
America, paradoxically, focused concern for one’s personal material good is the 
basis for compassion, because compassion can only exist between men equal and 
(more importantly) similar (II.3.1; see also Emile IV), and the desire to acquire is 
the principle of similarity in America.  The great fellow-feeling Tocqueville 
observed amongst the Americans, which far surpassed that of the English, is 
even more remarkable in light of the great competitiveness characteristic of a 
capitalistic people.  But that just goes to show that the desire for material well-
being is not only an effect of equality, it is also a cause of it.60
How exactly does democracy cause materialism?  Let us now move from 
Tocqueville’s claim that democrats are more materialistic than aristocrats and 
delve further into his explanation of how and why this happens.  We will go 
through three links between equality of conditions and the desire for material 
 
                                                 
60 This is but one example of the “deliberate confusion of causality” central to Tocqueville’s concept of the 
social state and his political science more generally (Mansfield 1996b, viii, Mansfield and Winthrop 2000, 
xliii).  He may have learned this from Montesquieu (See Rousseau Confessions VIII, 317). 





well-being.  The first and by far the most important is individualism, one of the 
most famous teachings in DA.61
Individualism functions as Tocqueville’s state of nature teaching.
   
62
In times of aristocracy, each man is always bound in a very tight manner 
to several of his fellow citizens in such a away that one cannot attack him 
without having the others rush to his aid.  In centuries of equality, each 
individual is naturally isolated; he has no hereditary friends from whom 
he can require cooperation, no class whose sympathies are assured him; 
one easily sets him apart and rides roughshod over him with impunity. 
(II.4.7, 668)
  
Earlier, in the Introduction, it was discussed how, while Locke argues that men 
are naturally free, Tocqueville sees this as a condition only of modern, 
democratic man.  In making men equal, democracy also isolates them (II.2.2 and 
II.4.3).  Democracy discredits all forms of rank, privilege and inequality, and thus 
dangerously weakens the bonds that kept men and society together.  No more is 
there any real definition in human relations, as there was in aristocratic times.  In 
aristocracy, men were not only more different, more diverse, they were also 
closer and more dependent.  Aristocratic society was natural; democracy’s is 
manmade.  The hierarchical arrangement of aristocracy provided for this, by 
allowing for a system of tight social bonds and “individual influences,” a system 




                                                 
61 There are many useful accounts of Tocqueville on individualism (Villa 2005a, Villa 2005b, Ceasar 1990, 
Maletz 2005), but few focus on its connection with materialism.   
62 See Manent 1996, Chapter Six, and Manent 1995, Chapter Ten on the similarities between individualism 
and the state of nature. 
63 See also I.1.3, II.1.21, 472, II.1.11, 439, II.2.2, II.3.1 and Manent 1996, Chapter Seven. 





Tocqueville acknowledges that aristocratic exclusivity was one of the 
many forms of extremism in aristocratic mores, because it bred bizarre mixes of 
intense tenderness to one’s own and equally intense cruelty towards others.64  
Nevertheless, he believes that aristocratic society functioned more easily than 
democratic society.  Relations between all members of society were easier 
because men at all levels of aristocratic society were clearer about where they 
stood with one another.  Paradoxical but true, it was because of inequality, 
because of the defined differences between men, that their bonds could be, so to 
speak, natural.65
                                                 
64 See especially the letter from Madame de Sevigne quoted in II.3.1 “How mores become milder as 
conditions are equalized.”  See also Allan Bloom on Polemarchus’ (and also apparently Lessing’s) 
conception of justice (Bloom 1991, 317-8).  Incidentally, it is not true that these extremely tight bonds of 
affection and loyalty only existed within particular families and estates; they often also existed between 
masters and servants (II.3.5).   
  This does not mean that men were not selfish (II.2.2), but rather 
that aristocracy lacked the generalized tendency to separate men from one 
another that is built into the structure of democratic society.  However clear the 
concept of obedience to the general will or (or, more precisely, one’s own will) 
may be on an abstract, theoretical level, obedience to another individual’s 
personal will always be much clearer, practically speaking.  This fact favors 
aristocracy, because all social life depends on obedience.  In democracy, 
Tocqueville says, “obedience has lost its moral character” (“The Social and 
Political State of France Before and After 1789,” quoted in Manent 1996, 19).  In 
65 Tocqueville’s appreciation for how difference conduces more to stronger bonds than similarity can be 
seen in his discussions of the relations between American men and women (II.3.12).  Just like in 
Rousseau’s theory of the sexes, the relations between men and women in America are so harmonious 
because the natural differences between them are so well respected.  





aristocratic times, it was not thought immoral or below one’s dignity to obey 
another, but in democracy, “the only legitimate obedience is obedience of a 
person to himself (Manent 1996, 21).” 
Because men are all equal in democracy, they tend also to view 
themselves as independent.  Individualism is the name for the unenlightened 
love of independence that arises out of this separateness.  Originally caused by 
equality (II.4.1), individualism is a “sentiment,” an active force, which, if left 
unchecked, leads to abject selfishness and civic apathy.66 When Tocqueville uses 
the term “individualism,” he is always referring to a problem.67  Individualism is 
the name for the tendency of equality of conditions to separate men from one 
another and dissolve the bonds of loyalty, trust, obedience which had held pre-
democratic society together, and that’s a problem, both for society and the 
individual.68
In order to fight individualism, society must be remade anew, and a new 
principle for order and harmony must be discovered since hierarchy is out.  The 
American example proves that such principles can be discovered, that 
individualism can be tamed, “defeated (II.2.4, 486),” even, and that order and 
 
                                                 
66Mansfield and Winthrop 2000, xxxviii. 
67 See Villa 2005a, 664. 
68 Although individualism is most typically associated with DA, it is useful also to compare Tocqueville’s 
use of the same teaching in OR, to explain the problems of pre-Revolutionary France (see “Preface,” 87, 
II.8, 9 esp. 162-3; Furet and Melonio 1998, 31-41).  In OR, Tocqueville speaks of the “collective 
individualism” of aristocratic society in its decayed form, wherein civil society is fragmented into 
independent and alienated groups, not different individuals. 





harmony can be engineered without hierarchy.  The Americans’ success in 
taming individualism may be expressed as a paradox: although the Americans 
are “the greediest people on the globe (I.2.10, 317),” Tocqueville is not worried 
about their selfishness.  Americans have selfishness under control because they 
have found a solution to individualism, at least in terms of its political 
dimension.  In some sense this confidence that individualism can be mastered is 
what’s most distinctive about Tocqueville’s teaching on individualism in the 
modern age, distinguishing it from doomsayers such as Ortega y Gasset and 
Maistre.  Tocqueville devotes most of DA II.2 to showing the various means by 
which the Americans have accomplished their victory over individualism’s 
political effects, through both habits (civic associations), and doctrines (self-
interest well understood).   
For now, we must leave aside Tocqueville’s discussions of individualism’s 
political effects and the Americans’ defeat of them, fascinating though they 
might be.69
                                                 
69 For discussions of individualism (and how the Americans have prevailed over it) from a more directly 
political angle, see Villa 2005b, Maletz 2005 and Ceaser 1990. 
  Here we are interested in the effect of individualism on the 
individual’s soul, and how it causes materialism.  This has political 
consequences, too, but in a more indirect way.  Individualism undermines 
authority as such, and one form of authority is tradition.  Traditionally, tradition 





was the main source of habit, belief, and desire.70  As a result of their passion for 
equality, however, the Americans “take tradition only as information (II.1.1, 
403).”  Tocqueville does not view this modern disposition to doubt traditional 
sources of authority as a good and liberating thing.  By what will men take their 
bearings?  How will they determine the content of the good, the true, the right, 
all of which must be articulated, at some level of consciousness, for human life to 
be possible?  From a very young age, Tocqueville was skeptical of the possibility 
of living with doubt.71  Radical doubt is harmful not only for society but for an 
individual soul (II.1.2, II.1.5, and OR I.3.1-2,).  Tocqueville at one point even goes 
so far as to imply that doubt about fundamental religious questions is humanly 
impossible (II.1.5, 417)  Answers must be provided for the fundamental questions 
and clearly nearly all men cannot find them by means of an independent exertion 
of their faculties (see ECHU I.3.24).  But neither are men disposed to “take the 
superior reason of one man or one class as a guide for their opinions,” as they 
did in aristocratic times.72
Something must give, since neither the natural light of their individual 
reason nor traditional authority can provide democrats with the guidance they 
   
                                                 
70 “Originally, the authority par excellence or the root of all authority was the ancestral (Strauss 1953, 91).”  
Ortega y Gasset argues that modern man is distinguished by his “radical ingratitude…[like that of] the 
well-known psychology of the spoilt child” (Ortega y Gasset 1957, 58; see also Chapter Six).  Tocqueville 
does not seem to be concerned about the ingratitude implicit in individualism. 
71 Jardin 1988, 61-4 and Lawler 1993, 92-3. 
72 Contrast also Constant’s account of ancient societies’ “complete conviction in all matters.” (Spirit of 
Conquest and Usurpation II.6 and “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns.”) 





need.  There are two results of the effect of individualism on belief: one, the 
absolute tyranny of public opinion in American society and two, materialism.  In 
the first case, deference to authority is revitalized as conformism, justified by 
either self-deception (“How dare you accuse me of not thinking for myself-I’ve 
read Al Gore’s The Assault on Reason!”) or respect for majority rule (“it does not 
seem plausible to them that when all have the same enlightenment, truth is not 
found on the side of the greatest number (I.2.7, 236).”73  Tocqueville famously 
argues that the tyranny of public opinion over the individual intellect in America 
is far more complete than in pre-democratic society (I.2.7, 243-5, II.1.1, and II.1.2).  
Democratic society goes beyond the horse sense found in all societies because 
certain opinions are totally unopposed.74
As for the second effect of individualism on moral belief, equality casts 
into doubt all moral goods.  This effect will provide, at long last, the primary 
  Intellectual life in modern democratic 
times is more homogenous than in pre-modern aristocratic times, even under 
absolute monarchies (II.1.2, II.3.17, and II.3.21, 615).  It is paradoxical but true 
that never have there been times so conducive to dogmatism and narrow-
mindedness as “the centuries of doubt” (I.2.3, 179-180, II.2.17, and II.3.21, 613) in 
which people now live.   
                                                 
73 Related to this point is Tocqueville’s claim that the real cause of the strength of religious conviction in 
America is not the belief that that it is revealed truth, but because it possesses the force of majority opinion 
(Manent Chapter Four). “[R]eligion itself reigns there much less as revealed doctrine than as common 
opinion (II.1.2, 409).” 
74 Manent 1996, Chapter Four is the best explanation of this. 





answer we seek to the question “how does democracy make men materialistic?”  
Certainly all thoughtful individuals in all times have recognized and struggled 
with the difficulty of distinguishing between the various human goods.  Which 
good is the greatest good?  Can it be harmonized with the lower goods?  If not, 
how to negotiate the tension?  In democratic times, all the natural uncertainty 
about the good is intensified by individualism.  Due to individualism, men 
receive less guidance from trustworthy sources in dealing with the question of 
the moral good.  And as moral goods become more uncertain, material goods 
show themselves as that much more certain and therefore fetching: “[I]n their 
doubt of opinions, men in the end attach themselves solely to instincts and 
material interests, which are much more visible, more tangible, and more 
permanent in their nature than opinions” (I.2.3, 180; see also II.3.17).  Material 
goods become more distinct as moral goods become fuzzier.  This is how 
equality, by means of individualism, tends to make men materialistic.75
                                                 
75 “One must recognize that equality…tends to isolate [men] from one another and to bring each of them to 
be occupied with himself alone.  It opens their souls excessively to the love of material enjoyments (II.1.5,  
419).” 
  In 
democratic times, the only things which are certain are material, and thus men 
take to them more aggressively.  What is left when all ends are cast into doubt?  
The need to live is what is left.  When all authority is destroyed, material ends 
become the most compelling ends to pursue.  Although Tocqueville initially 
presents his concept of individualism to explain how people believe in 





democracy, in the end, it also accounts for what they believe.  When neither 
tradition nor reason is available, men’s “only star and compass” is material 
goods (Manent 1996, 59).   
Individualism provides the best explanation for the difference between 
aristocracy and democracy with respect to the pursuit of material well-being.  In 
aristocracy, material goods were treated not as ends but as means (II.2.10).76  
Tocqueville retains the traditional aristocratic perspective in that he believes that 
this tendency to focus more and more exclusively on material goods is a prime 
defect of democracy.  The historical development of democracy has changed man 
in many ways, but it has not changed him so much as to make him satisfied with 
only material well-being.77
To return to the point made earlier about how individualism functions as 
Tocqueville’s state of nature teaching, in this connection between individualism 
and materialism, we see a close similarity between Tocqueville and Locke.  
  But democracy does have the power to change men’s 
beliefs, habits and desires enough such that means tend to be taken as ends.  This 
confusing of means and ends is essential to the phenomenon of restlessness.  
Americans treat material goods as the exclusive ends, but this indicates a 
fundamental confusion on their part, for there is for Tocqueville such a thing as 
human nature, intrinsic to which are spiritual needs as well as material needs.   
                                                 
76 See Ethics I.8.  On Aristotle’s influence on aristocratic morality, see Strauss 1952, Chapter IV.   
77 See Manent 1996, 59. 





Democracy makes men individualistic and, connected with this, it instills in them 
a preference for material things.  Locke's state of nature doctrine implies not only 
that men are naturally independent of one another but that they are concerned 
primarily with lower, material goods.  There are no gods in the state of nature; 
when men are “in nature,” they seem to be outside of both political and religious 
authority.  Both democratic individualism for Tocqueville and nature for Locke 
are active forces that set men apart from one another and turn them toward 
material goods. 
So with respect to the American obsession with material well-being, 
individualism’s effect is essentially negative-it tends to rule out all goods other 
than the non-rule-outable material kind, thus explaining the utter centrality of 
material goods in American moral life.  Just as with Hobbes on power and Locke 
on property, means transform into ends when it is recognized that means are 
more certain than ends. 
Incidentally, this account of how democracy leads to materialism by way 
of individualism is not so different from the most famous account of the 
connection between modernity and materialism, Max Weber’s.  It could be said 
that Tocqueville’s teaching on inquietude is an attempt to answer the same 
question that Weber is trying to answer: how did the limitless pursuit of wealth 
come to be morally accepted in modern times after having been denounced by 
virtually every moralist for centuries?  In Weber’s account, the Protestant-





Calvinist believer is motivated by a desire to know that he is saved, and anxious 
about his prospects because, as a Protestant, he cannot look to his works and 
guidance by the church.  Inevitably, in his desperate search for signs that he is 
one of the elect, and for relief from the “feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness 
of the single individual (Weber 1948, 104),” he will look towards how he fares in 
the world.  Tangible worldly success becomes hugely important for the certainty-
seeking anxious believer.  Both Tocqueville and Weber describe a scenario in 
which the condition of doubt leads towards the pursuit of material goods.  The 
inability to live with doubt, to tolerate uncertainty, leads to limitless acquisition.   
We might also note a certain “Pascalian” character to the link between 
individualism and materialism in Tocqueville’s thought.  Many scholars have 
attempted to look to Pascal to explain Tocqueville, to varying degrees of 
plausibility (this will be discussed later at greater length).  Whether or not 
Tocqueville made this connection as a result of his Jansenist education, there is a 
resemblance to Pascal’s understanding of diversion and the turn towards 
material goods in Tocqueville’s account of democrats (Manent 1996, 58-9).  
Material goods are attractive in the sense that they provide more solidity to 
people who are spiritually adrift as a result of the doubt that the age of equality 
has instilled in them.  The differences are that Tocqueville says this is more of an 
issue for democrats, and that the pursuit of material well-being is just one form 
of diversion for Pascal.    





Let’s pause to get our bearings.  We are still trying to account for the 
dominance of the concern for material well-being in democratic American life, 
which is the most crucial element of Tocqueville’s teaching on inquietude.  
Individualism is the most important part of the explanation, because it explains 
how, by rendering doubtful the goodness of most other moral goods, it makes 
material goods that much more desirable.   
There are a couple other factors which also turn democrats towards the 
pursuit of material well-being, relating to certain aspects of democratic and 
American mores.  Tocqueville does not say that the Americans are only interested 
in material well-being.  The democratic revolution has not been so total as to 
eradicate all the higher yearnings natural to the human soul.  But what happens 
is that Americans seek to fulfill those higher yearnings through commerce.  Even 
when material goods are not the end which motivates the action, the pursuit of 
them often defines the form of the action.  Men are still attracted to virtue in 
democracy, but their pursuit and exercise of virtue takes on different character: 
they pursue virtue through commerce. 
In order to understand the full moral appeal of the pursuit of material 
well-being in democracy and America, certain revaluations of values with 
respect to commerce must be understood.  For example, in America, a slavish 
single-minded pursuit of gain is more likely to be considered having a good 
work ethic than a slavish single-minded pursuit of gain (II.3.18, 594).  Also, in 





America, Tocqueville observed that bankruptcy is much less morally stigmatized 
than in Europe (Ibid.).  This could simply be attributed to the fact that in 
democracy, more people are borrowers than lenders and the majority rules, but 
this is not Tocqueville’s interpretation.  He claims it is because Americans honor 
“audacity” and “recklessness” over caution in commercial life.78
Americans believe that someone who acquires without any defined end is 
more likely to understand the world as it really is than someone who doesn’t.  A 
favorable orientation towards limitless acquisition constitutes American 
prudence.  The premise of this attitude is a belief in the fundamental instability 
of worldly goods (I.2.10, 387-8, II.2.17, II.2.19, II.3.6, and II.3.18, 594).  Men in 
democracies believe that worldly goods are unstable and, what is more 
important, this motivates them to do something about it.  This latter feature 
distinguishes the American moral outlook from many pre-modern instances of 
  As a result of 
democracy, men possess entirely new moral dispositions, and with respect to 
both intellectual and active virtue, these new dispositions direct them towards 
the pursuit of material well-being.  There are two important ones: the new 
conception of practical reason and the attractiveness of commerce to the 
American moral imagination.  Let’s first take intellectual virtue, the new 
democratic understanding of practical reason. 
                                                 
78 Though not directly about the topic, TR’s “Man in the Arena” speech (given at the Sorbonne on April 23, 
1910) helps to explain why Americans are so easygoing about bankruptcy. 





belief in the instability of worldly goods, such as the medieval image of Fortune’s 
wheel, or the book of Ecclesiastes.  The democratic mind equates fortune or the 
instability of worldly goods with opportunity.  Most of the great American 
capitalists either founded or significantly expanded their fortunes during times 
of economic depression.   
Goods are unstable, so we must strive to secure them through acquisition.  
The goods of the world are more unstable because the moral and political 
barriers placed on acquisition no longer exist.  Sure, nature and chance still affect 
the distribution of material goods: there are still hurricanes, earthquakes, locusts, 
boll weevils, etc., in a modern democracy.  But to the extent that human intention 
exercises at least some influence over the fixity and thus availability of worldly 
goods to all comers, aristocracy and democracy maintain opposite positions on 
acquisition.  The whole intent of primogeniture, perhaps the most distinctive 
institution of aristocratic society, was to prevent the dissolution of property, of 
great estates, and thus to thwart fortune as much as possible.79
                                                 
79 See also the discussion of leases in DA II.3.6.  The critique of primogeniture is of course an important 
part of Locke’s liberalism.  See 1T, Chapter VI and 2T, Chapter VI (esp. 72-3). 
  In democracy, 
there are not only laws outlawing primogeniture, there is also the estate tax, 
whose purpose is to disrupt the inter-generational transfer of wealth.  Also, 
equality of opportunity inevitably causes the distribution of worldly goods to be 
less regular and orderly.  “There is no country in the world where particular 





fortunes are more unstable than in the United States.  It is not rare that in the 
course of his existence the same man rises and falls back through all the stages 
that lead from opulence to poverty” (II.3.10; see also I.1.3, 51).  Here we are of 
course reminded of Machiavelli, Bacon, Locke and in some sense modern 
philosophy more generally, which tends to hold that a favorable disposition 
towards unlimited acquisition is the sign of practical or “worldly” wisdom.  This 
does not mean that the Americans learned this new moral attitude from 
Machiavelli or Bacon: as with Descartes, the Americans follow Machiavelli 
without having read him.  And to pursue this logic to its ultimate moral 
conclusion, because goods are necessarily unstable, there cannot be any natural 
or legitimate limits on acquisition.  What would be the justification for ceasing to 
acquire, or to grow or to save?  Either the economy is growing, or it is receding.80
Democracy, in the short term at least, renders the world and its goods 
unstable.  This is an objective fact, from which men draw the subjective, moral 
implications we have just discussed.  But of course, the question could be raised 
if this new, Machiavellian definition of prudence should not be more accurately 
understood as a cause of the democratic world’s instability more than a moral 
imperative derived from it.  The problem is as follows.  Democracy encourages 
 
                                                 
80 “The great manufacturing or commercial concern which does not earn at least interest upon its capital 
soon becomes bankrupt.  It must either go forward or fall behind: to stand still is impossible” (Carnegie 
2006, 3).  See also 2T 157, Leviathan XI.1-2, Discourses on Livy I.6.4, Prince III, XXV and Mansfield 
1996a, 290.  This has great implications for the fate of moderation in democratic times, as well as 
prudence.  Moderation will be discussed below, in connection with luxury. 





more men to rise, because it instills in them pride in their individual capacity.  
Elsewhere, aristocratic vestiges or limited natural resources might hinder this 
effect of democracy, but the example of America shows that, when left 
unhindered, democracy does or can have this emboldening effect on men.  Thus, 
from the perspective of the naïve observer, worldly goods seem tremendously 
unstable and up for grabs.  People rise, lots of people rise, then others notice this 
effect and interpret it as evidence that “all the things of men are in motion.”  But 
they are deluded because what they observe is the direct effect of human 
intention, art.  The instability seen and experienced in America is not simply 
given by nature.  Aristocrats would say human choice made the world unstable 
or at least more unstable, and therefore this new definition of prudence is just 
democratic ideology.  Democratic “prudence” excuses greed by exaggerating 
necessity.  Democrats don’t want any stigma attached to their desire to get rich 
quick and so they dream up an extreme view of the world to justify it.81
How would Tocqueville the consummate non-partisan settle this?  He 
would allow, to some degree, the aristocrats’ contention that this is a self-
fulfilling prophecy: Machiavellian prudence does make the world more 
objectively unstable.  However, he would probably give more weight to the 
democratic perspective and say that the change in American moral attitudes is a 
   
                                                 
81 It is not necessary to be an aristocrat to make this argument.  See also John Kenneth Galbraith’s The 
Affluent Society. 





fairly minor factor relative to the grand historic march of equality.  Equality of 
conditions opens up new opportunities and makes the world more unstable, and 
the vast broadening of equality of conditions was not effected by human choice.  
The most important factors in the rise of equality of conditions-the invention of 
the printing press, the Catholic church, Louis XIV-contributed to democracy’s 
rise accidentally, without any conscious effort of furthering equality, and their 
effects are matters of necessity.  Because of the instability of goods in democracy, 
democrats, rich, poor and middling alike, possess a keener sense of necessity and 
of the main chance than aristocrats did.  Many of the more distinctive features of 
democratic mores are owing to this. 
Another interesting thing about American greed (in addition to its 
universality and its mildness) is that it is not rooted in or in anyway related to 
cynicism.  The greed of the early 19th century French after the Revolution and 
Napoleonic wars is sometimes equated with the cynicism resulting from the 
experience of having seen man at his worst.  After nobility and liberty have 
shown themselves to be chimerical, stand-ins for the most barbaric actions, then 
it is tempting to conclude that money and power are only the things that are real.  
The years following the American Civil War were also marked by a remarkable 
degree of greed, cynicism and corruption; similarly so for Britain and Europe 
following the Great War.  But this is not the case of the Americans’ greed when 





Tocqueville is writing.  The Americans have not endured unspeakable sufferings 
and are not jaded.  They are both worldly wise and innocent. 
We are dealing with the effect of democracy on mores.  The gradual 
development of equality of conditions has made the pursuit of material well-
being more attractive.  We have gone through two examples of this-how 
individualism makes men more materialistic, and the new, democratic 
understanding of practical wisdom.  The third has to do with the attractiveness 
of commerce to the democratic moral imagination.  In America, commerce is an 
honorable activity.  Not only are those who succeed in commerce in America not 
apt to be regarded as cheats and scoundrels, but they are likely to be held up as 
positive exemplars of moral good.  It is assumed that only the intelligent, strong 
and daring succeed in commerce.  Commerce calls forth virtue, which means 
that, as a corollary, Americans are attracted to commerce not only because of the 
promise of financial gain, but because of the natural attraction of virtue.  They 
discern “a sort of heroism in [their] greed for gain (I.2.10, 333).”  “In democracies 
there is nothing greater nor more brilliant than commerce; it is what attracts the 
regard of the public and fills the imagination of the crowd; all energetic passions 
are directed toward it” (II.2.19; see also I.2.9, 268-72, II.1.17, II.2.18, II.3.18, 
endnote XX, 700-1, Mansfield and Winthrop 2000, xxxv and lxxix, and Winthrop 
1988, 163-4). 





Of the three ways in which democracy inclines men to commerce, this 
third one is the most distinctively American, because it is common in America 
but rare elsewhere.  But Tocqueville does not want to say that it is only American 
or caused by incidental factors which have nothing to do with democracy 
(geography, coastlines, etc.).  The honorability of commerce, commercial virtue, 
is caused by democracy-it is not incidental to it.82
What’s the relationship between commerce and greatness in America?  
For Tocqueville, the attraction to greatness is natural to the human heart, and 
transcends democracy vs. aristocracy and pre-modernity vs. modernity.  
Commerce on the grand scale in which it is found in America is found to 
encourage human development, not just economic development.  This was 
envisioned by Alexander Hamilton, who argues in his “Report on Manufactures” 
that a great, complex economy will “Furnish…Greater Scope for the Diversity of 




This is interesting.  Many of the modern political philosophers who 
promoted commerce and unlimited economic development did so in a deliberate 
 
                                                 
82 Manent 1996, 57. Tocqueville is interesting to compare to Weber on this point.  For Weber, there have 
always been daring entrepreneurs: there is nothing modern about that.  What is modern is the level of 
organization, rationalism and sobriety in service to the pursuit of unlimited acquisition in modern society 
(Weber 1948, 24). 
83 “When all the different kinds of industry obtain in a community each individual can find his proper 
element and can call into activity the whole vigor of his nature, and the community is benefited by the 
services of its respective members in the manner in which each can serve it with most effect (“Report on 
Manufactures,” Section Five).”   





effort to simplify human life even if that meant stunting human development.  
Human perfection is a goal both too high and ineffective for politics.  In order to 
create a more effective basis for morality and politics, they looked to the passions 
in order to locate the one which would provide the most peace and stability, 
isolate it, and then rely on it even at the expense of human perfection.  The queen 
passion, or “interest,” that was singled out to perform this function was the 
desire for material well-being.84
Tocqueville is saying that this is not entirely the case in America, that the 
higher aspirations of the human soul (in a further departure from much modern 
thought, Tocqueville does use “soul”) are not totally left unfulfilled.  The desire 
for virtue or greatness is an important motivation behind American commercial 
life. 
   
As discussed in the Introduction, democracy is more just, but aristocracy 
greater.  But we do find, at least in the case of America, a slight qualification on 
democracy’s anti-greatness tendency, in the exalted, poetic language Tocqueville 
uses to describe daring, strenuous American commerce.  Like Montesquieu in 
Spirit of the Laws XX, Tocqueville sings a hymn to commerce, not to poeticize a 
mundane prosaic thing, but because poetry is somehow appropriate to great 
commerce.  Tocqueville is clearly very impressed by the imperialistic-
                                                 
84 See Hirschman 1977, Part 1 and also 129, 132-3.  Hirschman discusses Hume, Montesquieu and other 
minor modern philosophers. 





materialistic exertions of the daring pioneers, despite their being not the best 
examples of democracy’s justice.85
Commercial virtue, poetic commerce is not simply American because it 
owes its existence also to the fundamental mildness of democracy.  Democracy 
makes men materialistic and also softer.  Men are more compassionate because 
they are so much more alike.  Consequently, they view commerce as a more 
suitable arena for heroism than conquest or war.  The effect is similar to 
Montesquieu’s teaching on doux commerce,
 
86
Tocqueville stops short of claiming that commerce supplies “the moral 
equivalent of war.”  He does not expect men with an especially high-minded and 
exacting attachment to virtue to be satisfied with commerce.  But it is true that 
the qualities summoned by both endeavors are similar-sangfroid, 
 but with the difference that 
democracy is the root cause of everything for Tocqueville.  In Tocqueville, 
democracy makes men materialistic and soft, independent of the fact that it also 
makes them commercially-minded (II.3.1, II.3.4).  Commercial-mindedness 
softens men, too (II.3.21, 609), but democracy is what is fundamental, because it 
causes commerce directly, and indirectly, by making men milder and less 
inclined to pursue greatness in war.  Democracy causes mildness and commerce, 
which, respectively, cause commerce and mildness.   
                                                 
85 Manent 1996, 58-59. 
86 Spirit of the Laws XX-XX1, Manent 1998, Chapter One.  “The spirit of commerce has a tendency to 
soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into 
wars (Federalist #6).” 






Commercial honor in America only slightly qualifies the tendency of 
democracy to stifle greatness, and among the three factors which incline 
democrats towards the pursuit of material well-being (individualism, prudence, 
honor), it is the least important.  But it does serve to illustrate the uncanny 
tendency of democracy in America to commit all focus and energy towards 
commerce, because even what few heroic souls there are tend to turn towards 
commerce. 
  Democracy is, generally speaking, less 
vainglorious than aristocracy, but also simply vainglorious in different ways.   
For the purposes of explaining why democracy makes men inclined 
towards the pursuit of material well-being, our discussion is complete.  
However, before leaving this section on material well-being, perhaps we might 
state, in a more general way, Tocqueville’s views on commerce.  Democracy and 
commerce are intrinsically connected; democracy is the cause of the widespread 
pursuit of material well-being, and is also, historically speaking, its effect.  
Commerce contributed much to the rise and spread of equality of conditions, but 
equality of conditions also, through individualism and a revaluation of values, 
inclines men towards the pursuit of material well-being.   
                                                 
87 Tocqueville believes there is something to the democratic peace theory (II.3.26, 631), but does not think 
we should go too far with it.  Democracy, through commerce, contains tendencies to make men prefer 
peace, but it also, in less noticeable ways, can incline men towards war. 





Does Tocqueville view this as good or bad?  We will take up this question 
more directly in the second part of this chapter, but here are a few thoughts in 
anticipation.  The universality of the pursuit of material well-being provides a 
bond of unity and fellow-feeling which the desire for something higher such as 
virtue or salvation could never provide.  This is good.  However, left untutored, 
the intense obsession with material well-being is bad for both the individual soul 
and society.  It stifles and weakens the spiritual dimension of men and can lead 
to drastic inequalities.  Commerce makes men mediocre, thisworldly, and, most 
ominously, it also can cause them to neglect their rights and duties as free 
citizens of a democratic republic.   
Tocqueville’s attitude towards commerce in the modern world is best 
described as one of resignation.  In democratic times, 
materialism/commercialism is inevitable, and so the wise legislator and political 
scientist will look for ways to leverage this attachment and use it to support 
political freedom.  Tocqueville is anxious to emphasize that an inordinate 
attachment to material well-being is one of the main causes for the appeal of 
despotism, because it can make people weak and short-sighted.  Freedom is 
more conducive to commercial prosperity than despotism of any form, and this 
popular belief can provide a reliable, if mercenary, support for freedom in 
democratic times.  The Americans understand that free peoples tend to be more 
prosperous than non-free peoples.  But not all peoples will realize this; on 





balance, materialism is more of a threat than a support to freedom (II.2.14).  It is 
eminently possible that democrats will sacrifice their freedom for comfort, 
because in the short term, despotisms are often in a better position to offer 
material well-being than democracies. 
However, on the whole, Tocqueville is willing to go along with the other 
modern political philosophers who argue that the partnership between political 
freedom and commerce is mutually beneficial.  This partnership was promoted 
by philosophers such as Hume and Montesquieu in a conscious attempt to 
replace the ancient partnership between political freedom and war.88  Freedom is 
good for commerce because free peoples tend to be more prosperous than those 
under monarchies and especially those under despotism.  Commerce is good for 
freedom because commercial prosperity is simply essential for national strength, 
and because men can be taught to view freedom as an essential means toward 
the end of greater prosperity.89
American materialism is an extreme; a number of factors which have 
nothing to do with democracy also encourage Americans toward commerce, 
such as their vast expanse of land, the lack of revolution and general 
peacefulness in its past, their having no serious rivals near them, and their 
descent from the English (who were also a most industrious, commercial people).  
 
                                                 
88 See Randal Hendrickson, “Montesquieu and the Problem of Republicanism: A Reexamination of the 
Treatment of Ancient Republics in the Spirit of the Laws,” and Pangle 1973, 86-89.  
89 See Hume’s essays “Of civil liberty,” Of commerce,” and “Of refinement in the arts.”  





But the taste for material well-being will be found in all democracies.  Towards 
the end of Volume II, Tocqueville famously raises the threat of soft 
administrative despotism.  Democrats possess powerful, intrinsic tendencies 
toward relinquishing their freedom in exchange for greater equality and/or 
greater material well-being.  And this discussion seems to be aimed at 
democracies other than America, who have not instituted the array of curbs 
against despotism that America has.  Tocqueville did not write DA for 
Americans.  At the end of Volume II, he is clearly looking past America to argue 
that all democracies need to be wary of keeping their desire for material well-
being under control, lest they consent to exchange their freedom for it.   
Tocqueville views commerce and democrats’ powerful attachment to it 
with equanimity.  He acknowledges the many lamentable aspects of the 
heightened commercialism of the modern West, but seeks to make the best of it.  
He sees good and bad things about it, and provides counsel about the difference 
between what is inevitable and what may be changed.   
 
I.3 Intensity 
At the outset of this chapter, inquietude was defined as “the intense, 
limitless pursuit of material well-being.”  The preceding account of the material 
well-being part of the definition also explained how democracy causes 





inquietude.  These next sections will concentrate less on its causes and more on 
elaborating its characteristic features of intensity and limitlessness.  How do we 
know it when we see it?   
The intensity of Americans’ efforts at satisfying this desire was also 
touched on earlier, in the discussion of individualism.  When all human ends are 
cast into doubt, all the energies which would be devoted towards other pursuits 
are absorbed by the pursuit of secure material well-being (II.1.9, 429-30).  
Consequently, it becomes more intense.  It’s so easy to make a fortune in 
America.  No wonder that art, theatre, belle-lettres, philosophy, music, romantic 
love, and architecture stagnate, and commerce flourishes (II.1.9).  Much of the 
time, effort and attention which in other places would be devoted to cultivating 
these pursuits are instead directed towards commerce, and that makes it more 
intense.  In other times and places, commercial progress has been concomitant 
with progress in the fine arts, but in America, commerce seems to prosper at the 
expense of civilization.  
In America, an important reason for why the pursuit of material well-
being is so intense is because idleness is stigmatized: 
In America I sometimes met rich young people, enemies by temperament 
of every painful effort [!], who had been forced to take up a profession. 
Their nature and their fortune permitted them to remain idle; public 
opinion imperiously forbade it to them, and they had to obey. I have often 
seen, on the contrary, in European nations, where aristocracy is still 
struggling against the torrent that carries it away, I have seen, I say, men 
whose needs and desires constantly spurred them on remain in idleness in 





order not to lose the esteem of their equals, and submit more easily to 
boredom and discomfort than to work. (II.3.18, 595)90
 
  
Contrast this with the following passage from Nancy Mitford’s Madame de 
Pompadour: 
Versailles, in the eighteenth century, presented the unedifying but 
cheerful spectacle of several thousand people living for pleasure and very 
much enjoying themselves.  Pleasure, indeed, had an almost political 
significance since the nobles, removed form their estates and drugged 
with useless privilege, had to be kept contented and amused…Nineteenth 
century historians, shocked by the contemplation of such a merry, 
pointless life, have been at great pains to emphasize the boredom from 
which, they say, the whole Court, and the King himself, suffered.  No 
doubt a life devoted to pleasure must sometimes show the reverse side of 
the medal, and it is quite true that boredom was the enemy, to be 
vanquished by fair means or foul.  But the memoirs of the day, and the 
accounts of those courtiers who lived through the Revolution and 
remembered the Ancien Regime, do not suggest that it often got the upper 
hand; on the contrary they speak, one and all, of a life without worries 
and without remorse, of a perfectly serene laziness of the spirit, of 
perpetual youth, of gambling in the great wonderful palace, its windows 
opening wide on the fountains, the forest, and the western sky (Mitford 
2001, 93-4).  
 
This passage is brought up not to stress how much more hedonistic 
aristocrats were than democrats (although that’s true, too), but to illustrate how 
much easier aristocrats’ consciences were about leisure.  That these 18th century 
aristocrats could idle so much time away, confident in already having achieved 
human perfection, apparently without going insane with boredom, implies that 
                                                 
90 Tocqueville says that those rich Americans who do not accept that they “[owe] it to public opinion to 
devote [their] leisure to some operation of industry or commerce or to some public duty” often abscond to 
Europe where “they find the debris of aristocratic societies among which idleness is still honored (II.2.18).” 





they were able to take their leisure with a good conscience.  Pascal famously 
contended that literally doing nothing and just being is extremely challenging for 
all men as such (Penseés 136, 622).91  Tocqueville seems to think that it was at 
least somewhat easier for aristocrats.  Because democrats have a bad conscience 
about leisure, what Oscar Wilde called “the great aristocratic art of doing 
absolutely nothing”92
To characterize aristocrats as lazy seems at odds with the “extremist” 
characterization of aristocratic morality given in the Introduction, until it is 
recognized that laziness is in fact itself an extreme, whose opposite is 
spiritedness.  Aristocrats, like primitives, were known for being both lazy and 
warlike.
 is to them unknown and uncultivated.  Democrats are 
impatient (II.1.3, 414) and ill at ease in the present. 
93  Getting up late was a distinctive aristocratic custom,94
Restlessness and leisure with a bad conscience are two sides of the same 
coin.  Democrats cannot live in the present; the present discomfits them and so 
 but so was 
dueling (Locke addresses dueling and aristocratic morality in ECHU II.28.15).  
Democrats are very different: they work harder but are more peace-loving.  
Democrats live their lives more at an even keel than aristocrats, the impression 
they give of their restlessness notwithstanding.  
                                                 
91 This is also addressed in Eric Rohmer’s La Collectioneuse and Rousseau’s “5th Promenade” in the 
Reveries of the Solitary Walker. 
92 The Picture of Dorian Gray, Chapter Three. 
93 Hence Tocqueville’s likening the American Indians to aristocrats (I.2.10, 314).     
94 Contrast the entry for “Early Riser” in Flaubert’s Dictionary of Accepted Ideas with Poor Richard’s 
Almanac, 5, 15, and 17. 





they constantly strive to leave it behind and live in the future.  All accounts of 
restlessness, including those of Locke, Tocqueville,95
“There exists…in democratic societies agitation without a precise goal 
(I.2.5, 202).”  This was not so in aristocracy.  Aristocratic society was 
characterized by “repose” (II.1.13, 447, II.1.16, 453, II.1.17, 458, and II.3.21, 610) 
and “immobility” (II.1.11, 439; II.1.17, 461), each individual viewing himself as 
part of a fixed, greater whole, such as his family or estate or (in ancient times) 
city.  This belief in the immobility of human things was good and bad.  It tended 
to produce elevation of mind and spirit.  It was also responsible for the 
characteristically aristocratic vices of fatalism (II.1.8), complacency (too much 
“maintaining [instead of] perfecting” (I.2.5, 202; II.1.8) and lack of seriousness, 
especially with respect to material goods, but also, to some extent, with respect to 
spiritual.
 Pascal (Pensées 47, 148), and 
Rousseau (Emile, 410-1) cite this as an essential feature of it.  A restless man is 
always somehow extended into the future, and never at home in the present.  
Hobbes claims that this “anxiety for the future time” is the origin of all science 
and religion (Leviathan XI.24 and XII.1-5). 
96
                                                 
95 “Vague restlessness and an incoherent agitation of desires have always been a chronic malady with 
me…I lack the greatest of all conditions of happiness: the tranquil enjoyment of present good” (“Letter to 
Sophie Swetchine, February 11, 1857,” Selected Letters, 248.)   
  Democracy, by contrast, implies a mobile, restless life in which 
96 For a discussion of aristocracy’s tendency to produce complacency and amateurism, a discussion which 
is on the whole sympathetic to aristocracy, see “The World” from David Cecil’s Life of Melbourne.  
Amateurism/non-professionalism is a classic critique of aristocracy, which did much, over the course of the 
19th and 20th centuries, to lead to a decline in aristocracy’s hold over many institutions, such as the civil and 





change, within certain limits, is constant.  “Democratic nations…like movement 
for itself (II.1.16, 453).” 
This “leisure with a bad conscience” phenomenon, characteristic of 
democratic life, is one example of the intensity of the pursuit of material well-
being in democracy.  So is the seriousness of democrats. 
It has occasionally been alleged throughout our history, by both non-
Americans and Americans, that Americans are a singularly frivolous people.97
                                                                                                                                                 
foreign service and the clergy.  See also Max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation” and Strauss on the 
gentleman’s “noble contempt for precision (Strauss 1953, 142).” 
  
Whatever may be the case with 20th and 21st century Americans (and always 
remember when reading Tocqueville that his arguments about the nature of 
democracy are not necessarily discredited if America changes), Tocqueville does 
not describe the Americans he encountered as frivolous.  Tocqueville in a few 
instances describes the Americans as “serious” or “grave” (II.3.3, II.3.11, 571, and 
II.3.15).  Democrats are more serious than aristocrats in Tocqueville’s view; they 
are less fun (I.2.5, 205, II.2.19; although southerners are an exception to this I.2.10, 
360-1), more care-full, and more anxious.  Tocqueville certainly questions 
whether the Americans are serious about the right things, but they are definitely, 
in their way, serious men.  Tocqueville thinks the aristocratic and democratic 
forms of religion differ in many ways (the political influence of the clergy, the 
arguments in favor of religion that people are most likely to find persuasive), but 
97 See for example Solzhenitsyn’s “A World Split Apart.”  





he refrains from saying that either democrats or aristocrats were more deeply 
religious.  Aristocrats may have been overly easy going and complacent at times, 
but at least such seriousness that they did possess and exercise occasionally was 
directed towards the highest, greatest things.  
Not only may this gravity of the Americans be understood as a form of 
intensity in itself (isn’t it always implied that someone who is said to be grave is 
also intense?), but it also may be understood to cause the pursuit of material 
well-being to be more intense, through its effect on the Americans’ exercise of 
instrumental reason.  America is a place in which unprecedented consensus 
reigns about ends-the pursuit of material goods is universally respected.  With 
respect to means, the means towards material well-being, the main object of 
Americans’ intense anxiety, the case is different.  “It is a strange thing to see with 
what sort of feverish ardor Americans pursue well-being and how they show 
themselves constantly tormented by a vague fear of not having chosen the 
shortest route that can lead to it (II.2.13, 521).”  How to know if there is not an 
easier path towards to ease?  Democracy causes men to be grave and anxious 
about means (Manent 1996, 56). 
Aside from being superficial, Americans have the reputation of being an 
“innovative” people, good at tinkering, at finding and making new tools, and not 





at all constrained by traditional ways of doing things: “a nation of engineers.”98  
This also is not Tocqueville’s view.  Tocqueville does believe that tradition has a 
negligible influence over Americans, but he does not believe that Americans 
excel in terms of instrumental reason.  Americans are an energetic people and are 
extremely persistent with respect to the ultimate end of greater well-being, but 
they are also restless and impatient.  Americans lack the capacity to see some 
machine, art or technology through to the end.  They get frustrated easily, which 
is okay, since their sheer limitless energy ensures that, through trial and error, 
chances are good that they eventually will prevail in the end.  But they will not 
do so in a smooth, efficient manner.  Restlessness breeds faddishness, which is 
harmful to progress (II.1.10).99
Americans are innovative in the sense that they are open to trying new 
means to a given end, but they have a short attention span.  If some innovation 
does not yield results immediately and convincingly, they toss it.  Tocqueville’s 
discussion of Robert Fulton’s initial failure to interest his fellow countrymen in 
the steamboat illustrates this point (I.2.9, 289).  For Tocqueville, the example of 
  Tocqueville describes the Americans’ knack for 
achieving progress despite their ineptitude as a “privilege”: “The great privilege 
of the Americans is therefore not only to be more enlightened than others, but to 
have the ability to make repairable mistakes (I.2.5, 216).”   
                                                 
98 See, for example, Adams 1986, Volume I, Chapter VI, 123-4, and Ortega y Gasset 1957, 138-9. 
99 Incidentally, this nexus of restlessness and a penchant for fads also gives democratic literature a bias 
towards the shocking and sensational (II.1.13, 449). 





the Americans illustrates that instrumental reason leads not only to wholesale 
irrationality, but also retail irrationality (contrast Strauss 1953, 4-5). 
Aristocracy does not have the same taste for technological progress that 
democracy does (II.1.8, 427), but aristocracy is actually better suited to executing 
it.  Aristocracies can plan and implement progress from the top down, in the 
form of projects whose overall ambitions may be maintained in the event of 
temporary setbacks or confusions.  The accelerated modernizations of Japan and 
Germany, which made them so formidable, so fast, were greatly facilitated by the 
aristocratic structure of those countries.     
What’s the relation between this impatience about means and the gravity 
of the Americans?  Should we say that the phenomenon is democratic, or is it just 
an American quirk?  Their gravity is the cause of their impatience.  In 
Tocqueville’s account, they intensely exercise their instrumental rationality 
because of their constant contact with necessity.  The instability of worldly 
goods-the awareness of which is a constant preoccupation of the democratic 
mind-is the primary form that this contact takes.  (Tocqueville also observed a 
constant obsession with mortality in the Americans, which could be understood 
as a sensitivity towards the instability of fortune (II.2.13)).  Democracy places 
more men in direct and constant contact with necessity than aristocracy did.  
Aristocrats tended to take too much for granted; democrats take nothing for 
granted.  Democrats’ familiarity with necessity makes them concerned about 





their well-being, and imbues in them a sense of responsibility for it, but in a 
manner detrimental to their rationality.  (We will return to the question of 
restlessness and rationality shortly.) 
Necessity makes men “realistic,” but it also makes them impatient and 
hasty in their deliberations.  Thus Americans obsess constantly over their ability 
to gain some measure of control over the instability of worldly goods, which 
spurs them on to find the best means to secure well-being.  In the meantime, 
obviously, they fail to notice how much well-being they have already secured 
and are too busy to enjoy.   
The intensity of American commercial activity is best understood as an 
extreme-all democracies will experience democracy’s materialistic tendency, but 
not necessarily to the degree of America.  Democrats will be more energetic, 
graver, and more anxious in their deliberations that aristocrats were.  But their 
energies will not necessarily be as exclusively absorbed in commerce as the 
Americans are.  From Tocqueville’s perspective, this means that there is hope for 
a democratic higher civilization, although, as with democratic freedom, this will 









I.4 Limitlessness: Tocqueville on worldly asceticism  
We have proceeded quite far in our account of inquietude in America, but 
we have one last part of the initial definition to explain, namely the restlessness 
of inquietude.  Why is the pursuit of material well-being limitless?  To say that 
Americans are restless is to say that there is no limit to their activity.  Why is 
this?  Why don’t their intense strivings after material well-being ever end?  Why 
does satisfaction elude them?  It is strange that we should be asking this question 
at all.  “Material well-being” is a particular type of material good.  It refers to 
stable comfort, commodious living, what is often referred to as a “bourgeois” 
existence, one materialistic through and through but not at all dissipated.  
Though Rome under the Caesars or 18th century Versailles may be said to have 
been materialistic times (indeed, even intensely materialistic), men pursued 
material goods of an entirely different stamp than in America, ones rare, 
exquisite, and cruel (II.2.11).  In times of aristocratic decadence, men were 
constitutionally incapable of satisfaction because their idea of the good life was 
coming up with new and exotic desires and satisfying them.  Their vaunted 
ambitions sometimes expressed themselves as the desire to rule the world, at 
others in purely sensual ways.100
                                                 
100 See Plutarch’s “Life of Anthony.” 
  However, in democratic times, fewer people 
aspire to rule the world, and their sensual or materialistic ambitions are similarly 
limited: 





The taste for material enjoyments does not bring democratic peoples to 
similar excesses.  There, the love of well-being shows itself to be a 
tenacious, exclusive, universal, but contained passion.  It is not a question 
of building vast palaces, of vanquishing and outwitting nature, of 
depleting the universe in order better to satiate the passions of a man; it is 
about adding a few toises101
 
 to one’s fields, planting an orchard, enlarging 
a residence, making life easier and more comfortable at each instant, 
preventing inconvenience, and satisfying the least needs without effort 
and almost without cost.  These objects are small, but the soul clings to 
them: it considers them every day and from very close; in the end they 
hide the rest of the world from it, and they sometimes come to place 
themselves between it and God. (II.2.13)   
In light of how low the Americans aim in their materialistic ambitions, 
why is it they have such a deuced hard time fulfilling them?  American 
materialism is at once intense and mundane.   
Another way to pose this question is: in light of the fact that the 
Americans are so materialistic, why is there no luxury in America?  Americans 
are constantly engaged in commerce, but apparently not because they want to 
enjoy a more refined life.  They certainly don’t seem to ever experience that life.  
This lack of a correlation between commercialism and luxury in America was 
particularly interesting to Tocqueville and is at the heart of the phenomenon 
inquietude.  Americans are an intensely commercial people, maybe the most 
intensely commercial people ever, but they are not luxurious.  What accounts for 
this? 
                                                 
101 This is a measure of land (like “acre”).  





In some sense, the Americans can be viewed as exemplars of the new 
moderation promoted by modern philosophers such as Montesquieu and Hume.  
Modern moderation is explicitly utilitarian.  It is not to be practiced for the sake 
of itself-because it is simply morally good to be moderate-but to increase wealth 
by making possible a more enlightened and prudent pursuit of it.  This is an 
integral component of what is sometimes referred to as “the new republicanism,” 
because this form of moderation provides a link between the tameness in mores 
and reasonable, reliable attachment to liberty that republicanism needs, but 
which is compatible with the modern commercial disposition.102
One reason why democracy does not favor luxury in the traditional sense 
is because it does not favor the conditions required for great artisanship.  With 
respect to the prospective clients of great artisans, democratic taste is too 
utilitarian: “Democratic nations…will cultivate the arts that serve to render life 
convenient in preference to those whose object is to embellish it; they will 
habitually prefer the useful to the beautiful and they will want the beautiful to be 
  While classical 
republicanism castigated commerce and luxury, accusing them of undermining 
all support for virtue and freedom, the proponents of the new republicanism say 
that they have identified, in commercial mores, a more reliable support for 
freedom than the warlike classics ever found.  
                                                 
102 “What is praised is not so much a divine or noble and graceful coordination of appetite with reason for 
its own sake, but rather the enlightened, calm, and prudent pursuit of security and ease for oneself and for 
the society in which one finds oneself (Pangle 1988, 92).” 





useful (II.1.11).”  In aristocracies, the artisan’s view of his profession and his 
clients’ demands conspired to produce high art.  Artisans during aristocratic 
times had more professional pride than democratic artisans: it wasn’t just a job to 
them.  In many cases, the practicing artisan expected to ply his particular trade 
for his whole life, as did his ancestors and as would his descendants.  The guild 
system blurred the lines between occupation, family and class (Ibid.).   
The clients of these artisans in aristocratic times, the aristocrats 
themselves, tended to possess tastes which were at once exacting, fixed and 
coherent.  “As this aristocratic class is held immobile at the point of greatness 
where it is placed, without either contracting or expanding, it always experiences 
the same needs and feels them in the same manner.  The men who compose it 
naturally draw from the superior and hereditary position they occupy the taste 
for what is very well made and very durable (Ibid.).”  Many exquisite marvels 
resulted from this happy coincidence between aristocratic clients’ desire and 
artisans’ capacity. 
Democratic progressivism (II.1.8) is also the enemy of craftsmanship and 
thus luxury, according to Tocqueville.  Believing in progress makes it difficult to 
believe that perfection is achievable.  If it is widely assumed that watches 
(Tocqueville’s example-II.1.11, 441) will improve inexorably with the march of 
time, then watchmakers may not be inclined to devote themselves to making the 
best watch they can in the present.  Watchmaking may be still be a serious craft, 





but the focus shifts from how to make the best watch possible to how make 
watches as cheaply and efficiently as possible.  In aristocratic times, craftsman of 
all varieties had more of an incentive to make things that would last.  Tastes and 
desires changed little in aristocracy; aristocrats in some sense thought of 
themselves as existing outside of time and change (II.1.11, II.2.2, 483).  
Aristocracies did not deny the possibility of progress, but, unlike democrats, they 
certainly did not assume it nor did they believe that it would extend to all things.  
Not only did they believe in the possibility of perfection, but for all they knew, 
they had already achieved it in most things (II.1.8, 427).  Democrats are humbler 
about their own perfection because they are such deeply optimistic believers in 
progress.  So there will be no democratic equivalents of Mont St. Michel and 
Chartres, even though, in principle, there’s no reason why there couldn’t be.  
Engineers are just as smart, materials and labor are abundant, but democratic 
mores won’t allow it. 
In democracy, the clients are less exacting, their tastes always in flux, and 
they are more willing to accept compromises at a lower price.  Restless 
democrats are always up for shortcuts, and this goes for both artisans and clients.  
The clients’ desires are unstable and ever-expanding and thus ever-changing.  
And the artisans are then in turn inclined to take a more utilitarian view of their 
trade, and doubly so if they are not planning to ply it for the rest of their lives 
(II.1.11).  Sometimes, this means greater efficiency in production, but inevitably, 





it also means cheaper stuff.  “Democracy not only tends to direct the human 
mind toward the useful arts, it brings artisans to make many imperfect things 
very rapidly, and the consumer to content himself with these things (Ibid.).”103
Of course, on the question of luxury, it’s important to note that the 
Americans’ utilitarianism does not make them absolutely resistant to 
superfluities.  There is a sort of “democratization of luxury,” which qualifies the 
extent to which Americans have severed the connection between commerce and 
luxury.  Egalitarianism restrains the extravagance of the rich, but there is a 
thriving trade in lower and middle class luxuries, which are no less useless for 
being inexpensive.  (There is even a word for this distinctly modern, democratic 
form of luxury-“gewgaw.”
  
Tocqueville says that a good indicator of how far the democratic revolution is 
advanced in any place is how many Wal-Marts are there: “if I perceive that the 
products of the arts [in any given modern society] are generally imperfect, in 
very great number and at a low price, I am assured that among the people where 
this happens, privileges are weakened, and the classes are beginning to mix and 
are soon going to be confused with one another (Ibid.).”   
104
                                                 
103 The doctrine of perfectibility also provides something of a justification for shoddy artisanship (see 
Tocqueville’s anecdote about the shipbuilder II.1.8). 
)  This modern democratized version of the problem 
of luxury is what Tocqueville attempts to explain in his short work “Memoir on 
104 Of course, some contend that luxury is natural to man as man, and that the lower classes have always 
had at least some affinity for it: “O, reason not the need! Our basest beggars/Are in the poorest things 
superfluous (King Lear II.2.453-4).” 





Pauperism.”  Why do the wealthiest modern nations have the highest rates of 
indigence?  Because wants turn most easily into needs for their inhabitants, 
including those amongst the lower classes.  The modern lower classes experience 
a greater degree of comfort than any medieval baron, and are in this sense 
provided for to a historically-unprecedented degree.  But satisfaction still eludes 
them because the modern poor have greater desires than the pre-modern poor.  
(Tocqueville also concedes that the middle ages’ system of private and religious 
charity would not suffice in modern times.) 
Luxury and comfort are extremely different types of goods.  Indeed, it 
often seems as if luxury is not a material good at all.  Who is more superficial-the 
free-spending dandy or the obsessive miser?  Who is more spiritual?  Perhaps a 
truly materialistic individual is one only concerned with comfort or material 
well-being.  Luxury and comfort are often found separate from one another.  
Only men in modern times truly know of comfort.  In Medieval times, “life was 
brilliant, ostentatious, but not comfortable.  One ate with one’s fingers on silver 
or engraved steel plates, clothes were lined with ermine and gold, and linen was 
unknown; the walls of their dwellings dripped with moisture, and they sat in 
richly sculptured wooden chairs before immense hearths where entire trees were 
consumed without diffusing sufficient heat around them.  I am convinced that 
there is not a provincial town today whose more fortunate inhabitants do not 
have more true comforts of life in their homes and do not find it easier to satisfy 





the thousand needs created by civilization than the proudest medieval baron 
(“Memoir on Pauperism,” 44).”105
Tocqueville implies that comfort is more difficult to achieve than luxury 
because “comfort presupposes a numerous class all of whose members work 
together to render life milder and easier (Ibid. 44).”  There definitely are 
luxurious desires in modern times.  But the conditions for fulfilling them, or 
fulfilling them in a way that will do credit to modern democratic civilization, are 
not good.  
  
Tocqueville’s ultimate position on luxury is complicated.  Commercial 
progress is inevitable, but high civilization is not, or will take more time.  
Tocqueville does not expect that America will lack a taste for finer things 
indefinitely.  Inequalities of wealth are certainly inevitable.  And despite his fear 
about the emergence of a new industrial aristocracy, he does see possible benefits 
from it, namely patronage of the arts and thus a new, modern, democratic 
civilization.106
                                                 
105 See also Lewis 1957, Chapter Two on the architecture of Versailles (“Magnificence was what was 
aimed at in a seventeenth-century house, not comfort”) and Ortega y Gasset 1957, 57. 
  The democratic philistinism rooted in the preference for the 
useful over the beautiful may therefore be countered.  Let commerce produce 
inequalities, and inequalities will produce an idle rich who can devote their time 
to endowing universities, supporting the opera, buying up Old Masters from 
106 Louis Auchincloss argues that this essentially did happen during the Gilded Age, which witnessed 
capitalism at its most unrestrained, but also the produced most of the great American artists such as Edith 
Wharton, Henry James, Mark Twain, and John Singer Sargent (Auchincloss 1989). 





Europeans in need of liquidity, and so on.  For Tocqueville, this is to be looked 
forward to.  It is a disappointment that commercial progress has not produced 
higher civilization, and he stresses that this need not be the case for all 
democracies in the future, and maybe not even for America.  Tocqueville is pro-
luxury in the sense that, unlike Rousseau, he is pro-civilization.107
The fundamental reason for the lack of a connection between aggressive 
commercial activity and luxury in America is central to Tocqueville’s 
understanding of inquietude.  Inquietude, for Tocqueville, is really a mix of 
restlessness and orderliness.  The example of the Americans shows that 
democratic restlessness does not preclude orderly mores.  This is seen in the 
hyper-commercialism and non-decadence of American society.  Order and 
restlessness even support each other.  Commerce implies restlessness, but 
success in commerce requires orderly mores. 
 
American domestic life is also a safe haven for orderly mores amidst the 
otherwise turbulent, restless American landscape.  Tocqueville does not see an 
incongruity between the wild, open-endedness of public commercial life and 
stable domestic life (“…a morality so relaxed and so austere in the same people” 
II.3.18, 595).  On the contrary, his thesis is that the constraint in domestic matters 
is caused by the intense commercial focus.  People are generally inclined against 
                                                 
107 The best place to look at for the purpose of comparing Tocqueville’s views on civilization and progress 
with Rousseau is his “Memoir on Pauperism.”   





adultery, or any other domestic disorder, because it is a distraction from 
business, the business of America.108
This notion of a nexus of order and restlessness leading to limitless desire 
and activity we see in Tocqueville’s discussions of religion in America.  At some 
level, the restless, materialistic American way of life is contrary to nature.  The 
American character is out of accord with human nature because, in focusing so 
intensely on their material needs, Americans neglect their (equally natural) 
spiritual ones.  Like Augustine, and Psalm 41 (the text for Palestrina’s sublime 
motet Sicut Cervus), Tocqueville did believe that central to human nature was a 
natural restless, erotic yearning for the divine (this is a major difference between 
him and Locke).
   
109
The soul has needs that must be satisfied; and whatever care one takes to 
distract it from itself, it soon becomes bored, restive (inquiet), and agitated 




  If the minds of the great majority of the 
human race were ever concentrated on the search for material goods 
alone, one can expect that an enormous reaction would be produced in the 
souls of some men.  The latter would throw themselves head over heels 
into the world of spirits for fear of remaining encumbered in the too 
narrow fetters that the body wants to impose on them. (II 2 12) 
                                                 
108 “They do best, who, if they cannot but admit love, yet make it keep quarter, and sever it wholly from 
their serious affairs and actions of life; for if it check once with business, it troubleth men’s fortunes, and 
maketh men that they can no ways be true to their own ends (Bacon “Of Love”).” See also Winthrop 1986, 
241-244. 
109 Kraynak even argues that “Christian natural law, is the ultimate foundation of Tocqueville’s 
constitutional theory (Kraynak 1987, 1194).” 
110 Mansfield and Winthrop note that this sentence is almost a direct quotation from Pascal (Mansfield and 
Winthrop 2000, xxxi). 





This results in dissatisfaction, which they misunderstand the roots of, and 
respond by redoubling their materialistic efforts.  
Now, to say that Americans neglect their spiritual needs might sound 
surprising, in light of the Americans’ religiousness of which Tocqueville makes 
so much in DA.  It is true that Tocqueville often portrays religion as existing as a 
kind of stable constant reserve of order and moderation, but this has more to do 
with religion’s influence on politics and less on the individual soul.  With respect 
to the latter, American religion does not present the image of order and stability.  
There is something unhinged about American religious life, not necessarily in a 
dangerous way, but in a way that causes American society to vacillate 
continually between material and spiritual extremes.  This comes out especially 
in chapter II.2.12, which immediately precedes “Why the Americans show 
themselves so restive (Inquiets) in the midst of their well-being,” his most 
extended discussion of inquietude.  Here Tocqueville discusses what historians 
of American religious life refer to as “The Second Great Awakening,” a time of 
renewed religious enthusiasm occurring right around when Tocqueville visited 
America.  The central tenet of the “Great Awakening” school of American 
religious history is that America goes through cycles of religious seriousness, 
alternating periods of straying and then feverish, repentant enthusiasm.   
In II.2.12, Tocqueville professes the Great Awakening theory and also 
gives his own explanation of it.  He compares what he saw at revival meetings to 





the extremes witnessed during the time of the late Roman empire, when it was 
going through its height of materialistic decadence, and the early Christian 
church was at the height of its purity: “It is said that the persecutions of the 
emperors and the tortures of the circus peopled the deserts of the Thebaid; but I 
think that it was rather the delights of Rome and the Epicurean philosophy of 
Greece (II.2.11).”  Of course, the extremes found in America are less extreme than 
in Rome-revivals and itinerant preachers as opposed to stylites and desert-
dwelling, and commodious well-being as opposed to gladiator combat.  
Tocqueville does not portray these religious excesses as in any way dangerous or 
violent, a threat to the abiding freedom and enlightenment of American society.  
But they do betoken dividedness of soul and thus misery and restlessness.  The 
tameness of these vacillations may be seen as a cause of their perpetuation, 
which goes for the mundaneness of American restlessness more generally.  So to 
respond to the initial paradox-how can American materialism be at once limitless 
and mundane-part of the answer is that the mundaneness facilitates the 
limitlessness. 
According to Tocqueville, the Americans’ restlessness with respect to 
material things causes them to be restless with respect to spiritual things.  We are 
saying here nothing different than what was said above about “gravity” and the 
intensity of the pursuit of the quickest means to material well-being in America, 
except that now the picture looks more cyclical.  Their experience of necessity 





and concerns about death make them serious about acquisition (II.2.13, 512).  
Americans would not be so religious if they were not so obsessed with 
acquisition throughout most of their lives.  Intense commercialism is the cause of 
the “Great Awakening” phenomenon and of evangelical Christianity altogether.  
(As with the above discussion of heroic commerce, all moral phenomena in 
America seem to be somehow related to, even if not always derived from, their 
relation with material goods (II.3.17-18).)111  At the most fundamental level, 
religion is based in the deep and permanent spiritual needs of human nature, but 
as to how those needs tend to be fulfilled, this is influenced by convention, which 
in the case of democracy means having to contend with the intense materialism 
of men.112
To put the point differently, and without reference to religion, we recall 
that what originally draws Tocqueville’s Americans to the pursuit of material 
well-being is material goods’ relative stability.  In discerning something 
especially solid and reliable not only about material goods, but also the limitless 
pursuit of material goods, there is no denying that the Americans are onto 
  That’s why American religious history has this cyclical character, 
which parallels the interior religious and commercial life of the individual 
American.  
                                                 
111 “Equality makes the passion for material enjoyments and the exclusive love of the present predominant 
in the human heart; these different instincts mix with the sentiment of ambition and tinge it, so to speak, 
with their colors (II.3.19, 603).”  See Winthrop 1986, 249-50. 
112 Tocqueville explicitly says that religion will have to change to shape itself to democracy.  See II.1.5, 
“How, in the United States, religion knows how to make use of democratic instincts.” 





something.  Several of the acutest minds who studied the human passions in 
modern times noted a unique “constancy” in the passion for material well-being.  
In Albert Hirschman’s words, the passion for material well-being’s “very 
insatiability now became a virtue because it implied constancy.”113
The remainder of Tocqueville’s explanation of the limitlessness of the 
pursuit of material well-being has to do with the rupture between desire and 
capacity, which in turn has to do with how democracy has changed both desire 
and capacity.  Equality of conditions, because it means equality of opportunity, 
increases both the number of men’s desires and their strength.  However, it also 
  Most 
passions such as love and vainglory are fickle, fanciful and unreliable.  But not 
the passion for material well-being, which, due to its constancy, possessed a 
unique appeal for those thinkers, such as Montesquieu, Hume, and, in his own 
way, Locke, who sought a queen passion around which to order political and 
moral life.  These thinkers turned what was traditionally thought to be an absurd 
or vicious quality of this passion into a virtue.  There is thus a way in which, in 
addition to softening mores, the all-consuming character of the endless pursuit of 
material well-being gives a scientific character to moral and political life which 
provides a new basis for order and peace.  The orderliness that characterizes 
American life in DA is evidence that the passion for material well-being can serve 
this purpose. 
                                                 
113 See Hirschman 1977, 54-6 and Myers 1998, 9. 





prevents men (along with natural inequality) from satisfying all these new and 
stronger desires (II.2.13).  Although democratic nations are stronger in a 
collective sense, their citizens are weaker.  Relative to the size of their desires, 
individuals in democracies are weak because they lack the capacity to fulfill 
them.  
Also relevant is the democratic mind’s penchant for abstract ideas, and its 
effect on desire.  The democratic taste for abstract ideas has two causes.  First, 
Tocqueville says that equality gives men “a taste for abstraction.”  Abstract ideas 
are pleasing to the democrats’ minds, because they provide relief from the 
painful necessity of having to reason for oneself.  This taste originates out of 
intellectual laziness generated by individualism: lacking recourse to tradition or 
authority and lacking also the capacity to work things out for oneself, a common 
solution for the restless democratic mind is to seek comfort in a one-size-fits-all 
abstract idea or theory (II.1.3, II.1.7, II.1.16, and II.3.19).  Busy men have lazy 
minds (II.1.3, 414, II.1.4, 416).  The restlessness of American life alters desire by 
giving vaguer, abstract forms of expression a “certain secret charm” (II.1.16, 457).  
“[I]n the case of language, democratic peoples prefer obscurity to workmanship 
(Ibid.).”114
                                                 
114 The democratic penchant for abstractions also accounts for the poor quality of American rhetoric (see 
“Why American writers and orators are often bombastic,” II.1.18, 464).  
   





The second, and more legitimate cause for abstract ideas’ influence is less 
of a desire or taste and more of a habit or disposition.  Democracy simply makes 
men used to thinking in terms of abstractions, because it is hostile towards the 
distinctions of form and kind which characterized pre-modern life and made it 
so vivid and diverse (II.1.3). 
We have discussed already Tocqueville’s account of how democracy 
effaces the difference between rich, middling and poor.  Democracy is a great 
force for homogeneity over all human things such as manners, rituals, dress, and 
forms of address.  Democracy attacks human diversity because of the lack of 
publicly recognized forms of rank and because of the universal and all-
consuming nature of the desire for material well-being among democratic souls.  
Democracy is premised on an abstraction,115
Democracy encourages an over-reliance on abstract ideas and abstract 
ideas stimulate desire by tainting particular satisfactions and spurring on further 
efforts.  There are two desires especially characteristic of democracy-the desire 
for material well-being and the desire for equality.  Both are insatiable due to the 
democratic mind’s tendency to believe that only abstractions are true and real.  
In the case of the “ardent, insatiable, eternal, invincible” passion for equality 
 so democrats should not be faulted 
but so much for tending to think and speak in terms of abstractions. 
                                                 
115 “The [French] Constitution of 1795, like its predecessors, is made for man.  Yet there is no such thing as 
man in this world.  I have never seen one in my life; if man exists, it is without my knowledge” (de Maistre 
quoted in Ceaser 1990, 148-9). 





(II.2.1, 482, II.2.13, and II.4.3), abstractions point out each new inequality as the 
next object of the will, and persistently focus attention away from the particular 
and present toward the general and future.116
As for the desire for material well-being, the desire more of interest here, 
abstract ideas hinder democrats’ ability simply to drift in the present and enjoy 
what they have without thinking of their next scheme.  Is this as good as it gets?  
Is there something better?  (The threat that reason and abstraction pose to 
happiness will be treated at greater length in the next chapter, on the connection 
between rationality and happiness in Locke.)  Simpler beings less given to 
abstractions because their rational faculties are less-developed have an easier 
time accessing ease.  The democratic reliance on abstract ideas gives an 
expansiveness and thus limitlessness to the desire for material well-being.  
  
Turning now from democracy’s effect on desire to its effect on capacity, 
the capacity of primary interest here is reason.117
                                                 
116 See Spirit of the Laws VIII.3, “Of the Spirit of Extreme Equality” and Manent 1996, 9. 
  Are the Americans a 
reasonable people?  The answer is complicated.  On the one hand, Tocqueville 
often describes them, especially in their practice of politics, as an exceedingly 
rational or “enlightened” people, far more so than their French counterparts.  
This Tocqueville makes clear in all his discussions of, for example, the American 
constitution and federalism, free institutions, and estate law (I.1.6, 95, and I.1.8, 
117 See II.3.11 for Tocqueville’s discussion of the effect of democracy on imagination. 





149, 155-6).  Throughout all these discussions, Tocqueville advances the 
propositions that (1) America proves that there can be political order in 
democracy, and (2) political order in America is not just “spontaneous order,” 
reasonableness in effect not intention.  In the case of politics, the Americans 
really do seem, at some level, to understand why they are doing what they are 
doing.  Tocqueville makes clear that the Americans’ enlightenment-their 
rationality-is not of an especially high, elevated, refined character, but it is real, 
and, to a remarkable extent, distributed throughout all levels of American society 
(I.2.9, 289).118
Political rationality in this sense is not caused by democracy as such.  The 
American example shows how the rule of reason in politics is compatible with 
democracy.  Reason can rule in democracy, but there is certainly no necessity to 
this.  Tocqueville predicts that democracy will most likely only work for peoples 
who have had a long experience of freedom and enlightenment.  That claim, in a 
phrase, sums up most of Tocqueville’s explanation of why American democracy 
  “[I]f the passion of the Americans for material enjoyments is 
violent, at least it is not blind, and reason, though powerless to moderate it, 
directs it (II.2.14, 516).”  Reason directs the passion for material well-being, 
specifically, by convincing the materialistic Americans that only free peoples are 
prosperous. 
                                                 
118 For a good discussion on what Tocqueville means by the enlightenment of the Americans, and its 
differences and similarities from the Enlightenment proper, see Maletz 2005, 11-2.   





has been a success and French democracy has not.  Not all democracies will have 
the blessedly long experience with self-government that America has had. 
Most basically, democracy promotes a different, more utilitarian form of 
reason than does aristocracy.  Tocqueville has serious reservations about purely 
instrumental reason.  He claims that the exclusively instrumental employment of 
reason is a primary cause of the limitlessness of the pursuit of material well-
being, and the rupture between desire and capacity.  An overly instrumental 
bent leads towards haste and stupidity in reasoning.  This is the argument of 
II.2.16, “How the excessive love of well-being can be harmful to well-being” and 
“On the gravity of the Americans and why it does not prevent their often doing 
ill-considered things (II.3.15).”  In these two chapters, Tocqueville develops his 
conception of restless rationality, and its tendency to produce dumb, half-baked 
ideas:   
In democracies men are never settled; a thousand accidents make them 
change place constantly, and there almost always reigns something 
unforeseen and so to speak improvised in their lives.  Thus they are often 
forced to do what they have learned badly, to speak of what they scarcely 
understand, and to engage in work for which they have not been prepared 
by a long apprenticeship.  In aristocracies each one has only a single goal 
that he constantly pursues, but in democratic peoples the existence of man 
is more complicated; it is rare that the same mind does not embrace 
several objects at once, and often objects very foreign to one another.  As 
he cannot know them all well, he is easily satisfied with imperfect notions.  
When the inhabitant of democracies is not pressed by his needs, he is so at 
least by his desires; for among all the goods that surround him, he sees 
none that is entirely out of his reach.  He therefore does all things in haste, 
contents himself with approximations, and never stops but for a moment to 
consider each of his acts ….The habit of inattention ought to be considered 





the greatest vice of the democratic mind. (II.3.15, 584, emphasis added; see 
also II.1.10, 434)  
 
Aristocracy promoted the use of pure, theoretical reason more than 
democracy does.  This is a shame in itself, for philosophical greatness is yet 
another form of greatness for which aristocracy seems to have provided a more 
fertile soil (II.1.10, 435-6).  But it is also a shame for the cause of utilitarian 
science.  Reason in any form, exercised towards any object, best performs its 
function when not pressed to produce hastily (II.3.15) and when not directed 
towards such a narrow range of ends.  These conditions are more likely to be 
fulfilled in an individual or people with some experience with the non-
instrumental or philosophic exercise of reason.  Even though the instrumental 
use of reason is, by definition, not for wisdom for the sake of itself, the same 
conditions are required: a patient, meditative spirit and the freedom from having 
to produce right away.  Thus, restless, impatient American society thwarts 
instrumental reason just as much as it does philosophic reason (II.1.9, 429, II.1.10, 
438).  “The soul must remain great and strong, if only to be able from time to 
time to put its force and its greatness in the service of the body (II.2.16).” 
Americans are an admirably rational people when it comes to politics, but 
when it comes to the pursuit of the moral good and happiness, they are deeply 





confused.  Utilitarian reason is neither as rational, nor as useful, as it purports to 
be.119
Let’s sum up.  With respect to the distinction between America and 
democracy, America is at once more rational than democracy on its own and 
perfectly representative of democracy’s antipathy to reason.  Although both 
democracy and enlightenment are associated with the modern world, there is no 
natural connection between them.  Democracy as such does not lead to 
enlightenment, and “the Enlightenment” was but one of the many causes of the 
gradual rise of democracy.  Enlightenment is an extra-democratic factor which, 
in the case of the Americans, helps to support freedom, and to demonstrate that 
democracy is compatible with the rule of reason.  America also shows that 
democracy threatens reason.  Democracy means inquietude-restlessness, haste, 
constant motion.  The busy-ness of American life puts tremendous strain on 
reason to produce, which is bad for reason, and explains why so many 
purportedly “enlightened” Americans make so many stupid decisions.    
   
Perhaps the simplest thing to say about the disjunction between desire 
and capacity in America is that the Americans experience the classic paradox of 
progress, as criticized by Rousseau in the 1st and 2nd Discourses.  All their 
extravagant, intense, focused efforts at satisfying their desires only serve to 
                                                 
119 This relates to a debate between Spengler and Ortega y Gasset.  Spengler believes that technological 
development will be able to continue in the absence of a genuinely philosophical natural science that 
addresses fundamental philosophical problems but Ortega y Gasset disagrees (Ortega y Gasset 1957, 
Chapter Nine and Twelve). 





multiply and produce new ones rather than satisfy the ones they already have.120
As should be clear by now, “equality of conditions causes all” is a 
deceptively simple statement.  Not all of the tension within modern societies and 
individual souls is due to the conflict between democracy and aristocracy.  
Democracy gives rise to certain qualities that are difficult to reconcile with one 
  
Tocqueville knew Rousseau’s argument and drew from it in his understanding 
of modern progress.  However, there are two differences worth mentioning 
between Tocqueville and Rousseau.  First, Rousseau sees the connection between 
progress of the arts and sciences and moral corruption and misery as a kind of 
natural law of civilization.  Tocqueville is interested in the same sort of effects as 
Rousseau, but for him the fundamental cause is not the progress in the arts, 
sciences and commerce, but democracy.  Second, Tocqueville is for the progress 
of the arts and the sciences and worried that democracy won’t produce enough 
of it.  He is concerned that the connection between commercial progress and the 
progress of the arts and the sciences won’t be close enough.  Like Rousseau, 
Tocqueville is definitely concerned about democracy’s tendency to make men 
focused exclusively on material goods, and does think that it poses a real threat 
to political liberty.  But Tocqueville is more tolerant than Rousseau and more 
willing to make compromises.   
                                                 
120 See Mansfield and Winthrop 2000 on how art and nature conspire in America to increase desire without 
limit (lxvii), and on reading DA II.2.13 as a critique of modern political philosophy (xxxi). 





another.  Democracy sets the soul against itself, by giving us both the desire for 
freedom (II.4.1) and a desire for material well-being.  Democracy attacks the very 
qualities it needs to survive.121
The fundamental fact of the modern world is democracy.  The character of 
democracy is best apprehended in the example of America.  America shows us 
that democracy makes men restless.  It does by inclining them to the pursuit of 
material goods, by making it intense, and then by making it limitless.  This 
explains why restlessness is a uniquely modern condition. 
  Democratic political science must grapple with 
two types of tensions: those between qualities inherent to democracy and 
between democracy and extra-democratic factors.  Unlike Robert Dahl, John 
Dewey, and Al Smith, the solution for Tocqueville is never “more democracy.”  
There are good qualities natural to democracy, but these require art, care and 
freedom to be brought out.  This challenge defines the scope of human freedom 
in the democratic world and the task for “a new political science needed for a 
world altogether new.” 
   
II.1 The dark side of inquietude 
The discussion of “what is inquietude, and how does democracy cause 
it?” is now complete.  We proceed now to Tocqueville’s teaching on inquietude.  
As mentioned at the outset, like all traditional political scientists, Tocqueville is 
                                                 
121 Mansfield 1996b. 





concerned with the forms of political arrangement and what factors support and 
undermine them.  The preceding discussion has attempted to show the 
connection between inquietude and democracy.  Democracy produces 
inquietude, but does inquietude support or undermine democracy? 
Tocqueville is ambivalent about inquietude.  On the one hand, inquietude 
is associated with all the more undesirable aspects of American life, such as the 
unhappiness of the Americans and their lack of greatness.  On the other, 
inquietude seems to be connected with freedom, and therefore essential to 
preventing democracy’s drift towards despotism.  The following discussion will 
explain this ambivalence.  First we will go into Tocqueville’s criticism of 
inquietude, how it is part of his teaching on what to avoid in American 
democracy.  In Volume II of DA, Tocqueville spends a good deal of time 
detailing the unhappiness and mediocrity of the Americans.  Those who believe 
Tocqueville to be anti-democracy, and even anti-modern political philosophy, 
base their reading on these discussions.  Essentially what will be emphasized 
here is what is obvious to most readers of DA, that, despite the Americans’ 
immense strength, wealth and freedom, you wouldn’t necessarily want to be 
one.  After this, it will be argued that Tocqueville counsels tolerance of 
inquietude, due to its connection with freedom.  Tocqueville’s political teaching 
is primarily concerned with supporting freedom, and there turns out to be an 
important connection between inquietude and freedom.  We will conclude with 





some words on Tocqueville’s audience.  To whom does Tocqueville counsel 
tolerance for inquietude? 
 
II.2 Neither virtuous nor happy 
America never will be a nation envied for either its greatness or its 
happiness.  This Tocqueville makes clear in his most comprehensive statement 
on inquietude, II.2.13, “Why Americans are so restless [inquiets] amidst their 
well-being.”  In this chapter, “inquietude” and “misery” are virtually 
interchangeable terms.  Tocqueville claims that Americans are constantly 
tempted by suicide and would do it, too, were it not that their religion forbids it.  
The fact that unhappiness exists amidst conditions of remarkable material 
abundance is not new, he says.  What is new, is that a whole people would be so 
blessed and at the same time such utter strangers to the sweetness of life.  What 
accounts for this?  In this case, it seems to be more democratic than uniquely 
American factors that make the Americans unhappy.  Men are unhappy because 
their desires are limitless, because equality both expands desires and prevents 
their fulfillment (II.2.13, II.3.19).  Men are also unhappy because they neglect 
their natural spiritual needs in their endless quest for material well-being.  This is 
to say that the more democratic a people becomes, the unhappier it will become 
(unless, perhaps, it was absolutely wretched before democracy).  Not to be overly 





dramatic, but the situation is, in a sense, tragic:  “In the absolute monarchies that 
custom and mores temper, [men] often display an even and cheerful humor 
because, having some freedom and great enough security, they are diverted from 
the most important cares of life; but all free peoples are grave because their 
minds are habitually absorbed in the view of some dangerous or difficult object 
(II.3.15).”122
Americans are constitutionally incapable of savoring the fruits of their 
strenuous labors.  They are unhappy because they can’t live in the moment-to 
stop and enjoy what they have, before immediately moving on to the next thing.  
Democratic individuals display the opposite tendency of democratic 
governments, who often seem incapable of focusing on anything except the 
present or the short term (I.2.5, 212-4, I.2.7, 238-9, II.2.17, and II.3.19, 603).  The 
situation in aristocracy was opposite.  Aristocrats tended, as individuals, to drift 
in the present but, as collectives, they often proved themselves capable of very 
far-sighted policies.  Democratic individuals are chained to the foresight they 
lack collectively.   
  
This existence has been described, unfavorably, as the “joyless quest for 
joy,” but there is an argument for it, made, as we shall see in the next two 
                                                 
122 Presumably this would apply to aristocratic republics as well, although Tocqueville never applies the 
“all free peoples are grave” point to aristocracy.  Montesquieu seems to have come to a similar conclusion 
through his studies of the system of English liberty (see Spirit of the Laws XIV.13, XIX.27, Manent 1998, 
47, and Rahe 2009, Chapter Two).  In an effect very similar to Tocqueville’s description of democratic 
individualism, Englishmen are said to possess “espirit inquiet” as a result of being isolated from one 
another. 





chapters, by Locke.  Maybe it is better not to drift in the present, and to maintain 
awareness of the fact that pleasures are fleeting, and that they are not simply 
given but have conditions.  To resist this notion is to live in an illusion.  Weak, 
untutored human nature inclines us to think that just because the good times are 
here now, they will be here forever.  Yes, an anxious disposition does result in 
the production of new desires before the old have been fully satisfied, but more 
desires also means more industry and thus more increase and security.  Despite 
all the restlessness and misery of civilized life, who, given the option, sincerely 
would prefer to be a Lotus Eater or South Sea Islander?   
This is Locke’s view; it is not Tocqueville’s.  Tocqueville thinks that there 
is something stupid and transparently unattractive about the Americans’ 
inability to be happy.  In democracy, inquietude is inevitable, for the reasons 
covered in Part I, but there is no point in deceiving ourselves by making a virtue 
out of necessity.  All things being equal, it would be better to be happy.  
Tocqueville believes that the restless, inquiet American existence runs the gamut 
of all characteristically modern vices: misery, absurdity, dividedness, mediocrity, 
blandness and weakness (II.4.2-3, II.4.7).  Put in terms of Glaucon’s dilemma 
from Republic II, Americans are neither virtuous nor happy.123
                                                 
123 Tocqueville does remark several times on the “happiness” of America in Volume I (see I.1.5, 65, I.1.8, 
127, 154 and 160-1, I.2.6, 231, I.2.9, 272 and 279), but this may be accounted for by the fact that Volume I 
is more about politics and institutions, and II about individuals (II.2.14).  When one looks more carefully at 
the nouns to which “happy” is appended in all these passages from Volume I, they are usually political 
arrangements, customs or physical conditions.  In many of these cases, they could just as well be rendered 
  





II.3 Tolerably restless, or conservativism and the teaching of 
inquietude 
 
Two things are astonishing in the United States: the great mobility of most 
human actions and the singular fixity of certain principles.  Men move 
constantly, the human mind seems almost immobile. (II.3.21, 611) 
 
 
 But despite the manifestly unattractive qualities of inquietude, 
Tocqueville counsels people to learn to live with it.  Inquietude is at least the 
cause of other good things, even if it itself is not good.  This is its political 
significance, how it connects with Tocqueville’s overall political teaching.  Due to 
the fundamental changes that have shaped democratic society, only two forms of 
government are now possible: democracy or despotism.  Perhaps aristocracies 
could be free without being restless, but aristocracies are no more, nor for that 
matter are benign monarchies like under Henry IV (of France-Tocqueville’s 
example), due to the fact that there is no longer an aristocratic corps to prevent 
monarchy’s slide into despotism.124
                                                                                                                                                 
“blessed” or “fortunate.”   And of course, the fact that America is a fortunate place is by no means 
forgotten in Volume II-the central question of “Why the Americans show themselves so restive in the midst 
of their well-being” could be restated as “Why are the Americans so miserable amidst their immense good 
fortune?” 
  In light of this choice between despotic 
government or a restless existence, Tocqueville thinks men should accept 
inquietude. 
124 The existence of a functioning nobility is also what Montesquieu (Spirit of the Laws II.4) and Bacon 
(“Of Nobility”) say distinguishes monarchy and despotism.  





At the beginning of this chapter, brief mention was made of the 
importance of surfaces to Tocqueville and that inquietude could be described as 
the “form” of American life-its immediately striking look that suggests deeper 
truths about it.  This must now be qualified.  Tocqueville does draw a distinction 
between the superficial impression of American society and the deeper truth 
about it, because the impression some have of restless disorder is incorrect.  
Tocqueville wants to demonstrate to his readers that, despite the seemingly wild, 
uncontained look of inquiet American society, there exists an underlying 
regularity to it.   
Tocqueville addresses DA to all thoughtful Europeans concerned about 
their inevitably democratic future, but he addresses the inquietude teaching 
especially to conservatives, those distinguished by the high priority they place on 
peace and stability and their preference for traditional means of securing peace 
and stability.  Conservatives take one look at the wild restlessness of democratic 
society and see in it nothing but more Usurpers and Committees of Public Safety.  
According to Tocqueville, this interpretation is incorrect.  It is the unavoidable 
fate of modern democratic society to be restless, but this does not mean civil war 
and a seemingly endless cycle of regimes.  Tocqueville will walk these well-
meaning but confused conservatives through the American example to show 
them inquietude’s secret structure, its inner source of stability.  This is central to 
Tocqueville’s teaching proper on inquietude: in it, he teaches conservatives to be 





careful what they agitate for.  In many ways, Tocqueville shares their 
sympathies, but were their interpretation of inquietude to carry the day, some of 
the most catastrophic potentials of the democratic age would be realized.   
In his book The Restless Mind, the most impressive treatment of inquietude 
in Tocqueville, Peter Lawler argues that Tocqueville saw in the inquietude of the 
Americans the true source not only of democratic greatness, but greatness simply 
(Lawler 1993, 40, 109, 121, 138-9, and 168).  Inquietude is good in itself, according 
to Lawler’s Tocqueville-indeed, it is one of the highest human goods.  Lawler 
makes a great deal out of the influence of Pascal on Tocqueville’s thought, 
claiming that Tocqueville not only agrees with Pascal about the content of the 
good, but believes that Americans do as well, even if, as goes without saying, 
they have not read him.  Americans are an unusually deep, spiritual people, with 
an instinctive sense for the fallenness of our nature and wariness towards any 
quick fixes for contentment such as administrative despotism.  Americans insist 
on their freedom, even though they are aware that they thereby diminish their 
chances for happiness.  Americans willingly trade happiness for political 
freedom and psychological depth.125
                                                 
125 Incidentally, Lawler actually believes this.  In his other works he has applied this thesis about the 
connections between restlessness, greatness and freedom to American politics more generally, and other 
sorts of quick fixes than soft despotism, such as medical technology.  Modern democracy is besieged on a 
number of sides by offers of numerous quick fixes for many varieties of restlessness.  But the application of 
Pascal filtered through Tocqueville can help us understand why we should resist these, and affirm the 
strength of free, inquiet American democracy (see Lawler 2002). 
   





Despite what anyone must admit is a fresh, most original approach (we 
should look to Pascal to restore the moral foundations of liberalism?), Lawler’s 
book has a number of difficulties.  To begin with, the influence of Pascal on 
Tocqueville is well-documented and many commentators stress it, but Lawler 
takes things too far.  Lawler does not sufficiently appreciate the aspects of 
Tocqueville’s thought and action which are in direct contradiction with Pascal, 
most of all his own personal very non-Pascalian attachment to pride, worldly 
recognition, and deep, sincere sympathy for aristocratic morality.126
                                                 
126 Mansfield and Winthrop 2000 point this out as a criticism of Lawler.  Other mistakes Lawler makes in 
giving insufficient attention to aristocracy include collapsing aristocracy and democracy’s differing 
understanding of rights (Lawler 1993, 135), arguing that Tocqueville advocates a kind of Aristotelian 
“mixing” of aristocracy and democracy’s better features (Ibid. 132-3, 138-9), an overly critical view of the 
morality of obedience in pre-democratic times (Ibid. 37) and, more generally, the importance of (non-
natural) inequality as a condition of greatness and the importance of justice to Tocqueville.  In general, 
scholars who play up the Pascalian influence on Tocqueville do so at the expense of the aristocratic one, 
which is in fact more basic for him.  In addition to Lawler, 
  
Tocqueville’s involvement in politics at a high level, his tremendous ambition, 
his appreciation of aristocracy, all point to a vast difference in spirit between his 
own thought and Pascal’s.  Pascal is an extremely reductionist thinker-he shares 
this with Enlightenment atheism.  Tocqueville’s liberalism stands out in contrast 
to Locke’s and others in its lack of reductionism, and aptness to appreciate the 
high as high. 
see McLendon 2006 and even Rahe 2009, to 
some extent.  Manent 1996 (esp. Chapter Six, 68-9) alone seems to maintain the just proportion between 
the aristocratic and Pascalian elements in Tocqueville’s thought.   





Second, Lawler does not give enough weight to American greed, and how 
truly, utterly disgusted with them Tocqueville sometimes is.127
The argument here, in contrast to Lawler, is that Tocqueville does affirm 
inquietude, but not because of its status as a good in itself.  The restlessness 
experienced by Pascal, by Augustine, expressed in Palestrina’s Sicut Cervus, is 
not the same thing as the restlessness of the American tea merchant.  Yes, both 
are intensely individualistic conditions.  But souls in the first condition cannot 
find the rest they seek among spiritual things, whereas those in the second find 
  Why wouldn’t it 
be better to be virtuous and happy instead of mediocre and miserable?  Fair 
enough, soft administrative despotism would be an ignominious end for modern 
democracy, but what about being a red Indian or an aristocrat?  If Tocqueville 
were confronted with Locke’s famous choice between being a day laborer in 
England or an Indian chief in America, would he not almost surely prefer to be 
the latter?  Third, Tocqueville does think there is some sense in which Americans 
have traded happiness for freedom (“all free peoples are grave”), but not for 
depth.  Tocqueville is not impressed by Americans’ depth of soul.  As discussed 
above, Tocqueville does describe the Americans as serious, not frivolous, but this 
has to do with their seriousness regarding commerce and material goods.   
                                                 
127 For a vivid account of Tocqueville’s disgust with the Americans, see Winthrop 1986. 





no rest among material things.128
 
  There is no evidence that Tocqueville thought 
democrats were spiritually deeper, or somehow closer to God than aristocrats. 
Yes, democrats do manifest a restlessness of spirit with respect to other facets of 
life-art, manners, religion, but it is rooted in their restlessness towards commerce 
and the pursuit of material well-being.   
II.4 Inquietude and political freedom 
First a few remarks on the status of freedom for Tocqueville.  Tocqueville 
is obsessed with political freedom, both in terms of its precariousness in 
democratic times, and its importance as a good simply.  Much of DA consists of 
warning men about the danger of despotism and its strong appeal in democratic 
times.  Why is despotism uniquely appealing in democratic times?  First, modern 
democratic society lacks the natural barriers against despotism which existed in 
aristocratic times.  Such barriers must be constructed, by art and with much 
effort.  Second, although democrats do desire freedom, the desires for material 
well-being and equality are much stronger, and they could easily conceive that 
despotism is the best way to satisfy these desires.  Democracy makes men greedy 
and envious and satisfying these passions sometimes seems to come easier to a 
                                                 
128 More precisely, Augustine argues that restlessness is the result of original sin and our fallenness 
(Confessions 1.1; see also Montaigne “On Vanity” and Rahe 2009, 40).   





dole-dispensing administrative Leviathan than it does to a democratic republic 
(II.2.14, II.4.4-5).   
When discussing Tocqueville on the threat of despotism and the perilous 
state of freedom in democratic times, it often sounds as if Tocqueville’s political 
science takes its bearings only by what to avoid, not by any positive good in 
mind.  Is political freedom a genuine moral end or merely the absence of evil 
(despotism)? The two chief moral goods for Tocqueville, as discussed in the 
Introduction, are justice and greatness.  Political freedom is a necessary condition 
for achieving either of these goods.  Neither democratic justice or aristocratic 
greatness could exist without freedom.  In a despotism, there is neither justice 
nor greatness.   
Political freedom may be said to be the end of Tocqueville’s political 
science, but only in a qualified way.  “Freedom” is an inherently derivative and 
partisan concept.129  Freedom can never be a true end because it always owes its 
meaning to some prior, more fundamental political principle.  Hence why 
aristocracy and democracy define “freedom” in such different ways.  Aristocracy 
understands freedom as “privilege.”130
                                                 
129 “Freedom has manifested itself to men in different times and in different forms; it is not attached 
exclusively to one social state, and one encounters it elsewhere than in democracies.  It therefore cannot 
form the distinctive characteristic of democratic centuries (II.2.1, 480).”  “No word has received more 
different significations and has struck minds in so many ways as has liberty (Spirit of the Laws XI.2).”  On 
the ambiguity of “freedom” in Tocqueville, see Aron 1970, Chapter 1.  
  Aristocratic freedom is something that 
could only be possessed by a few, and moreover could only exist at the expense 
130 See Ceaser 1990, 13. 





of the many’s lack of freedom (or even outright servitude).  Anything else is not 
true freedom, for it would not support greatness, which can of course only be the 
preserve of a select few.  Freedom is defined in relation to greatness, the 
aristocratic good.   
Democrats understand freedom as the possession and exercise of 
universal natural human rights.  Democracy’s freedom is possessed, in principle, 
by all.  Democrats view aristocratic freedom as false because founded in injustice 
and arbitrariness (II.4.7, 667).  Aristocrats view democratic freedom as abstract, 
fabricated and so watered-down as to be meaningless.  “The aristocratic notion 
of liberty (liberty as privilege) appears among those who have inherited an 
elevated sentiment of their individual value, an impassioned taste for 
independence.  It gives to egoism an energy and a singular power.  Experienced 
by individuals, it has often brought men to the most extraordinary acts” (“The 
Social and Political State of France Before and After 1789”131
Tocqueville also discusses the difference between the aristocratic and 
democratic understandings of freedom in OR I.2.11 (see Furet and Melanio 1998, 
36).  Both conceptions are derivative in that they are each premised on a certain 
understanding of human social and political life.  Those who cherish aristocratic 
liberty begin with the belief that inequality and dependence are inevitable.  There 
). 
                                                 
131 The source for much of this distinction between aristocratic and democratic liberty in Tocqueville is 
found not in DA but in this article he published slightly before DA Volume I, which is quoted at length in 
Manent 1996, 18-9.  See also Aron 1970, Chapter One. 





must always be ruled and rulers, master and servants, those who command and 
those who obey.  Consequently, “freedom” can only legitimately be possessed by 
those at the top if it is to be something not only good and desirable (all 
definitions of freedom, like all definitions of justice,132
Tocqueville does not come out in favor of either definition of freedom, any 
more than he does aristocracy or democracy.  Democratic freedom places more 
importance on nature and justice, and the aristocratic conception of freedom 
places more emphasis on pride.  Both can degenerate into corrupted versions of 
themselves when they become purely civil, and stripped of all political content.  
Aristocratic freedom/privilege becomes “a title to be separated from one’s fellow 
citizens” (Furet and Melonio 1998, 7, 33 and 36).  Democratic freedom becomes 
an abstract commitment to the possession of natural rights.  True freedom, for 
Tocqueville, must somehow transcend this division between aristocracy and 
democracy: in all times and places, it must be something active and exercised. 
 imply that it is something 
good) but meaningful.  Democrats, on the other hand, reject the inevitability of 
inequality.  Societies may tend to arrange themselves in terms of ruled and ruler, 
but if we scrutinize these particular arrangements and apply the standard of 
nature to them, they will surely appear at least partly illegitimate.  All forms of 
authority are unnatural according to democrats.  Thus, “freedom,” in order to be 
just and in accord with nature, must apply to all men.   
                                                 
132 Stauffer 2001. 





In sum, the attachment to freedom, according to both Locke and 
Tocqueville, always proves to be derivative of an attachment to something else, 
such as justice, power, pride, self-interest or greatness.   
Tocqueville is intensely focused on securing freedom both because it is 
integral to his conception of greatness and because of the threat of despotism in 
modern times.  The threat of despotism is so great, that simply to ward it off, to 
achieve the success that the Americans have, is in itself a signal achievement.  
This is so even if, as in the case of the Americans, greatness itself is not achieved.  
So although not ultimately adequate, it’s not misleading to say that the practical 
intention of Tocqueville’s political science is to teach men how to avoid the 
political evil of despotism.  
These two motivations for Tocqueville’s advocacy of freedom-avoiding 
despotism and promoting greatness-overlap in large measure.  The passionate 
urgency that characterizes Tocqueville’s discussions of the threat of democratic 
soft despotism at the end of DA II.4 can only be accounted for by the threat that 
he thinks it poses to human greatness.  However unjust soft despotism may be, 
this is clearly not what raises Tocqueville’s dudgeon.133
                                                 
133 “Democratic societies that are not free can be wealthy, refined, even splendid, powerful because of the 
weight of their homogeneous mass; one can find there private virtues, good family men, honest merchants, 
and very worthy squires; one will even see some good Christians, for their country is not of this earth and 
the glory of their religion is to bring them forth amidst the greatest corruption of mores and under the worst 
governments: the Roman Empire in its greatest decadence was full of good Christians.  But what will never 
exist in such societies are great citizens, and above all a great people, and I am willing to state that the 
  The close connection 





Tocqueville discerns between liberty and greatness causes him to both denounce 
soft despotism and praise the French Revolution (in its initial phase) (OR I.3.2, 
208; III.8, 244). 
For Tocqueville, liberty is dependent on greatness and greatness is 
dependent on liberty (OR I.3.8, 244).  Recognizing this close connection between 
these two themes also helps to understand what he means by them.  First of all, 
enlightened self-interest could never be enough for Tocqueville, certainly not in 
terms of an assurance of the perpetuation of free government, nor as satisfying to 
an individual.  Self-interest well understood cannot satisfy the natural desire for 
freedom, to participate in self-government, nor an individual’s desire for 
greatness (OR I.3.3, 217).  Love of freedom is an important sign of greatness, and 
indifference to freedom mediocrity. 
The close connection between liberty and greatness in Tocqueville’s 
thought explains his fairly critical view of Napoleon.134
                                                                                                                                                 
average level of hearts and minds will never cease to decline as long as equality and despotism are 
combined (OR, “Preface”).”   
  Tocqueville, unlike 
Burke, does think that there was some greatness and beauty in the initial stages 
of the French Revolution, but he does not think that there was anything ever 
redeemable about Napoleon.  For someone so anxious about the leveling, 
mediocritizing spirit of modern democracy, this is surprising.  Many, many 
others in the 19th century saw Napoleon as a rare exception to the lack of 
134 See OR II, 27 and 239, Herrold 1958, 214, and Mansfield and Winthrop 2000, xxiv. 





greatness in modern times, but not Tocqueville, because for him, greatness 
without liberty is as empty as liberty without greatness. 
This is not the place to scrutinize Tocqueville’s concept of greatness in 
depth, but his fastidiousness regarding Napoleon (“as great as a man can be who 
lacks the least shred of virtue,” “more extraordinary than great”) does raise 
questions about whether or not his understanding of greatness holds up.  If 
Napoleon doesn’t count as great in the truest sense of the term, who does?  John 
Winthrop?  Tocqueville’s elevation of greatness distinguishes him from early 
modern enlightenment philosophy generally speaking, but when he subjects 
greatness to liberty in such a severe manner, his method is somewhat 
reminiscent of the blunter, doctrinaire elements of the enlightenment.  Many 
philosophers throughout history have been criticized for their endorsement of 
unfree government, either in their thought or their actions.  But a passionate, 
even noble commitment to free government may also produces biases that are 
incompatible with philosophy and clear-mindedness. 
Tocqueville thinks that it is possible to transcend the debate between 
aristocrats and democrats about the true meaning of freedom.  The appeal of 
both greatness and liberty is transcendent (this is further evidence of 
Tocqueville’s non-historicism).  Whether a society is structured around 
inequality or equality is less important than whether or not its citizens have some 
share in rule.  Yes, aristocrats and democrats define liberty differently, but 





neither can claim to define liberty in a truly meaningful way without it meaning 
free government: republicanism, either in a democratic or aristocratic form, self-
government, participation in rule.  Only liberty in this form can truly be 
experienced and exercised.135
To come then, to the main argument, what’s the link between inquietude 
and freedom?  It is somewhat paradoxical.  Inquietude is both the cause of the 
problem and the problem’s solution.  At the core of inquietude is the limitless 
desire for material well-being caused by democracy.  This and the limitless 
passion for equality are responsible for much of the appeal of despotism in 
democratic times.  The desire for material well-being is so great that we should 
expect that men will occasionally be willing to give up their freedom in hopes of 
satisfying it.  Men will trade freedom for relief.  But this also means that so long 
as men remain restless, so long as they can tolerate restlessness, they will have 
avoided the siren song of soft despotism.  Possessing a restless soul and 
knowingly tolerating it is therefore a sign of freedom’s persistence, a way of 
knowing they are yet free (I.2.6, 231-5, I.2.10, 388).  Perhaps this sounds strange, 
to say that men need signs informing them of whether or not they are still free.  
But isn’t it true that despotism usually emerges stealthily, without openly 
  This is the freedom that Tocqueville says we have 
a natural desire for and that is for him inextricably connected with greatness.   
                                                 
135 Compare Constant’s definition of ancient liberty: “active and constant participation in collective power” 
(or “sharing of social power among the citizens of the same fatherland”).  The point of Constant’s essay is 
that this form of liberty is simply impossible in modern times.  Tocqueville, contrarily, seems reluctant to 
give it up. 





announcing itself by name or true intention (II.2.14, 2T 208-9, 223, and 230)?  This 
is an even greater threat for soft despotism than hard.   
Thus, inquietude, restlessness of soul, may be understood in the same 
class as free associations, religion, self interest well-understood, as ways to 
prevent despotism in democratic times.  Tocqueville does not believe that men 
should be made more restless than the Americans, but modern democracy 
requires a healthy tolerance for restlessness of soul.  In democratic times, as long 
as there is inquietude, there will be freedom (I.2.9, 285), which may mean 
unhappiness, absurdity and mediocrity, but it will not mean servitude.  
Tocqueville does not embrace inquietude for the sake of itself but for its effects.  
As argued in the previous section, Tocqueville’s position is that it would, all 
other things being equal, be better to be happy (contrast Lawler 1993, 27, 31, and 
40).  But since they cannot, and there must be a quid pro quo, it’s better to be free, 
unhappy and mediocre than unfree, content (in the short term) and mediocre. 
Who needs to hear this?  To whom is this teaching directed?  Perhaps 
democrats, like all men, are always in need of straight talk (DA II “Notice”), but 
Tocqueville does not address this argument about the link between inquietude 
and freedom to democrats.  He addresses it to conservatives.136
                                                 
136 Mansfield and Winthrop 2000, liii. 
  The 
conservatives Tocqueville is addressing are aristocratic partisans who nourish a 
futile yearning for the past out of both an appreciation for the virtues of 





aristocracy, which Tocqueville shares, and a rejection of democracy, which 
Tocqueville believes is delusional.  In the conservative understanding, 
democracy begets freedom and freedom begets disorder, violence and 
revolution.  Of course, given their experience of the democratic revolution in 
France, this is understandable.  Over the course of the fifty years prior to the 
publication of DA, France had endured one protracted and bloody revolution, a 
World War of twenty years duration, and then yet another revolution.  At the 
time of the publication of DA, neither Tocqueville nor his conservative audience 
saw a settlement on the horizon (a judgment confirmed by the 1848 revolution).  
France, when Tocqueville is writing, is a mess, and because it has consented to 
democracy, according to Tocqueville’s conservative audience.137
Tocqueville often insists that he is above partisanship, but he clearly has 
much sympathy with the conservatives, arguably more than with the 
progressives.  He even seems to let their nostalgia for the ancien régime rest 
undisturbed, in the sense that aristocracy comes off looking better than 
democracy in DA.  Tocqueville does not give aristocracy the “warts and all” 
 
                                                 
137 The Revolution of 1848 and the accession of Louis Napoleon tragically confirmed, in Tocqueville’s 
mind, the tendency of France to democratic tyranny.  Although he was prescient about Louis Napoloen’s 
intentions, like so many other things, it should be mentioned that, after the war with Prussia and the Paris 
Commune, with the establishment of the Third Republic, France did settle into something like a free liberal 
democracy which lasted (by French standards) for quite a long time, until WWII.  Although democratic 
despotism ended up being the fate of other nations throughout the 20th century, France did eventually break 
from the Revolution’s cycle of tyranny and democracy.  





treatment that he gives democracy, and possibly out of a desire to appeal directly 
to conservatives.   
How does Tocqueville expect to win over conservatives with all this 
emphasis on the inherent restlessness of modern democracy?  Inquietude should 
be understood as the outlier case in Tocqueville’s general argument towards 
conservatives.  If he can reconcile conservatives to inquietude, then he can 
reconcile them to anything about democracy.  The first truth that conservatives 
must accept in order to reconcile themselves to the modern democratic world is 
that aristocracy really is over (DA “Introduction,” II “Notice,” and II.4.7, 666).  
Aristocrats underestimate the real force of democracy.  Or they misinterpret it as 
only capable of abrupt, violent paroxysms which eventually pass, instead of 
something with deep roots and real staying power.  The latter is of course 
Tocqueville’s view.  The second truth is that the inquietude of the Americans, at 
least, contains an inner resource of order, peace and stability.138
Because men in democracies always appear excited, uncertain, breathless, 
ready to change will and place, one fancies that they are suddenly going 
to abolish their laws, to adopt new beliefs, and to take up new mores.  One 
does not consider that if equality brings men to change, it suggests 
  We discussed 
this earlier with respect to luxury, domestic life and religion.  In “Why great 
revolutions will become rare” (II.3.21), Tocqueville applies this idea of the 
coexistence of restlessness and orderliness to politics:  
                                                 
138 The “very violence of their [materialistic] desires…troubles their souls, but it arranges their lives 
(II.3.17).”   





interests and tastes to them that need stability to be satisfied; it pushes 
them and at the same time it stops them, it spurs them and attaches them 
to the earth; it inflames their desires and limits their strength. (II.3.21, 616; 
see also 607-8, 610) 
 
The difference between aristocracy and democracy is not order vs. 
disorder (as aristocratic partisans would have it) or oppression vs. liberty (as 
democratic partisans would have it) but order vs. order.139
First, as discussed earlier, inquietude does not characterize all elements of 
human life.  Moral life in America is remarkably stable.  We have, for example, 
Tocqueville’s discussion of the American family, in which he is probably the 
most unqualified in his praise of democracy.  In the case of the family, democrats 
live in accord with nature, and it’s lovely.  The American family, which 
Tocqueville calls “the natural family,” is perfectly orderly, moral and happy.  
The family plays a crucial role in educating civic virtue, and is also appealing in 
itself, thereby giving Americans a direct material stake in the orderliness of 
  Inquietude teaches 
conservatives to qualify their insistence on order, or to teach them that they are 
mistaken to see no order in democracy.  America is not France and inquietude is 
not the Reign of Terror.  In other words, America can and should be understood 
as a conservative country.  How does inquietude reveal the nature of a new, 
democratic conservativism? 
                                                 
139 “Contrary to the thinking of many of Tocqueville’s contemporaries who belong to an aristocratic milieu, 
democracy is not simply disorder that leads to the dissolution of any healthy social life; it is, rather, the 
comprehensive principle of a new society (Manent 1996, xviii).”   





society more generally.  Even aristocrats concede the greater attractiveness of the 
democratic family (II.3.8).140
 The two elements of American life which are most distinctly restless are 
commerce and politics.  It is not clear that Tocqueville’s conservative audience is 
deeply opposed to commerce, if at all.  Officially speaking, of course, aristocratic 
morality often did look down on moneymaking/working for profit (II.2.10, 507, 
II.2.17, 525, endnote XIX (699)), but there was always much hypocrisy to this 
attitude.  It’s very complicated, the relation between aristocratic morality and 
commerce, and this is not the place to go into it in detail.
 “It is in the family that democracy pleads its case 
most eloquently, that it reveals its happy conformity with the nature of man 
(Manent 1996, 83).”  Tocqueville’s account of democracy’s triumph over 
aristocracy in domestic matters is the account of harsh convention losing out to 
sweet natural goodness.   
141
                                                 
140 See also Tocqueville’s praise of American gregariousness in II.3.2 “How democracy renders the 
habitual relations of the Americans simpler and easier” and his discussion of American manners (II 3 14) 
for other places in which he praises American private life. 
  The point for now is 
simply that, according to Tocqueville, conservative aristocrats must rid 
themselves of any hang-ups they might have about commerce and money-
making, and accept commercial restlessness, just like equality of conditions, as a 
fait accompli.  Democrats will be more commercially-oriented than aristocrats, and 
141 For an entertaining discussion of this question, see Nancy Mitford’s Noblesse Oblige (1956).  Mitford 
argues that, although the British aristocracy always held that “effort is unrelated to money,” they always 
allowed themselves the freedom to engage in commerce if they felt like it because they allowed themselves 
the freedom to do anyone that they felt like.  Shame is a bourgeois virtue: aristocrats have an easier time 
being hypocritical and breaking with conventional opinion than democrats. 





commerce means busy-ness.  The American example proves that commercial 
restlessness does not violate conservative principles of order, not only because it 
is compatible with political orderliness, but because it causes it.  As Tocqueville 
argues in II.2.14 “How the taste for material enjoyments among Americans is 
united with love of freedom and with care for public affairs,” Americans 
understand that they need political order and freedom in order to satisfy their 
passion for material well-being.  They understand that administrative despotism 
is but a short-term fix and that the example of history proves that, in the long 
term, freedom is much more conducive to commercial prosperity than servitude.  
This line of thinking involves a denigration of politics below economics, seeing it 
as a means to an end, but in democratic times, we must take what we can get, 
and do all that can be done to fight despotism.142
American politics only looks chaotic.  This is a general truth about 
American democracy: underneath the surface of direct, active participation, 
constant electioneering, the idiotic, incessant chattering of the media and civic 
associations, there exists a core orderliness.  “This political existence impresses 
on society a continual, but at the same time peaceful, movement that agitates it 
without troubling it” (I.1.5, 65; see also I.1.8, 127 and 154, I.2.10, 382, and II.3.17).  
The elections, newspapers and civic associations tame restless democratic 
 
                                                 
142 As further evidence for the link between inquietude and freedom, it should be mentioned that II.2.14 
follows immediately after II.2.13, the most arresting and sustained treatment of inquietude in DA. 





energy-they contain it, channel it and allow its expense in a harmless manner.  
Understood in this way, the restlessness of American politics is better 
understood not as the surface impression belied by the underlying orderliness, 
but as the very cause of that underlying order.143
The real importance of this truth about the nexus of inquietude and order 
is seen when it is applied to the case of revolution.  Tocqueville’s audience bases 
much of their opposition to democracy and the restlessness it produces on its 
tendency towards revolution.  Tocqueville is sympathetic: “The same causes that 
render citizens independent of one another push them every day toward new 
and restive desires and spur them constantly.  It therefore seems natural to 
believe that in a democratic society, ideas, things and men must change forms 
  Tocqueville’s arguments for the 
importance of freedom of the press and the absence of great parties also may be 
understood along these lines.  “Now in America, political life is active, varied, 
even agitated, but it is rarely troubled by profound passions (I.2.3, 175).”  
Precisely because there is so much agitation, there are no great parties, which is a 
good thing because great parties resist compromise and easily become impatient 
with parliamentary procedure.  The notorious stubbornness of the Federalists, 
the only great party America has ever known, is a perfect illustration of this 
point (I.2.2, 168-9).  
                                                 
143 “In Europe, [Tocqueville] was well aware, it was customary to regard ‘uneasiness of mind [inquietude 
de l’espirit], the immoderate desire for wealth, the extreme love of independence’ as ‘a great social 
danger.’  But in America, he was convinced, the passions inquietes evoked by the opportunities afforded by 
an empty continent were, in fact, favorable to orderly government (Rahe 2009, 179-80).”  





and places eternally and that democratic centuries will be times of rapid and 
incessant transformations (II.3.21, 607).”  But for the same reason, Tocqueville 
believes they should take heed of America, which is at the same time one of the 
most restless nations ever and the one least inclined towards revolution.  
This is a democratic quality, not just an American one.  Tocqueville argues 
at length in “Why great revolutions will become rare (II.3.21),” that democracy in 
the long term turns men away from revolution.  There are two main reasons-the 
predominance of the propertied middle class and the intellectual conservativism 
of democracy.  The main cause of revolutions in the past has been conflict 
between the separate races of the rich and poor, but in democratic times there 
exists “an innumerable multitude of almost similar men who, without being 
precisely either rich or poor, possess enough goods to desire order and do not 
have enough of them to excite envy (Ibid., 607).”  As discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter, the rise of democracy is the rise of the size and influence of the 
middle class.  Not only will most of the inhabitants of a democracy own 
property, they will possess a uniquely strong attachment to their property, one 
“more fierce and tenacious” than the rich or the poor, or rather than the rich and 
the poor before they, too, acquired middle class mores.  As Aristotle, too, 
believes, the greater the size and influence of the propertied middling class, the 
less likely a nation or polis is to suffer revolution, and revolution is, almost 
always, a great evil in politics.  The greatness of the American achievement 





largely consists of establishing a free, orderly political arrangement in whose 
perpetuation the great majority of people feel like they have a stake. 
Generally speaking, democracy inclines men towards commerce and 
commercial peoples are not revolutionary.144
The second element of democracy which both strongly resists revolution 
and where we see the powerfully conservative effect of inquietude, is its 
intellectual conservativism.  In democracy, men and material goods are in 
constant flux but ideas do not move.  “Two things are astonishing in the United 
States: the great mobility of most human actions and the singular fixity of certain 
principles.  Men move constantly, the human mind seems almost 
immobile…One encounters, in fact, few idle men in democratic nations.  Life 
  To look at it, a commercial society 
seems disposed to revolution because it is so bustling, mobile and restless.  On the 
one hand, change for a commercial people is a constant.  On the other, a truly 
shrewd, commercially-minded people well understands the dangers that 
revolution poses toward increase.  More than just being reconcilable with order 
and stability, inquietude, the intense, limitless pursuit of well being is the cause 
of stability.  Commercial democratic peoples “love change, but they dread 
revolutions (II.3.21, 610).”   
                                                 
144 “…the growing love of well-being and the mobile nature of property make democratic peoples dread 
material disorder.  Love of public tranquility is often the sole political passion that these peoples preserve, 
and it becomes more active and powerful in them as all the others are weakened and die; this naturally 
disposes citizens constantly to give the central power new rights, or to allow it to take them; it alone seems 
to them to have the interest and the means to defend them from anarchy by defending itself (II.4.3).” 





goes on in the midst of motion and noise, and men are so busy acting that little 
time remains to them for thinking….They are perpetually in action, and each of 
their actions absorbs their soul; the fire they put into affairs prevents them from 
being inflamed by ideas (Ibid., 611-4).”  The conditions in democracy for 
intellectual revolution are poor.  Tocqueville claims that the Protestant 
Reformation was only possible in an aristocratic social state.145  Had Martin 
Luther to contend with the tyranny of the majority, his cause would have never 
prevailed (Ibid., 613).  Persuading a few at the top will always be easier than 
persuading the many.146  But the tyranny of public opinion is only one cause of 
the immobility of intellectual life in democracies.  Another is the mobility of life, 
inquietude itself.  The example of America shows that busy men are not curious 
(Ibid., 614).  The democratic mind “oscillates within itself and does not move 
(Ibid., 613).”147
Tocqueville does not view this lack of any revolutionary spirit with 
unqualified gladness (Ibid., 609).  Taken to an extreme, this attitude could be 
extremely dangerous, since citizens who desire to remain free must retain a taste 
for some sort of “public agitation.”  And, of course, the lack of revolutionary 
 
                                                 
145  “An aristocracy in its vigor not only runs affairs, it still directs opinion, sets the tone for writers, and 
lends authority to ideas (OR I.3.1, 198).”   
146 Compare Tocqueville’s account of the differences between the intellectual revolutions of the sixteenth 
and eighteenth centuries in OR I.3.5, 230. 
147 It is with respect to intellectual inquietude that Tocqueville says “Great revolutions are no more 
common in democratic peoples than in other peoples; I am even brought to believe that they are less so.  
But a slight, bothersome movement reigns within these nations, a sort of incessant rotation of men over one 
another that troubles and distracts the mind without ever animating or elevating it (II.1.10, 435).” 





ardor contributes significantly to the lack of greatness in democratic times.  
Tocqueville is not willing to give up on greatness or spiritual life in democracy, 
although he believes its prospects are dimmer.  Maybe there is some way to curb 
the intensity of the pursuit of material well-being, direct more energies to more 
spiritual pursuits, while still maintaining the benefits which restlessness brings 
in keeping men free.   
 Americans are strong and free when viewed collectively, and weak (II.4.3) 
and unhappy (II.2.13) when viewed individually.  It is the individual soul who 
desires freedom who must live this inescapable tension.  America is the first and 
only great republic (in all prior history, only small communities have proved 
capable of freedom), but greatness in the sense of individual virtue, excellence, is 
difficult to find in America.  A main source of Tocqueville’s fascination with the 
New World is how it seems to have found an answer to difficulties which prior 
to its example were believed irresolvable.  In America, material self-
interestedness serves as the basis for social unity and even compassion, instead 
of social fragmentation.  And to the extent that America has managed to be both 
great and free, its achievement is impressive.  But Tocqueville is not only in the 
business of solving problems; in some cases he wants simply to reveal and 
analyze them.  The tension between democratic freedom and happiness is real 
and, apparently, irresolvable.  “All free peoples are grave.”   









We now leave Tocqueville for Locke, and a different account of 
restlessness and its connection to liberalism.  It is different in two major ways: 
Locke argues that restlessness is not a historical condition, but one natural to all 
men, and Locke is on the whole more sympathetic to restlessness than 
Tocqueville.  As with Tocqueville, there is both an “is” and an “ought” side to 
Locke’s teaching on restlessness.  At a fundamental level, we cannot help our 
restless condition, but, understood properly, it does point the way to a more 
choiceworthy way of life, which we can do something about.  This chapter will 
treat the “is” side, and as well as provide some transition towards the “ought.”  
The next chapter will flesh out in greater detail what Locke’s restless “ought” 
looks like. 
ECHU II.21, “Power,” contains the entirety of Locke’s teaching on 
uneasiness.  Rarely does he even use the word elsewhere in ECHU, or in the rest 
of his corpus, and never with the thematic significance it possesses in II.21.  II.21 
is a powerhouse-it is the longest chapter in the ECHU and easily the densest in 
terms of sheer number of themes treated in close proximity.  In it, Locke 





discusses cause and effect, the relation between good and evil and pleasure and 
pain, the difference between desire and volition, the afterlife, happiness, 
judgment, and, most of all, human liberty.  In the same chapter where Locke 
gives a searching epistemological analysis of the concept “liberty,” he presents 
his uneasiness doctrine.  In II.21, “Power,” Locke argues that, upon close 
examination, the desire for freedom is the desire for relief from uneasiness, 
which is also the desire for power. 
The title “Power” refers to Locke’s intent to show how we come by the 
idea “power.”  In this capacity, II.21 fits in seamlessly with Book II as a whole.  In 
Book II, Locke executes the central task of the ECHU-to demonstrate the natural 
history of our ideas.  Book II contains Locke’s famous argument that all our ideas 
come from experience.  The other three books either prepare the way for II or 
draw consequences from it.  Book I refutes the opposing thesis, that some of our 
ideas are innate, and not acquired through experience.  Book III examines 
language, how we signify our ideas in words, rightly and wrongly, and Book IV 
treats knowledge-if all our ideas are grounded in experience, what can we know, 
and in what forms and to what degree of certainty?    
So within the context of Book II and the ECHU as a whole, this is what 
II.21 proposes to give an account of the origin of the idea of power.  However, it 
turns out that Locke devotes very little of II.21 to “power” proper.  At roughly 
paragraph 6, human liberty becomes his main concern, and remains so for the 





subsequent 66 paragraphs.  “Liberty,” we learn retrospectively, would have been 
a more obvious (although perhaps not as revealing) title for II.21.148  Locke never 
formally announces it, but the main aim of II.21 turns out to be to give an 
account of human liberty, of its true character and limits.  More precisely, Locke 
believes he can derive a concept of “liberty” which satisfies both the demands of 
morality and science.  It is possible to reconcile our subjective experience of being 
free and the demands of moral responsibility with our rational understanding of 
ourselves as distinct beings with natures and identities.149
Locke believes that men often aim too high in their attempts at justifying 
liberty.  They fight determinism too doggedly, and as a result, the “liberty” they 
end up with is simply incredible.  So instead of arguing that we are not 
determined in the ways often assumed, Locke argues, first, that we are even more 
determined than people think, but second, that “liberty” can accommodate a fair 
amount of determination.  In fact, it must: “liberty” must be able to be reconciled 




                                                 
148 Near the end of the chapter, Locke refers offhandedly to the preceding as “this enquiry into human 
liberty (II.21.71).”  Leibniz, in his commentary on the ECHU, New Essays on Human Understanding, titles 
II.21 “Of Power and Freedom.”   
  It cannot be the case that only seizures and 
muscle spasms are truly free actions.  “Liberty” cannot violate the law of 
149 “Morality and Mechanism…are not very easy to be reconciled, or made consistent (I.3.14).”  “If the 
agent’s choice of reasons is ultimately determined, then he cannot be responsible for his actions.  If, on the 
other hand, his choice is not determined, then it is unmotivated and arbitrary.  If this is the case, however, 
responsibility will not make much sense either, for the agent is not ‘rational’” (Rapaczynski, quoted in 
Myers 1998, 140). 
150 Hume says it can’t be (see Treatise on Human Nature Part III.1-3). 





sufficient reason.  As a result, Locke gives to us in II.21 a “strange doctrine” of 
liberty.  Most strangely, it denies free will.  But, in his view, he must do this, in 
order to avoid an even stranger doctrine of liberty which attributes liberty to a 
faculty (will), not a person, and is indistinguishable from “whim.” 
The uneasiness doctrine is the third of three critiques of free will that 
Locke presents prior to explaining the true nature of human freedom in II.21.  
The first two are essentially epistemological critiques that show the theoretical 
contradictions and confusions embedded in the very concept of free will as 
conceived by its proponents.  With the uneasiness doctrine, Locke moves away 
from epistemology and takes up the question of what moves the will.  He argues 
that uneasiness moves the will, and that this means that it cannot be seen as truly 
free.  If we were free, then we would be able to move our wills with our 
understandings, but this is not what happens.  Uneasiness, not the 
understanding, determines the will.  The experience of uneasiness is the 
experience of pain, and also the desire to be freed from that pain.  All action is 
the seeking to be free from some pain.  Free will and restlessness are thematically 
connected in that those who believe in the possibility of free will deny 
uneasiness.  They deny that we are constantly being urged by our desires, and 
that all action is a response to desire and pain.  Freedom of the will means 
freedom from desire, and the existence of a state of rest which is guided by our 
intellectual faculties of understanding and reason alone.  Locke denies this.  The 





central claim of II.21 that “uneasiness determines the will,” is an assertion that 
we are, in fact, determined by desire, that the experience of desire is the 
experience of uneasiness, and thus our will cannot be said to be free.  Locke 
believes that he must deny free will in order to preserve the possibility of our 
being held responsible for our actions. 
Locke’s general strategy for the theoretical problem of human liberty has 
two thrusts: first, through three critiques of free will, Locke will reduce liberty to 
its bare minimum, and emphasize how determined we are.  Second, he will show 
that “liberty” is still liberty if it contains an element of determinism.  As is the 
case with much of modern philosophy, Locke’s treatment of freedom is a mix of 
low and solid, humility and pride, good news and bad news.  Or to use another 
metaphor appropriate to modern political philosophy, Locke inoculates his 
audience to determinism-he lets in just enough of it to neutralize its effects.  We 
are determined to a large extent-there is no free will-but this fact does not 
threaten human liberty or moral responsibility in the way others have feared.  To 
show this, Locke must elucidate a more precise understanding of “being 
determined,” and this is where he brings in his uneasiness teaching.  The 
uneasiness teaching is Locke’s positive, deterministic account of human action 
and his third, longest and most decisive critique of free will.  Within the context 
of II.21, the uneasiness doctrine is, above all, an expression of the extent and 
character of human determinism. 





Chapter Two’s main question is thus: how does Locke’s understanding of 
“the uneasiness of man” function as a part of II.21’s greater whole, the true 
meaning of human liberty?  Locke the great liberal thinks that true human liberty 
can only be understood in light of the uneasiness of man.  Although many 
philosophers (maybe all) understood themselves as the philosopher of freedom, a 
strong case could be made for Locke’s deserving that title, especially in terms of 
“freedom” conventionally understood.   “Political freedom,” “religious 
freedom,” “economic freedom,” “freedom of mind”-how essential to the modern 
world are these concepts, and what philosopher contributed more to their 
meaning than Locke?  Any understanding of Locke’s philosophical position on 
political and intellectual “liberty” would be imperfect and unfaithful without an 
understanding of uneasiness.    
 
I.2 “Power” and “Liberty” 
 The discussion of human liberty emerges out of the discussion of the 
origin of the idea “power,” the ostensible purpose of II.21.  “Power” is, of course, 
a hugely important concept to the ECHU (the term occurs on almost every page) 
and to Locke’s conception of science more broadly.  Science, and especially the 
modern natural science which Locke lauds so highly in the “Epistle to the 





Reader,” is knowledge of powers.  Following Bacon and Hobbes,151 Locke 
expresses both the limits, possibilities and character of knowledge in terms of 
“power.”  The ECHU itself (and the 2T (2T 1-3)) is defined as an inquiry into 
power, specifically “the Powers of our own Minds (I.1.6).”  Locke did not write an 
essay concerning human nature, but one concerning human understanding, a 
distinction helpful to keep in mind.  Human nature, or human “substance,” 
Locke argues, is unknowable (III.6.3-4, 21-27, III.11.20, IV.4.13-16, IV.7.16-18, and 
IV.8.6).  Our knowledge the world and its beings is not only limited by the limits 
of our experience of it.  Our senses are dull, and that places serious limits on 
what we can know (II.23.11-12, II.23.32, IV.3.6, IV.3.11-12, IV.3.23-27, and 
IV.12.10), but that’s not our only problem, for we cannot even have knowledge of 
what we do have sensual experience (and thus ideas) of (III.6, IV.3.28-31, IV.6.7-
16, and IV.12.9-12).  This is central to Locke’s empiricist theory: “[T]he extent of 
our Knowledge comes not only short of the reality of Things, but even of our own 
Ideas (IV.3.6).”  We can collect all the qualities encompassed by “human nature”-
corporeality, rationality, hair, legs-but we cannot know in what relation they 
stand to one another, or which are truly “essential” (III.6, III.9).152
                                                 
151 On Locke’s debt to Bacon and Hobbes for his concept of “power,” see Manent 1998, 113-5. 
  Which 
amongst these qualities, if removed, would prevent the substance from being 
itself?  Do any of them cause, support or ground each other?  Like all substances, 
152 Locke defines “essence” as “the real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of 
Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend (III.3.15).” 





“human nature” is impossible to know.  We can, however, have knowledge of its 
component qualities or powers.  This is why human understanding, a power, is 
infinitely more intelligible than human nature, a substance.  Even if we cannot 
know how the understanding stands in relation to our corporeality, we can know 
what are its limits and proper function. 
But despite its importance to modern natural science and Locke’s science 
of ideas, Locke does not think that it is necessary to dwell on “power” for more 
than 6 paragraphs.  This is because “power” is a simple idea. Simple ideas cannot 
be defined like complex ideas, for simple ideas are homogenous and have no 
parts (II.2.1, II.32.9, III.4, III.11.14, and IV.18.3).  We can only describe the 
experience by which the simple idea comes to us,153
                                                 
153 Locke does this with “solidity” at II.4.6. 
 or refer to a more complex 
idea (“red is the color of apples,” “round is the shape of the moon”).  Locke says 
that we experience “power” when we observe regular changes in our ideas.  
When a certain alteration happens between two ideas with such regularity that 
we expect the same changes to occur in the same way in the future, we infer a 
power.  “Power” comes in two varieties: the agent which causes the change 
possesses an active power, and the patient which experiences the change 





possesses a passive power.  A power is an attribute possessed by a substance to 
bring about, or suffer, change.154
Locke moves from the topic of “power” to liberty by drawing a distinction 
between how we experience active power and passive power, and claiming that 
we only truly experience active power from the experience of ourselves willing.  
Passive power, the power to suffer change, comes to us exactly as “blue” or 
“round” do, in observing the motions and interactions of bodies.  But passive is 
only one part of power: “it is but a very obscure Idea of Power, which reaches not 
the Production of the Action, but the Continuation of the Passion (II.21.4).”  It is 
only when we reflect on ourselves, and specifically on our ability to exercise the 
will and thereby bring thought and motion into being, that we really experience 
power.
 
155  “The Idea of the beginning of motion, we have only from reflection on 
what passes in ourselves, where we find by Experience, that barely by wiling it, 
barely by a thought of the Mind, we can move the parts of our Bodies, which 
were before at rest (II.21.4).”156
                                                 
154 See also the account of our experience of power that Locke gives in “Pleasure, Pain, the Passions,” 
(Political Essays, 244).   
   
155 To be exact, Locke does not insist “power” only comes from our reflection on our immaterial selves.  At 
one point he claims outright that we can get it just as easily from external nature (II.7.8), at another he says 
he is open to that possibility, but just has doubts himself (II.21.4).  It should also be mentioned that Locke 
says that how one body moves another is not any clearer than how the mind moves the body through the 
will (II.23.28).  
156 There is another dimension to the polemicism of “power”’s simplicity.  Mansfield argues that to speak 
of abstract powers is an innovation of modern natural science, which both Hobbes and Locke appropriate 
for political science (Mansfield 1987, 151, and 170-5).  ECHU II.21 provides epistemological support for 
this, by arguing that power is not an abstraction, but indeed, quite simple indeed.  





Locke defines will as the “Power which the mind has, thus to order the 
consideration of any Idea, or the forebearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion 
of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa in any particular instance 
(II.21.5).”  Willing connotes endeavor towards producing some action we take to 
be in our dominion. Locke gives a very stripped-down definition of the will and 
willing.  Specifically, both “good” and “reason” are absent from his definition: 
“an Act of the Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it takes itself to have 
over any part of the Man, by imploying it in, or withholding it from any 
particular Action (II.21.15).”  Willing does not require the ability to conceive of 
the good.  It only requires consciousness and sensitivity to pleasure and pain.  
Locke soon makes clear that his main purpose in broaching the topic of 
willing is to enter into a discussion of free will.  Many chapters in the ECHU have 
this character: a treatment of a classic philosophical problem is introduced 
through the question of how we come by a particular idea.  This is how Locke’s 
method achieves its stated purpose, namely, to solve old problems through a 
new approach.  In his ensuing discussion of willing and his critique of free will, 
Locke makes clear that he addresses not human liberty’s declared enemies, but 
its false friends, whose expectations for it undermine its credibility.  In their 
thinking about human action, men tend to fall prey to the school of thought 
Locke terms “indifferentism.”  Indifferentists would have us believe that 
freedom means freedom from all concern; they chafe at the manifold constraints 





placed upon our actions simply by virtue of our possessing a nature and 
personal identity.  Most specifically, they believe in freedom to will.  The 
attractiveness of the idea of free will results from the tendency of “the inquisitive 
mind of man (II.21.22)” to believe that, at any given moment, our wills remain 
free, undetermined by forces outside of us.  In II.21, Locke will give his audience 
freedom in accord with willing, but he will deny them freedom to will, freedom 
with respect to willing.  For Locke, men can never be indifferent, only faculties 
and non-human nature can (II.21.71, 2T 13 and 125; see also Beyond Good and Evil 
9). If we are to think clearly and reasonably about liberty, we must first come to 
realize how determined our lives truly are.  We are never indifferent and are 




I.3 Uneasiness determines the will (before II.21) 
Locke makes three attacks on free will in II.21.  In the first (II.21.16-20), 
Locke claims that the proponents of free will attempt, in effect, to attribute a 
power to a power.  When the nature of powers, qualities and substances is 
properly thought through, it will be seen that the power “freedom” can only be 
attributed to “man,” a substance, not “will,” since it is only a power possessed by 
                                                 
157 “For if we take wholly away all Consciousness of our Actions and Sensations, especially of Pleasure and 
Pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity 
(II.1.11).” 





man.  The very concept “free will” is therefore absurd.  In Locke’s second critique 
(II.21.21-26), he argues that the free will hypothesis cannot provide an intelligible 
account of what moves the will, or the cause of action.  What moves the will?  
Something, some action or passion other than the will must move it.  It is an 
incoherent understanding of human action that asserts that the will moves itself, 
or that all human action is pure spontaneity.  It is equally incoherent to say that 
the will moves the will, that each willed action is caused by a prior act of willing.  
For what then prevents that act of willing from being moved by a prior act of 
willing?  It is not necessary to dwell on either of these critiques at length. 
The uneasiness doctrine (II.21.31ff.) is Locke’s third, and most important 
and interesting critique of free will.  With it, Locke gives a positive account of 
willing, and of what moves the will.   
The most concrete way to ask the question “is there free will?” is “what 
moves the will?”  If freedom is to be distinguishable from caprice, a freely willed 
action must be distinguished by a particular cause.  Something has to move the 
will, something other than itself.  Which of our powers can be said to cause our 
choices?  As Locke frames the debate, there are only really two contenders, 
understanding and desire.  Under the first scenario, our conception of the good 
determines the choices we make and the understanding is the power with which 
we conceive and contemplate our conception of the good.  Reason/deliberation 
compares goods, relates them to one another, and judges them in light of the 





greatest good, of which we are always somehow dimly aware.  Which particular 
good is most in accord with the greatest good, most truly participates in the good 
simply?  All willing is shot through with some consideration of what is good; 
deliberation proceeds by sorting through the goods that the understanding 
intuits and then selects based upon the participation of some particular good in 
the greatest good. 
This is the conception of the will that Locke denies.  In denying our 
conception of the good to be intrinsic to willing as willing, Locke has denied it 
the possibility of being free.  For Locke, willing is not a pursuing of goods, but a 
fleeing from evil, or more precisely, pain.  Willing is determined by present pain, 
not absent good, or in Locke’s phrase, “uneasiness determines the will.”  Willing 
qua willing relates directly to desire (hence our occasional confusion of the two in 
speech-II.21.15), but only indirectly to the understanding.  And willing relates to 
desire by being caused by it, which makes the notion of mastery of desire or of 
the other passions, so central to Aristotelian ethics, impossible for Locke.  
Whatever role the will will now play in Lockean ethics, it will have to be one of 
“indirect management” of the passions, likely by “using certain passions to 
counteract other passions,” instead of ruling them directly as in Aristotle (Ethics 
I.13).158
                                                 
158 On modern philosophy’s turn away from Aristotle’s understanding of ethics and the will’s relation to the 
passions, see Mansfield 1995, 49-50, and Hirschman 1977.  
  





The understanding by itself never moves the will.  Desire does.  
Understanding furnishes us with goods to contemplate, to varying degrees of 
clarity, distinctness and possibility.  But contemplation of the good is not the 
same as desiring that good, especially not if desire means, as we shall soon see, 
pain or uneasiness.  We pursue some good if we feel uneasy in its absence.  We 
can’t live without it, and so we will its attainment-that’s the structure of all 
action, according to Locke, without exception.  Locke contends that we are only 
ever able to exercise our will by virtue of the fact that we can experience desire 
and pleasure and pain.  Being free to will would mean the capacity to choose our 
course of action from a position of complete objectivity or cool indifference, 
wherein we direct our faculties simply based on what we believe is good, and are 
not swayed by desire, present pain or uneasiness.  Freedom of the will would 
mean freedom from desire, and this Locke denies.  The understanding is never 
strong enough to overpower desire.  If pleasure and pain did not make us 
predisposed in one direction or another, we would just drift, we wouldn’t act 
(II.7.3 says this explicitly; see also II.21.48 and “Pleasure, Pain the Passions,” 
Political Essays, 238).  Locke is quite sure he knows something about what the 
understanding can and can’t do, with respect to theory and practice, and because 
the understanding cannot move the will, the will is not free.159
                                                 
159 2T 58 and 63 provide interesting confirmation that the will would be free if the understanding moved it. 
  





The experience of willing is the conscious setting ourselves to being free 
from some pressing uneasiness.  Locke is aware that this thesis conflicts with 
most people’s conception of action.  Don’t we sometimes say “I pursued X” 
unqualifiedly?  Locke believes that saying “all men pursue the good” is not so 
much wrong as misleading, for our conception of what is good moves us 
indirectly and desire or uneasiness moves us directly.  We cannot rely on speech 
to determine what moves us, for we are almost always deceived in our self-
understanding due to the massive influence of custom in shaping our speech.  
There must be a standard outside speech, and that is experience.  We must access 
our experience of action that is not tainted by speech and custom.   
This is Locke’s account of an action: (1a) we experience passion, which 
really means (1b) we experience some uneasiness, then (2a) we desire the good 
whose attainment we judge will bring relief to that initial uneasiness, which is to 
say (2b) we experience an additional uneasiness in the absence of this good, 
which concentrates the mind and makes us (3) will its attainment, and (4) attain 
it, if adverse circumstances do not obtain.  To repeat, Locke is addressing an 
audience with an overambitious view of human freedom and self-determination.  
Here we see that this specifically means an overambitious view of the power of 
our understanding’s role in practice.  For his part, Locke is fairly unimpressed by 
the role the understanding typically plays in human action.  He has nothing 
against greater clarity in our ideas-indeed, he wrote a long, ponderous 720 page 





book about how to achieve it.  However, his point here in II.21 is that all the 
understanding can do in practice is offer ideas to contemplate, and 
contemplation alone does not move the will (II.21.5). 
Uneasiness not understanding determines the will-this is Locke’s claim.  
Locke gives the impression that his argument for this claim is contained wholly 
within II.21, but II.21 does not stand on its own.  As is often the case with Locke, 
most of the argument for the claim is found elsewhere.  To exaggerate a little, 
II.21 mostly just provides confirmation for what has been laid out before Locke 
expresses any interest in the question “what moves the will.”   
In two crucial ways, Locke has prepared for his critique of free will prior 
to II.21.  The first is his empiricism, and the second is his understanding of the 
nature of desire.  Let us begin with empiricism, Locke’s theory of the nature of 
experience and how all of our ideas originate therein.  In two ways, Locke’s 
empiricism makes it extremely unlikely that “the good” moves the will.  First, 
“good” and “bad” are complex ideas and pleasure and pain are simple ideas.  
We only truly experience simple ideas, such as “soft,” “blue,” “round” (II.2.1).  
Experience gives us simple ideas, as themselves, but it only suggests complex 
ideas to us, if at all (II.12.1).  Many complex ideas, such as moral notions, have no 
template in nature, but even those that we might call natural beings, such as 
“man” and “gold,” are really only vaguely unified aggregates of simples.  It is up 
to us to unify them, by distinguishing them from other complex ideas and 





naming them.  Human concern and convenience decide which qualities are 
essential and which accidental, and this explains why, from language to 
language, (or even within the same language, from use to use, as with “pig” and 
“pork”) the same things are called by different names.  This especially goes for 
modes, the ways of being of substances (“justice,” “freedom”) but it also goes for 
substances themselves (“water,” “man”).  So although we often dispute over 
complex ideas, we rarely, if ever, dispute over simples (III.4.15, III.9.18).  Simple 
ideas are natural ideas, which just impress themselves on our senses and, 
through them, our understanding.  Simples generate little controversy; we never 
mistake them for each other nor do we argue about their existence.  Locke also 
believes it is fairly easy to distinguish between simple and complex ideas 
(“power” included).  We can tell which ideas are simple based on which ones we 
are not free to reject, which ones we never have disputes about, and which ones 
cannot be defined (III.4.4-13), except with reference to a more complex idea. 160
Locke bases the distinction between simple and complex partially on our 
direct, immediately observable experience (what do we have disagreements 
about?), and partially on what experience has to mean if there are no innate 
     
                                                 
160 Brief point of clarification.  This discussion perhaps overstates the gap between simple and complex.  It 
is arguable that it makes more sense to look at simple-complex as more of a spectrum, in that the simplest 
complex ideas (like simple modes like “good” and “will” and “five”) are closer to simple ideas like blue 
and round than complex ideas like “justice,” “gold” or “man.”  This is unquestionably true with respect to 
our certainty about them and their contentiousness.  However, with respect to the matter at hand-what 
moves the will-it matters a lot for Locke’s argument that we more truly experience pleasure and pain than 
good and evil, and that the former are much more certain than the latter. 





ideas.  At its absolute deepest level, Locke’s critique of free will rests on his 
critique of innate ideas.  How did we “experience” the world before we were 
fully aware of it and how do we do so now?  It is fair to say that the 
simple/complex distinction conflicts with our common sense experiences of 
things-who experiences “water” or “man” as an aggregate, as a manifold of 
diverse sensory particulars?  But Locke would say that our fully conscious 
experience of the world cannot be the only type of experience, since we are not 
always fully aware as adults and even more rarely as children.161
                                                 
161 See Aaron 1971, 47-48 on Locke’s abiding fascination with the experience of children. 
  Thinking is 
always conscious (this is crucial to Locke’s philosophy-ECHU II.1), but 
experience is not.  We cannot define “what’s first for us” (Ethics I.4) as what is 
only first for fully conscious adults.  Furthermore, this less-than-fully-conscious 
form of experience must be the truest form of experience, since it is the most 
universal kind.  This is to say that for Locke, what experience is, is in one sense 
supremely self-evident, and in another not so.  True, unadulterated experience 
we don’t so much experience, but posit, due to the fact that there are no innate 
ideas.  All our ideas must come from experience.  From our state as fully rational 
adults, we derive “experience” from the nature of our ideas.  If ideas are not just 
“in” us, somehow, at birth, they must be acquired through our unconscious or 
pre-conscious interactions with the world.  Experience must precede our possessing 
ideas, and therefore “experience” must be stripped of all references to 





consciousness, reason and speech down to a bare minimum.  What we 
experience are simples, discrete sensory impressions, which we then assemble 
into complex ideas so habitually and instantaneously that we do not notice.   
Given this breakdown of all ideas into simple and complex, pleasure and 
pain are definitely simple ideas-what we find pleasant or painful may differ from 
person to person, but we don’t mistake pain for pleasure, (except perhaps in rare 
instances such as tickling).  We are never as certain about what good and bad 
mean for us as what “pleasure” and “pain” do.  That pleasure and pain are 
simple and good and bad complex may also be discerned in the fact that we 
experience pleasure and pain in the womb (I.4.2, II.1.21, and II.10.5), but only 
conceive of good and bad much later.  Locke says that no simple ideas are as 
prevalent, common, constant, as pleasure and pain (II.7.2-5 and II.20.1).  Our 
experience of what gives us pleasure and pain is more truly “experience” than 
that from which we form good and bad, because it is more constant and direct.  
This then strongly suggests that “pleasure” and “pain” move us in a more 
fundamental way than “good” and “bad.”  
In Locke’s view, our experience of pleasure and pain is entirely intelligible 
without any consideration of the good.  It must be so, according to his “new way 
of ideas,” for surely we experience pleasure and pain before we conceive of good 
and bad.  Our experience of pleasure and pain tells us that we are moved by 
variety and novelty (II.1.8; STCE 74).  If we care so much about the good simply, 





why is our experience of pleasure so facilitated and increased by an assortment 
or rotation of goods?162
What follows from Locke’s grouping “pleasure” and “pain” and “good” 
and “bad” into simple and complex is hedonism: “[W]hat has an aptness to 
produce Pleasure in us, we call Good, and what is apt to produce Pain in us, we 
call Evil, for no other reason [emphasis added], but for its aptness to produce 
Pleasure and Pain in us, wherein consists our Happiness and Misery” (II.21.42; see 
also II.20.2 and “Voluntas,” “of Ethic in General,” and “Pleasure, Pain, the 
Passions,” (Political Essays)).
  Those who would argue that the good is prior to the 
pleasant might say that we feel the need to deserve our pleasures, that our very 
enjoyment of pleasure is increased by this thought of desert. Locke, however, 
thinks the matter must be simpler than this, since not all people feel this need, 
such as for example little children and tyrants.  Locke does not think our 
pleasures are troubled by our fear of not deserving them so much as the thought 
that they will not last.  It is not necessary to have recourse to the transcendent 
plane of good and bad to understand pleasure and pain: their origin and 
operation can be understood entirely with reference to themselves. 
163
                                                 
162 “There is more pleasure in the recovery of health than in its undisturbed possession (Strauss 1952, 
162).”  
  Because pleasure and pain are more original, 
more natural than good and bad, they must define them, not vice versa.  Locke’s 
analysis of ideas leads him to the conclusion that we are incapable of believing 
163 “Locke’s hedonism, which supports his morality, is in turn supported by his empiricism (Mansfield 
1987, 206).” 





something good is simply painful.  When we seem to choose a painful course of 
action, we do so to avoid a more painful course, or because sometimes future 
pleasure requires present pain.  A fully aware human cannot act expecting his 
course of action to lead to more pain than pleasure.  Sometimes we are wrong 
and what we thought would be good turns out to be bad, but we almost never 
mistake the experience of pleasure for one of pain.  We can never be as certain 
that what we believe to be truly good and bad are good and bad as we are about 
what is pleasant and what is painful.  It therefore makes more sense to define 
what is less certain (good and bad) by what is more certain (pleasure and pain).   
So although Locke does not directly take up “what moves the will” prior 
to II.21, his empiricism prepares the way by defining good as complex and 
defining it as that which causes pleasure.  The second way that Locke has 
prepared for “uneasiness not the good determines the will” is in his discussion of 
the nature of desire in II.20.  Locke’s specific claim about why the will is not free 
is “present pain not absent good determines the will.”  Why pain, why not 
present pleasure?  Because for Locke, the experience of desire is the experience of 
uneasiness or pain.  In II.20, Locke discusses the passions.  All passions are 
modes of pleasure and pain, that is, different experiences of pleasure and pain.  
Some passions are distinguished by their characteristic pleasure, others by their 
pain, but the experience of any passion is perfectly intelligible as just the 
experience of pleasure or pain in some way.  Locke singles out one passion as 





particularly prevalent, namely desire.  Desire accompanies all passions-all 
pleasant ones and all painful ones.  The experience of fear, anger or envy is 
intimately bound up with the experience of the desire to seek relief from them.  
And the experience of joy, hope and love also involves the experience of the 
desire to perpetuate and secure their pleasures for the future.  So desire is what 
moves us to act, to do something about, or in response to, our passions.  But 
desire itself is a painful passion: we only really desire something when we feel 
painfully incomplete, lacking in its absence.  Yes, we always have a desire for 
some good (and this is how we would express our desire “I desire X”), but only 
insofar as that frees us from some uneasiness.  The experience of desire is the 
experience of being pushed from below or behind, of avoiding something, not 
being pulled from above or in front, striving towards or pursuing something.  
Pleasure as such moves us hardly at all, so in order to define desire in the least 
misleading way, truest to the actual experience, Locke defines desire negatively, 
as uneasiness (the two terms are virtually interchangeable in his usage).  Desire is 
uneasiness: desire is not the opposite of aversion, it is aversion (II.21.71).  
Anything less is not desire but “velleity,” a passion distinguished by its 
weakness and insignificance: “the term used to signifie the lowest degree of 
Desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so little uneasiness in 
the absence of any thing, that it carries a Man no farther than some faint wishes 





for it, without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it 
(II.20.6).”164
 “Uneasiness” is a general term, equivalent to “pain” (II.7.2, II.20.15).  
When Locke catalogues the various painful passions in II.20 and distinguishes 
them from one another, he does so in terms of their various uneasinesses.  
“Sorrow is uneasiness in the Mind, upon the thought of a Good lost, which might 
have been enjoyed further (II.20.8),” “Fear is an uneasiness in the Mind, upon the 
thought of future Evil likely to befal us (II.20.10),” and so on.  We know sorrow, 
fear, jealousy and anger from one another by the way in which we feel uneasy 
when overcome by them.   
   
“Uneasiness” seems to have two distinct advantages for Locke.  For one, it 
draws our attention to its special significance in his teaching.  “The impulse 
which always and only triggers the will” would perhaps be more easily 
overlooked had he left things at “pain” or “discomfort” (like Nietzsche’s 
ressentiment, when “resentment” would have worked just as well).  Second, the 
term’s breadth is essential for Locke’s teaching.  We engage our wills in reaction 
to impulses both arrestingly painful and mildly discomfiting, both bodily and 
mental.  “Uneasiness” usefully covers this whole spectrum of impulses.  
Connected to this second advantage, “uneasiness” expresses the discomfort that 
                                                 
164 In his discussion of the difference between love and desire in “Pleasure, Pain, the Passions,” Locke 
seems to imply that love has a tendency to become “velleity” (although he doesn’t use the word), because 
possibility is not of the essence of love, although it is of desire.  We can love something that is impossible, 
but we cannot, strictly speaking, experience desire over it (Political Essays, 242-3). 





attends the expectation of pain better than mere “pain” would.  The more or less 
vague awareness that love, joy and hope will not last or can only be secured by 
sometimes unpleasant efforts would seem to be better expressed by “unease” 
than “pain.”   
“Uneasiness determines the will” says in a more condensed way “the 
uneasiness which attends the passion desire moves the will.”  Not all uneasiness 
results in action.  We experience despair when we feel uneasy, pained, due to a 
sense of our own impotence in the face of some evil.  Also, we may genuinely 
desire something-feel uneasy in its absence-without being able to have it.  The 
experience of thwarted uneasiness or desire can then in turn increase or decrease 
the intensity of the desire.  (As we will see, Locke locates freedom in our capacity 
to influence our desires/uneasinesses.)  But all action, that is, all change, results 
from “some present or pressing uneasiness,” and the uneasiness of one passion 
in particular, desire.  When we think we react to the uneasiness of fear or anger 
or envy, it is really the uneasiness of desire which activates and directs our will.  
This is why people sometimes confuse the experiences of willing and desiring-
they do so because desire’s uneasiness always determines the will (II.21.30).      
Taking these two things together-the prevalence of desire and definition 
of desire as uneasiness-we have the fact that there is an asymmetry between pain 





and pleasure, a fact Locke notes a few times (II.20.14, II.21.43, 64).165  “[T]he sense 
of evil or pain works more upon us than that of good or pleasure; we bear the 
absence of a great pleasure more easily than the presence of a little pain 
(“Pleasure, Pain, the Passions,” Political Essays, 240).”  This asymmetry has two 
dimensions.  One, we respond more to pain than pleasure-more intensely and in 
more ways.166
                                                 
165 Many philosophers have noted that pain has a closer connection to the will than pleasure: see 
Tocqueville’s comparison of the South Sea Islanders and the New England Puritans in DA, Prince XVII, 
Hume’s “Of commerce” (Political Essays, 104) and “Of taxes” (Ibid., 162); Hegel’s claim that “The 
History of the World is not the theatre of happiness.  Periods of happiness are blank pages in it (Philosophy 
of History, 26-7),” and Montesquieu Persian Letters CXXV. 
  Pain moves us more because it focuses our attention more.  We 
remember experiences and ideas better if they are accompanied by pain (II.10.3).  
This goes both for the immediate experience of pain and pleasure, and the 
expectation of pain and pleasure.  We heed the threat of pain more than the 
promise of pleasure.  Pain, relatively slight pain, can taint extreme pleasure 
much more easily than slight pleasure can alleviate extreme pain.  If we are 
suffering a mortal illness and someone offers to fluff our pillow, this mocks our 
pain, it does not alleviate it.  But no matter how glorious a philosopher’s godlike 
reveries may be at times, they are no match for a tummy ache, to say nothing of 
the fact that it is difficult to stand in the clearing of being when someone is 
166 Locke says that his list of the passions in II 20 is not meant to be exhaustive (II 20 18) but in “Pleasure, 
Pain and the Passions,” an unpublished, preparatory work for II.21, he says explicitly that there are more 
painful passions (“we are more sensible of, and in this world more accustomed to, pain than pleasure 
(“Pleasure, Pain, the Passions,” Political Essays, 241)”).  





pulling out your toenails.167  In a head to head, pain wins out; pleasure thrives at 
the mercy of pain.  Pain, or the absence of pain, is the condition of pleasure.168
The second dimension of the asymmetry is that pain always taints our 
experience of pleasure.  It must, if desire attends the pleasant passions (hope, 
love, joy) as well as the painful ones.  If we really take pleasure in something, we 
desire to secure it, or to be able to reproduce it in the future, which is to say we 
experience some uneasiness over it.  Locke defines love as the satisfaction that 
comes from the knowledge that we do have the power to reproduce or secure 
some future good (“Pleasure, Pain, the Passions”).  Thus, unlike Aristotle (Ethics 
1153a1, X.14, 1173a25, and 1173b15-20), there are no pure pleasures for Locke.
   
169
So empiricism tells us pleasure and pain are prior to good and evil, and an 
examination of the nature of desire tells us that pain is prior to pleasure.  
Empiricism leads to hedonism, and examination of desire leads to “negative 
  
Speaking loosely, the purest pleasure for Locke would be the one we are most 
confident in being able to secure.  But its “purity” would be totally circumstantial 
to the pleasure itself and, strictly speaking, consist of two pleasures, not one. 
                                                 
167 The same goes for Machiavelli’s famous letter of December 10, 1513 (“…and for the space of four 
hours I feel no boredom, I forget every pain, I do not fear poverty, death does not frighten me.”) and 
Rousseau’s 5th Promenade.  Locke would say that these experiences were either predicated on an willful, 
illusory belief that they will last indefinitely, or, what amounts to the same thing, not fully conscious 
experiences, and thus not the experiences of an individual self or person. 
168 In argument similar to Dr. Johnson’s “I refute him thus” criticism of Berkeley, Locke asserts in IV.10.2 
that pain (and also sometimes pleasure, too (IV.9.3) is the most indisputable proof of existence (also 
IV.2.14 and IV.11.8). 
169 See also “Happiness A” in Political Essays, 251-2 and Montaigne’s “That we taste nothing pure.” 







  Prior to any direct, thematic consideration of the relation between 
the understanding and the will, we know that if the understanding does not 
move the will, since the only other candidate would be desire and desire is 
uneasiness, it is likely that uneasiness moves the will.  We will in the immediate 
present, and we only will one thing at a time, and so, given the prevalence of 
desire and the asymmetry between pain and pleasure, it is only natural the will 
would be dominated by present pain, unease, not the promise of absent good 
furnished it by the understanding.  But we cannot be sure that uneasiness 
determines the will until we have considered more directly why the 
understanding does not.   
I.3 Same subject continued: uneasiness determines the will (II.21) 
Locke introduces his argument proper for why uneasiness, not the good, 
determines the will by saying “Experience, and the reason of the thing (II.21.33)” 
support him.  “Experience” here refers to the same “experience” he relied on to 
define willing and distinguish it from desiring-direct, conscious observation of 
ourselves in action (I.4.25, II.1.1-2).  Locke has in mind the particular experiences 
he will point out which are familiar and apparent to all.  “Reason” refers to 
                                                 
170 Kraus 1984. 





Locke’s analysis of our constitution, of what faculties we have and what they are 
for. 171
First, Locke notes that, well, humans just tend not to work very hard when 
times are good (II.21.34).  Why has complacency proved to be such a persistent, 
intractable problem throughout political history?
  
172
                                                 
171 For other examples of “reason” used in this sense, see II.7.6, II.8.18, II.23.12, and III.3.1.  Of course, 
strictly speaking, an argument said to be based on “reason” cannot rest on a basis separate from experience.  
For Locke, everything must be founded on experience (I.4.25, II.1.2, and II.11.15), unless, perhaps, it is 
rooted in “the Wisdom and Goodness of the Soveraign [sic] Disposer of all Things” (II.7.6). 
  Perhaps it is because 
uneasiness and only uneasiness moves the will.  Locke also notes the close 
relation between certain (natural) pains and the goals of self-preservation and 
species preservation.  This would seem to suggest that uneasiness’ moving the 
will is part of God or nature’s design.  Have not these pains proved to be fairly 
effective in preserving the species and individuals, generally speaking?  
Obviously, the relation between what is required for preservation (of selves, 
organs and species) and what is pleasant is not absolute.  But we should not be 
distracted by the fact that the most pleasant things are not in every case the 
things most useful to our preservation.  What’s more impressive is that, generally 
speaking and in our ordinary, unreflective daily lives, we are guided by pleasure 
and pain and they conduce to preservation.  This is especially so for Pain, “the 
most importunate of all sensations (II.1.21).”  In children, Pain “suppl[ies] the 
172 “[O]pinion of store is one the chief causes of want, and satisfaction with the present induces neglect of 
provision for the future” (Bacon “The Great Instauration”; see also New Organon I.85, “Of Deformity”); 
“A Full Belly is the Mother of all Evil,” Poor Richard’s Almanac, 30).   





Place of Consideration and Reasoning,” and even in adults, it “act[s] quicker 
than Consideration (II.10.3).”  Pain “makes both the Young and Old avoid 
painful Objects, with that haste, which is necessary for their Preservation; and in 
both settles in the Memory a caution for the Future (Ibid.).”  According to Locke, 
we are more purely hedonistic beings than we realize, in the sense that pain and 
pleasure, and especially pain, work remarkably well, unassisted by thought, in 
ensuring the preservation of our organs, selves and species (II.7.5, IV.11.8).173
Next Locke brings up incontinence (II.21.35-6).  What is going on when 
men neglect what they must know to be good?  Locke believes that the most 
sensible conclusion to draw from the experiential fact of incontinence is that our 
rational conviction that some good is good is a necessary but not sufficient cause 
for our being moved by it.  It’s not that incontinent people lack a sufficiently 
clear view of the good, but that they don’t feel uneasy in its absence.  
  It 
is impossible to overstate the importance of pleasure and pain to our experience 
of the world and ourselves.  Locke strains to fathom what conscious experience 
would be like without pleasure and pain (II.1.11).  Not only are they probably all 
we know of before we are born (II.10.5), they remain the most important ideas 
during our adult life as well.  
                                                 
173 It is worth mentioning that when Locke does reflect on how well pain and pleasure work to achieve the 
end of preservation, he often suggests that we see in this connection the excellence of God’s (or sometimes 
“Nature’s”-II.7.4, II.10.3) design (II.7.3-6).  Although compare II.8.13, where Locke says that there can be 
no rational explanation for the connection between primary and secondary qualities established by God 
such as “the Idea of Pain” and “the motion of a piece of Steel dividing our Flesh.” 





Incontinence is for Locke a particular which reveals the universal: men only ever 
pursue the good when they feel pain in its absence.  Of course we are not always 
incontinent, but that is because sometimes we are uneasy about truly good 
things, which will satisfy us in a more than momentary way.  The good qua good 
never operates directly on the will: present pain, uneasiness, does. 
For Locke, it is a question of what holds the will more readily-present pain 
or absent good.  What is more effective in convincing the alcoholic wastrel to 
change-giving him a clearer conception of penury’s disadvantages, or hitting 
rock bottom?  In our thinking about what moves us, Locke believes that we are 
not struck enough by how disproportionately a present pain arrests our attention 
relative to its true badness, and, mutatis mutandis, an absent good does not.  We 
react immediately to any given uneasiness, especially if it is of a present and 
pressing variety, and we do so in exact proportion to its intensity.  Absent goods 
don’t have this effect on us, however clearly apprehended and sincerely 
acknowledged.  There is not the strict proportionality between a good’s goodness 
and the intensity and devotion with which we pursue it as there is between a 
pain’s painfulness and our determination to alleviate it.  We are constitutionally 
incapable of regarding pain with objective indifference, even if we wanted to.  
But absent goods easily can be something we just contemplate and do not 
pursue.   





So what is the reason for this experience?  What facts about our 
constitutions, our faculties confirm that incontinence is what Locke says it is?  
Well, the problem cannot be with the will itself, for, as we know in the cases of 
strong passions such as love or revenge, the will is certainly capable of being 
held, focused towards one particular task for some time.  Rather, since the will is 
capable of only one determination at a time, the problem is with the “weak 
constitution of our minds,” which “weakness” consists in the fact that we can 
only will one thing at a time.  Thus, given the aforementioned (1) constant 
onslaught of desire, that is uneasiness, and (2) disproportion between absent 
good and present pain, small wonder that not our conception of good but 
uneasiness determines the will.  “[A]s long as any uneasiness, any desire remains 
in our Mind, there is no room for good, barely as such, to come to the will, or at all 
to determine it (II.21.46).”  When uneasiness recurs with frequency and even the 
pleasant passions are touched by it, when do we even have the time to focus on 
absent goods?  The other reason Locke invokes is a version of no action at a 
distance, applied to human things: “tis against the nature of things, that what is 
absent should operate, where it is not (II.21.37).”  Absent goods are just like any 
other idea in the understanding-passively perceived to be themselves, but that’s 
it.  The understanding is just a passive power.  All it does is perceive: we have no 
compelling reason to believe it is active, that it also moves us.  Absent goods 
must be “made present” so that we feel pain over their absence and pursue them.  





What makes them present is desire: desire moves the will, not understanding, 
only and always. 
We will return to these matters later, when we discuss the possibility of 
shaping our desires.  For right now, the point is just how Locke views 
incontinence as support for “uneasiness determines the will”-incontinence is a 
matter of having the wrong desires, not lacking the right ideas.  From this outlier 
case, Locke universalizes and says that all action is a matter of having the wrong 
(or right) desires, not lacking the right (or wrong) ideas.  Locke’s argument is, 
that, clearly the good does not move the will in the case of incontinence and that 
the will can only be moved by one or the other, therefore, uneasiness must move 
the will. 
The next fact of experience Locke brings up is the relative weakness of the 
afterlife to motivate us.  “How many are to be found, that have had lively 
representations of the unspeakable joys of Heaven, which they acknowledge 
both possible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up with their 
happiness here? and so the prevailing uneasinesses of their desires, let loose after 
the enjoyments of this life, take their turns in the determining their wills, and all 
that while they take not one step, are not one jot moved, towards the good things 
of another life considered as never so great (II.21.37).”174
                                                 
174 See also “Happiness B” in Political Essays, 271. 
  Locke’s discussion of 
incontinence addressed the failure of particular goods to move us; his discussion 





of the weakness of the effect of the afterlife addresses our failure to orient our 
lives with reference to our conception of the greatest good, which would 
presumably be “Heaven” for Locke’s audience.  Why does the greatest good, the 
Summum bonum, move men so erratically, so disproportionate to its true 
greatness?   Compare the effect of “Heaven” on our will with that of “tonight’s 
dinner.”  “[I]n this life, there are not many, whose happiness reaches so far, as to 
afford them a constant train of moderate mean Pleasures, without any mixture of 
uneasiness; and yet they could be content to stay here forever: Though they 
cannot deny, but that it is possible, there may be a state of eternal durable Joys 
after this life, far surpassing all the good is to be found here (II.21.44).”  This is 
because uneasiness, not the good, moves the will.  The understanding is not 
strong enough to overcome the persistent, mundane uneasinesses of living.  
Locke asks us to imagine how different our experience of the world would be if 
Heaven really did determine us equal to its true goodness.  How would we ever 
find time to do the dishes (II.21.38)?   
Locke’s interpretation of why Heaven tends not to move our will is the 
same as why the drunken wastrel persists in being a drunken wastrel.  Having 
the right conception of the good is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
pursuing it.  In some cases, it might be because men are not sincere enough in 
their belief about Heaven, but that cannot account for how strikingly weak 
Heaven is in moving the great majority of men.  The real reason why Heaven is 





so weak in moving us proportionate to its true, professed greatness is because it 
is an absent good, which means it is easily eclipsed by objectively inferior yet 
more immediate worldly concerns.175
What to say, then, about those people who are in fact, monks?  And to the 
extent that many others are not, well, first of all, maybe they should be, and 
second of all maybe the reason they are not is because they are not sincere 
enough in their belief.  Maybe those who profess to believe in Heaven yet neglect 
it lack intellectual discipline.  Later on, Locke does take up these questions 
somewhat-asceticism, the question of how the afterlife’s possibility affects its 
appeal, the difference between the few and many-but let us put off the full 
treatment until the discussion of how we may influence our desires with our 
judgment.  For now, the point is just that we have a constitutional disposition to 
forget the afterlife because uneasiness not the good determines the will.  The 
  This explains the relative weakness of 
Heaven to move us, relative to its true greatness.  If the good moved the will, 
then the greatest good would move the will, which means we would all be 
monks. 
                                                 
175 Locke also at one point says Heaven is “more possible” than “the attainment, and continuation of that 
pittance of Honour, Riches, or Pleasure, which [men] pursue; and for which they neglect that eternal State 
(II.21.44),” but elsewhere leaves the after life as a “possible consequence of a good Life here” (II.21.70).  
Even if it is only “a bare possibility” he argues, on the basis of hedonistic calculation (exactly as Pascal 
does in his wager) that the rational thing to do would still be to pursue it, since its promise of “infinite and 
eternal Joys (II.21.38)” outweighs its uncertainty (II.21.70).  And obviously Locke’s point becomes even 
stronger for the many who profess to find the Afterlife probable, more than possible.  Both Pangle (1988, 
202) and Manent (1996, 132) note the similarity to Pascal.  Locke translated works by the Jansenist Pierre 
Nicole and describes Pascal at one point as a “prodigy of Parts (ECHU II.10.9).”  For more on Locke and 
Pascal, see Rahe 2009, 40ff. 





fundamental point is the same as with incontinence: if understanding did move 
the will, we could not account for why Heaven is so weak in moving us.  As with 
incontinence, Locke invokes our neglect of the afterlife as a particular experience 
which reveals universal mechanism of the will because it can only be accounted 
for by the thesis “present pain not absent good determines will.”   
With his account of the reason behind the experiences which suggest that 
uneasiness not understanding determines the will, Locke explains what role all 
our faculties (reason, understanding, will, capacity for pleasure and pain) play in 
action.    Though in a general way, Locke does intend to disappoint his 
indifferentist audience with his account of liberty, he also intends to articulate 
the true excellence of each faculty in question.  There are some ways in which we 
are better suited for action given Locke’s understanding of the arrangement of 
our faculties.  This is the implication of Locke’s argument about “reason of the 
thing”: there is a reason for the way our constitutions are arranged, we just need 
to discover it.  Our constitutions are not held together by string and chewing 
gum.  Doesn’t uneasiness succeed fairly well in ensuring the preservation of our 
selves, our organs and our species?  When do we have experience of 
understanding as anything other than a passive power?  Why would we need 
practical reason, a capacity for judging between uncertain matters, if we were 
simply moved by greatest good in view?  All our faculties have a place and 
excellence in this way.   





Locke even claims that uneasiness’ strength and the understanding’s 
impotence in moving the will are providential, divinely mandated.  How wisely 
and beneficently God designed things, by making uneasiness, rather than the 
“bare contemplation of the good” direct us towards our greatest needs, the 
preservation of species and self (II.21.34; II.7.4).  Locke asks us to consider the 
difficulty we would have in attaining our good were contemplation the means to 
it.  He brings up Paul’s counsel from I Corinthians 7:9 to emphasize how much 
the sacrament of marriage owes to the pangs of lust.  Furthermore, given how 
many more absent goods than present pains there are, what a relief God 
designed things as he did (II.21.44)!  How miserable we would be if we were 
moved by every absent good!  This attests not only to God’s wisdom, but His 
beneficence: it is better that we are determined by uneasiness.176
Locke stretches things a bit with this argument about the providential 
basis for uneasiness.  He goes way beyond what he says we can know about 
God’s essence elsewhere in the ECHU (III.6.11, II.17.1) and blithely calls into 
question God’s omnipotence, which, among other things, he elsewhere claims is 
one of the “Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action” (IV.3.17; II.23.13, 34-5, 
III.6.11-2, III.9.23, IV.3.23, IV.10.4, IV.11.13, and IV.13.3).  Why couldn’t God 
design things such that contemplation not uneasiness moved the will?  Surely 
 
                                                 
176 This is not the only example of such epistemological slave morality in the ECHU.  For example, in 
II.23.12, Locke argues that it’s good that we have imperfect seeing and hearing (see also IV.14.2). 





this would be less difficult than to “give to some Systems of Matter fitly 
disposed, a power to perceive and think” (IV.3.6).  And what to do with the 
claim that we see God’s elegant design in how effectively the pangs of lust lead 
us into marriage? 
Locke gives his readers other causes to wonder about how seriously this 
should be taken.  What sort of ethical teaching is this?  What form of Christianity 
does hedonistic calculation lead us to?  The next chapter will argue that the 
striking lack of ethical content to hedonistic Christianity (or any other ethical 
teaching in ECHU II.21) fits nicely with the specific teaching in “Of Property.”  
There, Locke does give a response to the question “given uneasiness, what 
should I do?,” namely, possession and acquisition.   
But these suspicions about Locke’s orthodoxy should not distract us from 
the basic force to Locke’s argument about “the reason of the thing.”  Given our 
constitutions and the world, it may be the case that a little uneasiness is a good 
thing, and it is definitely the case that it is vain to seek to escape it.  Unease is not 
“dis-ease,” for in being moved by it, there is nothing necessarily unhealthy about 
the way we are functioning (“disease” would seem to imply sickness, incapacity, 
or deficiency).  Pain is, if anything, more natural than pleasure (contrast Ethics 
1173b10).  To the extent that any providence or orderliness exists at all, Locke 
says that uneasiness is responsible for it.   
 





I.5 Uneasiness and human nature 
That completes Locke’s argument for why “uneasiness not the good 
determines the will” and why we are not free with respect to willing.  We 
always, only act in order to relieve some immediate, pressing uneasiness.  We 
would be free if, simply by contemplating what is good, we then pursued it, 
regardless of whatever pain may be impinging on us.  This is what Locke denies 
happens.  Our understanding is a passive power: it can and does influence what 
we choose, but by itself it is powerless to motivate our wills.  Only desire, 
present pain, motivates us to act.  As we will develop at greater length shortly, 
Locke believes that the fact that we are determined to flee pain in all our actions, 
that there is no free will, does not rule out human liberty in some form.  But 
however encouraging Locke becomes with respect to human self-mastery and 
freedom, he never retracts his original claim that “uneasiness determines the 
will.” 
Before moving on Locke’s discussion of how we are free, we might pause 
and reflect on the uneasiness doctrine.  The uneasiness doctrine is a hedonistic 
account of human action.  Two general considerations incline Locke to hedonism.  
The first is his empiricism.  If simple vs. complex ideas is such a fundamental 
distinction, it is likely that good is complex and pleasure simple, and thus we 
experience pleasure in a more direct, intelligible way than good.  The second is 





that Locke aims to give a universal theory of human action.  The uneasiness 
teaching is, above all, a universal, doctrinaire account of the causes of human 
action: why do we ever work, act, move or do anything?  Locke has a great 
appreciation for the variety of human desires and beliefs,177 but, at some level, 
the structure of human action must be the same.  This stems, no doubt, from 
Locke’s conception of “nature” as, in Michael Zuckert’s words, “pure 
immanence: what works everywhere the same.”178
The thisworldliness that results from Locke’s interest in deriving a 
universal account of human action is worth emphasizing, because the term 
“uneasiness” sometimes sounds like it may refer to a spiritual or even revelatory 
experience.  “Uneasiness” could mean a vague sense that something is not right, 
 The only way to locate this 
fundamental similarity of all actions, to give a truly universal account of human 
nature, is to focus on what is low and thisworldly.  For Locke, there is no 
experience, or, what amounts to the same thing, no idea, more common than 
pain or unease (II.7.2-5, II.20.1).   
                                                 
177 See the discussions of cannibals and exposure of infants in Book I, women conceiving by Mandrills 
(III.6.23) and beast-men (IV.4.16), Prince Maurice’s rational parrot (II.27.8) and “left-handed marriages” 
(Political Essays, 256).  Indeed, so eager is the legendarily “doctrinaire” Locke (who “simplifies man to get 
results” Myers 1998, x, quoting Bloom) to note examples of the wild variety of human customs that some 
have accused him of being overly credulous in accepting travelers’ accounts (“Then comes the credulous 
Mr Locke with his Indian, barbarian stories of wild nations…” (Shaftesbury, quoted in Dunn 1969, 102; see 
also Myers 1998 72-3 and 126, Zuckert 2002, 188 and Cox 1982, 98)). 
178 “Nature is the manifold of effective causes” (Zuckert 1994, 203).  Zuckert contrasts this from the 
traditional concept of nature as a term of distinction.  The context is Zuckert’s discussion of Locke’s radical 
revision of natural law.  





which in turn motivates further thought or action.179
This universalistic and low-but-solid approach manifests itself even more 
clearly in the account Locke gives of pleasure and pain.  Aristotle would insist on 
distinguishing between “pure” pleasures, such as those of friendship, 
contemplation, nice smells, music and mathematics, and “mixed” ones such as 
like those of eating and sleeping.  This distinction may be made on a purely 
  But it seems to be the case 
for Locke that we are generally able to identify the cause of our uneasiness.  Even 
if we cannot always do something about it (as with despair), it has a real, 
tangible cause.  We are only moved by things which are somehow close at hand, 
or the pains caused by such things.  Anything else would have difficulty 
qualifying as a cause, with a unique power to move us.  Uneasiness concentrates 
the mind; it does not paralyze it, or even less, reveal some obscure distant truth 
to it.  It gathers us together and gives focus and direction to our intellectual 
capacities through its intermediary the will.  The experience of uneasiness is in 
no way a rare, spiritual experience for Locke, but a worldly, everyday one.  As 
with many other elements of Locke’s philosophy, the uneasiness teaching tends 
away from, not towards, an imaginative, poetic, mysterious view of things, 
because there he will find his doctrinaire, universal account of action.  The 
uneasiness teaching is supposed to be disenchanting. 
                                                 
179 Pierre Coste (the first French translator of ECHU) explains uneasiness (and his rendering of it as 
“inquietude” in this way: “By inquietude, the author means the state of a man who is not at ease, the lack of 
ease & tranquility in the soul, which is in this regard purely passive (quoted in Rahe 2009, 41).” 





hedonistic plane without reference to the good’s priority to the pleasant.  
“Mixed” means preceded by pain; “pure” pleasures are those pursued simply for 
the sake of themselves, not in order to relieve some pain.  What pains are we 
seeking to relieve in conversation, listening to music or doing geometry?  On this 
basis, we may then establish a normative hierarchy of pleasures. 
Locke allows some degree of distinction between pleasures and pains 
other than intensity.  He distinguishes between natural and artificial pains, or as 
he puts it: “[t]he ordinary necessities of our lives…[such as] the uneasiness of 
Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, Weariness with labour, and Sleepiness” and “fantastical 
uneasiness, (as itch after Honour, Power or Riches, etc.) which acquir’d habits by 
Fashion, Example, and Education have settled in us (II.21.45).”  Natural pains are 
those which are more directly connected with our more fundamental concerns of 
preservation of species and self (II.21.34).180
                                                 
180 In STCE, Locke presents a similar, slightly more expanded distinction between “truly natural wants” 
(“…the pains of sickness and hurts, hunger, thirst, and cold, want of sleep and rest or relaxation of the part 
wearied with labor”) which “all men feel,” and “the wants of fancy,” which “children should never be 
gratified in nor suffered to mention (107).”  
  Locke does not claim that the 
natural desires are more easily satisfied than artificial ones, or that natural ones 
are, in every case, simply stronger than artificial ones.  But they are more 
fundamental and recurrent, and so, although this is stated more clearly in the 
Two Treatises, it would seem to be implied that there is something enlightened in 
attending to them more than the others.  Locke also distinguishes between those 
uneasinesses which are treatable and those we simply cannot help.  He draws his 





distinction later on in his discussion of how we exert control over our desires, 
what we find painful.  This overlaps with natural vs. artificial but is not exactly 
the same since sometimes we cannot realistically help some artificial pains either.   
For Locke, mixed vs. pure amounts to a distinction without a difference.181
                                                 
181 So, too does mental vs. bodily: “By Pleasure and Pain, I must be understood to mean of Body or Mind, 
as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth, they be only different Constitutions of the Mind, 
sometimes occasioned by disorder in the Body, sometimes by Thoughts of the Mind (II.21.3).”  “Delight 
and Joy on the one side; and Torment and Sorrow on the other; which, for shortness sake, I shall 
comprehend under the names of Pleasure and Pain, there being pleasure and pain of the Mind, as well as 
the Body…or, to speak truly, they are all of the Mind; though some have their rise in the Mind from 
Thought, others in the Body from certain modifications of Motion (II.21.41).”  Socrates expresses disbelief 
in the pleasures of the body in Philebus 35d.  See also “Ethica A” and “Pleasure, Pain, the Passions” 
(Political Essays). 
  
“Pure pleasures,” strictly speaking, do not exist, because if something is really a 
pleasure, it will necessarily give rise to uneasiness about its future perpetuation 
and renewal.  Take joy.  Joy is a pleasant passion, which means that, unlike envy, 
anger, and despair, we recognize joy as joy by its distinctive pleasure, not its 
distinctive pain.  But this does not mean joy is without pain.  Our experience of 
joy is always more or less satisfying relative to how confident we are that it will 
last or can be relived at will.  When we experience joy in a fully self-conscious 
manner, we cannot help but be saddened, or at the very least distracted, by its 
contingency.  Hence Locke’s definition: “Joy is a delight of the Mind, from the 
consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a Good 
(II.20.7).”  We possess reason, which means we possess foresight, (the ability to 
compare present and future), and so it is our unique fate as intellectual beings for 





joy to be “sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought.”182  Sure, joy and pleasure 
possess powerful charms which tend to make us forget their contingency 
(II.21.64), but we will do our best to withstand these charms if we know what is 
good for us.  We will be, on balance, happier if we don’t lose ourselves in joy and 
forget how we got there.  “So the greatest Happiness consists, in the having those 
things, which produce the greatest Pleasure; and in the absence of those, which 
cause any disturbance, any pain (II.21.55)” (emphasis added).183
Our natural experience of pleasure and pain does not point to any natural 
end to desire.  Desire never ceases because pain never ceases.  Due to the 
persistence of uneasiness, restlessness is the nature of man.  This bears emphasis.  
Locke’s uneasiness doctrine does not refer to a fact to be mastered, an 
  No great feat of 
reasoning is required to help us realize that any experience of joy is conditioned 
by efforts which are themselves joyless and perhaps even outright painful.  If we 
do desire to secure or perpetuate joy, then, inevitably, new desires will emerge in 
us, desires for the means to ensure security or perpetuation.  Self-consciousness 
causes our desires to be limitless.   
                                                 
182 Or as Theodore Roosevelt once put it (to make a very different point, in fact, the opposite one) “Black 
care rarely sits behind a rider whose pace is fast enough” (epigraph to McCollough 1982). 
183 In this context, we cannot fail to quote from Hobbes’ discussion of the nature of desire and happiness: 
“the object of men’s desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the 
way of his future desire.  And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend, not only to 
the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life…So that in the first place, I put for a general 
inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.  
And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already 
attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but because he cannot assure the power and 
means to life well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more (Leviathan XI.1-2).” 





unfortunate fact of nature about which art can do something.  This is the 
universal structure of human action, as it was in the beginning, now and ever 
shall be.  “Uneasiness determines the will” is a natural law, like unto gravity.  
Nature teaches us what we should avoid, not what we should pursue.  Art 
(custom, education) then increases the variety of uneasinesses without giving 
any lasting relief to those given us by nature (II.21.45).  Reason in concert with art 
can manipulate desire and increase our prospects for satisfaction, but we can do 
nothing to alter the basic structure of desire as orientated towards what to avoid.  
The central orientation towards pain in Lockean hedonism gives it its distinctive 
character as “Negative Hedonism,” and accounts for why, despite his 
uncharacteristically brash, incautious endorsement of hedonism,184 he has been 
taken far more often to be a killjoy than a libertine,185
Locke’s account of our pleasures and pains is universalistic-what is 
important about them is what is similar.  But Locke also believes that his account 
best explains the remarkable individualism of our experience of pleasure and 
pain.  Due to the flexibility of human nature with respect to both opinion and 
desire, variety and novelty are of the essence of our experience of pleasure and 
pain.  What we take pleasure in depends on our particular palate, which in turn 
 more Poor Richard than 
Cole Porter.   
                                                 
184 “Locke is a hedonist; this no one denies,” Kennington 2004, 258. 
185 Strauss 1953, 251. 





is shaped by custom, education, nature, and accident.  This diversity exists not 
only between different people but from moment to moment within the same man 
(II.21.43).   
It’s striking how suitable for liberalism this mixture of universalism and 
individualism is.  At some basic level, all our desires are similar, but at another, 
they are all essentially different.  We are, in principle, all equal and all free; since 
we know we are all the same, we may tolerate each other’s differences.  Locke’s 
understanding of “uneasiness determines the will” is not quite the same as “the 
desire for self-preservation is a fundamental right,” but it is, as Pamela Kraus 
argues, “decisive preparation” for that claim (Kraus 1984).  For example, we have 
the aforementioned distinction between “ordinary necessity” and “fantastical 
uneasiness,” and the direct association between the former natural pains and 
pleasures conducive to self and species preservation (II.21.34).  Indeed, in one 
way the uneasiness doctrine is even more familiar to the liberalism into which 
we are born than that of the Two Treatises, for which Lockean writing contains the 
phrase “the pursuit of happiness”?186
 
 
I.6 Uneasiness and human nature continued: no Summum bonum 
Locke’s uneasiness doctrine explicitly challenges ancient philosophy’s 
notion of the Summum bonum.  “[T]he Philosophers of old did in vain inquire, 
                                                 
186 “Fortunately the author of the Declaration knew the Essay,” Kennington 2004, 268. 





whether Summum bonum consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue or 
Contemplation: And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best 
Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided 
themselves into Sects upon it (II.21.55).”187  The doctrine of the Summum bonum, 
found in Book I of Aristotle’s Ethics and various passages in Plato,188 holds that 
all our beliefs, actions and desires, our pursuits of particular goods such as 
money, prestige, pleasure, and also, incidentally, justice and virtue, are in some 
way informed by some concept of what they are for and why they are good.  The 
greatest good (or as Plato puts it, “the idea of the good” or “the good itself”) is 
“what every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does everything (Republic 
505d),” and therefore its study is “the greatest and most fitting study” for man 
(Republic 504d).  All human action and desire must be understood with reference 
to human perfection.  We must look to man at his peak to understand human 
nature in general, just as we would look to a healthy heart to understand hearts 
more generally.189
                                                 
187 Although contrast IV.12.11. 
  Which human life most fully achieves the end for which we 
are intended?  Plato and Aristotle were of course well aware of the great 
disagreement about the content of the Summum bonum.  It would not be the 
greatest good if it wasn’t controversial.  But the fact that different men may 
188 Republic 504d-513e, Phaedo 97c ff., Symposium 204e-206b. 
189 Ethics 1099a22-4, 1113a25-33, 1166a12-3, 1170a14-6, 1176a15 (“…in all such matters, it seems that a 
thing is what it shows itself to be to a person of serious moral stature.”), and Politics 1254a36-38; Strauss 
1953, 8.  





disagree about the true meaning of human perfection is less important than the 
conviction that it exists.  The study of the greatest good is both inexhaustibly 
controversial and the most important study of all. 
But in II.21, Locke claims that the investigation into the nature of the 
greatest good is pointless, as well as, therefore, all other debates in classical 
philosophy premised on its existence, such as the question of the hierarchy of the 
goods and the relation between the noble/beautiful and the good.  In fact, even 
before II.21, Locke attacks the concept of the Summum bonum without naming it 
in II.20, in his account of the passions and especially desire.190
                                                 
190 For more on Locke’s critique of moral perfection, see also RC 245ff, and ECHU I.3.5, and II.28.10-2. 
  Our experience of 
desire is the battleground between the Summum bonum and uneasiness doctrines.  
In this context, it is worth quoting Locke’s definition of good and evil: “Things 
then are Good and Evil, only in reference to Pleasure and Pain.  That we call 
Good, which is apt to cause or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us; or else to 
procure or preserve us the possession of any other Good, or absence of any Evil.  And on 
the contrary we name that Evil, which is apt to produce or increase and Pain, or 
diminish any Pleasure in us; or else to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good 
(II.20.2).”  This definition rules out the Summum bonum.  The notion that the 
greatest good enjoys some sort of architectonic or authoritative status, that all 
other goods are not only relegated to a subordinate status, but in fact owe their 
status as goods to it, as instruments or reflections, is too abstract.  “Good” simply 





means “that which gives pleasure,” according to Locke.  We don’t want money, 
prestige, power, etc., because of their participation in a greater good, we want 
them because they give us pleasure: it ends there.   
In other words, human nature is uneasy, not erotic.  In rejecting the notion 
of the Summum bonum, Locke also rejects the classical notion of eros, as equally 
abstract and too foreign to our experience of desire to accept.  (Again, the debate 
about the relation between the beautiful/noble and the good Locke completely 
looks past.  This is of course consistent with his claim that it is pointless to 
dispute about what qualities define the transcendent good, beauty being classed 
with virtue, riches, honor, power, and pleasure.)  There is no deep, fundamental 
human desire any more than there is an overarching, transcendent good to 
desire.  In implanting desires in us, nature just makes us uneasy, without 
directing us towards any ultimate satisfaction.  Our natural uneasiness is then 
only compounded by art, which heaps on more and more pains to be avoided 
without giving permanent relief to the natural ones.  Human effort can do 
nothing to alter the basic structure of desire as an orientation towards what to 
avoid (II.21.45).  Desire, all desire, is less a desire for something than a desire to 
be relieved from something.  We are always, only moved away from things. 
The Summum bonum seems to imply that, in principle, we could reach a 
state of secure, lasting contentment.  Although we could never possess the good 
itself, we certainly could be more or less closer to it.  This aspect of the Summum 





bonum teaching suffers from an especially grievous misunderstanding, according 
to Locke.  For Locke, desires are naturally limitless because uneasiness is 
naturally limitless.  In Locke’s view, though man desires 
contentment/happiness, he is not suited for it at its highest extent, due to the fact 
that he is self-conscious.  We are bound to our self-consciousness, which means 
we are bound to realize when we are honest with ourselves that pleasure tends 
to be insecure and fleeting and uneasiness never lets up.   
 
II.1 Happiness and freedom  
We must now return to the theme of freedom.  Locke defines human 
liberty as the “power to act in accord with will.”  We act freely when our 
attempts to relieve our uneasiness are not thwarted by external circumstances.  
This is an extremely restrictive view of human freedom (II.21.56).  If “freedom” 
means nothing more than the power to act in accord with the will’s commands, 
freedom is an entirely contingent thing.  We are determined before we will, and 
our ability to will, to be free, can be limited by any number of bodily or 
environmental circumstances.  Not only may our will be frustrated by any 
number of factors, we cannot even control what we will before it is frustrated. 
This is a bleak “freedom,” but it is not Locke’s last word.  Locke spends 
the second half of II.21 discussing happiness and judgment and developing a 





redefinition of freedom.  He does not retract anything he has said, but there is yet 
some hope that we are not simply the playthings of transient uneasiness. 
Locke claims that we are free in that we can manipulate desire and 
influence what we are uneasy about.  This places an important qualification on 
the previous definition of freedom in that it implies that not everything that 
occurs prior to the act of willing is out of our hands.  Locke’s argument about 
how we are free is, again, a combination of experience and reason.  We are not 
the slaves of momentary pain because we desire happiness, which Locke defines 
as “the utmost pleasure we are capable of (II.21.42).”  We know that we desire 
happiness from experience and because we are rational beings.  We are capable 
of abstraction, memory and foresight, so, inevitably, we compare our pleasures 
and pains to one another.  That we desire happiness and that we are rational 
beings are inseparable facts of our existence; the two propositions simply refer to 
different aspects of the same phenomenon.  Only intellectual beings can be said 
to desire happiness.  If we were not rational, we could still be sensitive beings, 
and react to pain and pleasure, but we would not be interested in the utmost 
pleasure of which we are capable.  Rationality makes us want more and more 
secure pleasure. 
What follows from this is the fact that we can and do use our reason to 
pursue happiness, or in other words, to deliberate.  The desire for happiness 
means a concern for future, absent goods.  Such goods are easily eclipsed by 





present pain since, technically speaking, absent goods as such move us not at all.  
Under what conditions do we then pursue absent goods?  When do we feel 
uneasy about absent goods?  When we judge them to be necessary to our 
happiness.  We know from experience that we may exercise some influence over 
our desires, prior to when they determine our wills.  The question we ask 
ourselves when we perform this suspension of desire is “is this good necessary 
for my happiness?”  This is the essence of deliberation for Locke, and also what 
constitutes our perfection as intellectual beings:    
 
There being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting, and ready to 
determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest, and most 
pressing should determine the will to the next action; and so it does for the 
most part but not always [emphasis added].  For the mind having in most 
cases, as is evident in Experience, a power to suspend the execution and 
satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at liberty 
to consider the objects of them; examine them on all sides, and weight 
them with others.  In this lies the liberty Man has [emphasis added]; and 
from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and 
faults which we run into, in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavors 
after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and 
engage too soon before due Examination. (II.21.47)191
 
 
But let us back up a moment.  Locke’s most basic claim is that happiness is 
the end of all human desire and therefore all action.  We are always pursuing 
happiness: happiness is integral to our conscious experience of life (II.27.17, 25-
6).  In order to support such a universalistic claim, Locke must (yet again) 
                                                 
191 On the similarity between this understanding of deliberation and Hobbes’, see Zuckert 2002, 10.   





abstract from the particulars and strip happiness down.  Were happiness 
something rarefied or complicated, Locke would not be able to refer to it as “the 
unavoidable concomitant of consciousness (II.27.26).”  To be a self just means to 
be conscious, and consciousness implies a concern for happiness, Locke says, so 
happiness must be a simple thing.  “Happiness then in its full extent is the utmost 
Pleasure we are capable of, and Misery the utmost Pain: And the lowest degree of 
what can be called Happiness, is so much ease from all Pain, and so much present 
Pleasure, as without which anyone cannot be content (II.21.42).”  Compared to 
other philosophers, Locke finds happiness to be a fairly simple, straightforward 
matter.  Though a champion of freedom of mind and critic of convention in other 
contexts, Locke resists defining “true happiness” in a way that departs from the 
experience and belief of most men.192
The simplicity of Lockean happiness can be seen in how little time he 
spends searching out its true meaning and in the absence of two things from its 
definition.  First, there is no mention of “activity,” which is interesting for a 
philosopher of restlessness.  Second, unlike in book I of Aristotle’s Ethics, 
happiness does not have any important moral content, according to Locke.  The 
term “virtue” is totally absent from Locke’s discussion of happiness.  Locke also 
does not seem to believe that concerns about deserving happiness are in any way 
 
                                                 
192 On this point, see James Nichols’ comparison of Hobbes’ simplified conception of happiness and 
Lucretius’ philosophic one (Nichols 1976, 183-4). 





intrinsic to the phenomenon.  Two considerations lead Locke to believe that 
simplified happiness is the true happiness.  One, because what motivates us is 
pain, unease, the pursuit of happiness must be defined negatively: “Happiness 
[is] the enjoyment of Pleasure, without any considerable mixture of uneasiness 
(II.21.62).”  Any state in which pleasure predominates over pain qualifies as “a 
happiness” (II.21.44).  Experience confirms that most men are satisfied with ease 
alone; relief from pain is the effectual truth of our pursuit of “the utmost Pleasure 
we are capable of.”193
                                                 
193 II.1.4 cites “satisfaction” as the opposite of “uneasiness.” 
  If this is not the case, if relief is not usually enough, why is 
complacency or short-sightedness such a big problem in human affairs?  Why do 
we regard sleep, the lack of sensibility altogether, as pleasant?  Because it brings 
relief, which is satisfying to us (“Pleasure, Pain, the Passions”).  Second, to the 
extent that not all are satisfied with relief, that some do pursue extremes of 
pleasure, it is not clear that such hedonistic ambitions issue in greater happiness 
because we seem so poorly suited for them.  An insistence on the difference 
between relief and joy could lead to an underestimation of the danger of 
complacency for most men, and the danger of self-forgetting ecstasy for others.  
For most people, a life of occasional ecstasy may very well be, on balance, more 
miserable than life of sustained, moderate ease.  Furthermore, it is harder to say 
we are suited for joy in the way that we are suited for ease.  Recall the earlier 
discussion of joy and self-consciousness.  Self-consciousness taints joy, but it does 





not necessarily affect ease so profoundly.  Indeed, as he will say in his discussion 
about the causes of wrong judgment, Locke believes that far more unhappiness 
results from short-sightedness and living in the present than foresightedness and 
living in the future.   
 Locke’s discussion of happiness simply restates the uneasiness teaching 
with reference to the fact that we are rational beings.  “Uneasiness determines the 
will” and “Happiness is the end of all desire” are, for intellectual beings, two 
sides of the same coin.  Just as with “uneasiness determines the will,” we have no 
choice but to pursue happiness in all our actions, indeed, we are obliged, bound 
by our very constitutions to do so.  We pursue happiness even when our 
language and/or our self-understanding might suggest otherwise.  This of 
course implies that we never actually achieve happiness in any stable, lasting 
version.194
Understanding the centrality of happiness for Locke’s understanding of 
freedom and human action helps to clarify the significance of Locke’s rejection of 
the Summum bonum.  To reject the Summum bonum must necessarily lead to a 
redefinition of happiness.  Locke and Hobbes both retain happiness as the end of 
all our desires, but they develop a definition of happiness that does not include 
 
                                                 
194  “…more a goal to be sought than a state to be experienced” (Zuckert 2002 11; see also Zuckert 1994 
283-4).  “Happiness and misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not 
(II.21.41).”  See Locke’s early, only partly ironic, essay “Can Anyone by Nature be Happy in this Life? 
No” (Essays on the Law of Nature and Associated Writings) and “Happiness A” in Political Essays. 
“Happiness is the continuation of content without any molestation.  Very imperfect in this world.  No body 
happy here certain.” (quoted in Dunn 1969, 1) 





any conception of the greatest good.  “[T]he felicity of this life… consisteth not in 
the repose of a mind satisfied.  For there is no such Finis ultimus (utmost aim) nor 
Summum Bonum (greatest good) as is spoken of in the books of the old moral 
philosophers.  Nor can any man any more live, when desires are at an end, than 
he, whose senses and imagination are at a stand.  Felicity is a continual progress 
of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still 
but the way to the later (Leviathan XI.1).”  Locke and Hobbes both posit a 
connection between the reality of “repose of a mind satisfied” and a belief in the 
Summum bonum, and they reject both at once.   
Rousseau thinks that the inability to experience pleasures without anxiety 
is only a problem for especially reflective individuals such as intellectuals.195  But 
Locke draws no distinction between Valais mountaineers and intellectuals.  
Reflectiveness does indeed spoil happiness, according to Locke, but 
reflectiveness understood in a very basic sense as rationality and self-
consciousness.  Rousseau once sympathized with one of his unhappy, 
intellectual correspondents that “one does not take off one’s head like one’s 
bonnet, and one does not return to simplicity any more than to childhood.”196
                                                 
195 See “Letter to Voltaire” (Rousseau 1992, 111-2), Emile 80-3, 483, and Kelly “Rousseau and the Bad 
Calculations of the Philosophers.” 
  
Locke would say this to everyone. 
196 Quoted in Kelly, Ibid. 





Locke and Hobbes may be said to reject the Summum bonum in the sense 
that that they may be said to reject the orientation towards the Summum bonum.  
We are simply not constituted in a manner that allows us either to gain true 
knowledge of the nature of the greatest good (it’s epistemologically unsound), 
nor does our conception of the greatest good exert any sort of authoritative 
influence over our lives.  We must therefore redefine happiness accordingly.  
Happiness is neither anything like repose of a mind satisfied, nor does it entail 
the possession of the greatest good.  Happiness means restless motion, moving 
from desire to desire without attaining any lasting or secure satisfaction. 
How odd happiness becomes when the greatest good is excised from its 
definition.  What we really want, when we give it a moment’s reflection, is not so 
much contentment itself, but the means or power necessary for “the assuring of a 
contented life.”  We want the means to achieve, obtain or assure the thing, not 
the thing itself.  According to Locke, we are equally bound to pursue happiness 
as we are bound never to achieve it because (1) self-consciousness and our 
hedonistic constitution drive us constantly to pursue more and better pleasures 
and (2) the Summum bonum is out, and so, too, is repose and a satisfied mind. 
Happiness makes us concerned for absent goods.  Though “the weak 
constitution of our minds” gives the advantage to the short term, we cannot help 
but be concerned for happiness because we cannot help but be concerned for 
future pleasures, or that we might be missing out on a better deal.  Our desire for 





happiness gives a breadth of horizon and seriousness to our concern for 
pleasure.  The core of this seriousness is deliberation, “the suspension of desire.”  
Desire determines the will, but deliberation may affect desire.  “[I]n most cases 
we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire (II.21.52).”197
But unlike “uneasiness determines the will,” Locke seems to think 
“happiness determines desire” easy and uncontroversial.  He says at one point 
that it is “past doubt” (II.21.68) and, in general, argues much less strenuously on 
its behalf.
 
Deliberation consists in representing goods to our desire, that is, informing 
ourselves about what our desire is: “is this necessary to my happiness?”  Our 
answer will determine our desire for the absent good in question, that is, 
whether or not we are uneasy enough in its absence to pursue it.     
198
                                                 
197 How much or how often?  Locke says different things: sometimes not much (II.21.56), sometimes most 
cases (II.21.52).  He probably thinks it varies from person to person (II.21.53). 
  Our concern for happiness opens up a space in which we can 
engage our intellectual faculties which otherwise would be useless to us.  This 
space defines freedom, its scope and character; to deny freedom would be to 
deny concern, which, as Locke argues in ECHU II.27, would mean to deny 
consciousness.  According to Locke, it is impossible to be both conscious and 
without concern for one’s self and one’s happiness at the same time.  When 
people are said to perform “selfless acts,” such acts are, in truth, either taken 
without full consciousness (i.e. by a mad man) or, upon closer scrutiny, are not as 
198 In Book I, the desire for happiness (and aversion to misery) is the only truly innate practical principle 
mentioned by Locke (I.3.3). 





truly selfless as they first appear.  Consciousness and concern are inextricable, 
conscious concern means concern for happiness, and this means a sort of 
freedom exists, from what is temporary and most immediate.  All freedom from 
transient, accidental pain, all of our ability to orient ourselves towards future 
reasonable goods, ultimately rests on our concern for happiness.  “The constant 
desire of Happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, no Body, I 
think, accounts an abridgement of Liberty, or at least an abridgment of Liberty to 
be complain’d of (II.21.50).”  We are free because we are concerned for 
happiness-this is what Locke means when he says happiness is the “foundation” 
of freedom (II.21.51).   
Just as the Teutons discovered free government in the forests of Germany 
(Spirit of the Laws XI.6), Locke discovers freedom of action in our desire for 
happiness.199
                                                 
199 See Zuckert 2002, 11 and Myers 1998, 141. 
  Our desire for happiness makes us free, but in a manner slightly 
different from freedom as defined before (“action in accordance with will”).  
What makes someone free is the ability to influence his never-ceasing desires by 
making judgments about what is necessary to his happiness. Freedom means 
freedom to pursue and achieve happiness by means of our own faculties, and 
above all our judgment.  Contrary to the impression he gave before, Locke does 
not hold that freedom pertains exclusively to actions “consequent to volition 
(II.21.56).”  What would it mean that liberty is entirely contingent, the result of 





external forces out of our control?  Are all men in free countries free men?  No, 
actually, not any more than all men in free countries are happy men.  Locke has 
not sacrificed anything regarding his former teaching on human determinism, 
but by placing happiness on the table, he shows how we as whole persons may 
yet be said to be free though we are never free from desire, nor are our wills free.   
 
II.2 Judgment and freedom   
II.21 grounds and places judgment, thus fulfilling a main promise of the 
ECHU, that we are suited for practice, indeed, better suited than for theory, and 
that the understanding is “the Candle, that is set up in us, [which] shines bright 
enough for all our Purposes” (I.1.5; II.15.11, II.22.10, II.23.12-3, IV.12.10-11, and 
IV.11.8; see also Grant 1987, 12 and 39).   
Locke claims that his argument is not only based on experience, but also 
perfection (of faculties, not substances).  The perfection of our practical reason or 
judgment consists in determining which absent goods are necessary to our 
happiness-that’s what it’s for, what it’s good at.  Absent goods affect us, move us 
towards their pursuit, by way of the intermediary of judgment, or, more 
specifically, through the opinions we with our judgments form about their 
necessity to our happiness (II.21.59).  If we have judged correctly, we have 
“raised desire,” that is, made ourselves uneasy, “in due proportion to the value 





of that good (II.21.46).” Judgment’s medium (or technically, the medium in 
which we work in accord with judgment) is then desire, uneasiness, not the will.  
It’s not so much a question of making ourselves more or less uneasy but of being 
uneasy about the right things.  We can and “should take pains to suit the relish of 
our Minds to the true intrinsick good or ill, that is in things; and not permit an 
allow’d or supposed possible great and weighty good to slip out of our thoughts, 
without leaving any relish, any desire of it self there, till, by a due consideration 
of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our Minds suitable to it, and made 
ourselves uneasie [emphasis added] in the want of it or the fear of losing it 
(II.21.53).”  Judgment enables us to correct our “palate” in accord with nature 
and circumstances (II.21.54, 56, and 69).   
Judgment enables us to influence our desires in two ways.  The first is 
through deliberation on the spot.  If you find cod liver oil and beet greens 
repulsive, focus less on their taste and more on how healthy they are for you.200  
Second, we may influence our tastes over the long term with the aid of “practice, 
application, and custom (II.21.69).”201
                                                 
200 “To which the consideration of the pleasure there is in health and strength (to which that meat is 
subservient) may add a new Gusto, able to make us swallow an ill relish’d portion (II.21.69).” 
  Deliberation, the first form, is the more 
fundamental form of freedom reason affords us, in the sense that it affords us 
freedom from any random transient present pain.  How could we exercise 
201 See also “Ethica B” Political Essays, 319-20. 





judgment at all if we were simply the playthings of each arbitrary, immediate 
uneasiness?   
But habit governed by reason is by far the more effective form of freedom: 
“Habits have powerful charms, and put so strong attractions of easiness and 
pleasure into what we accustom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at 
least be easy in the omission of actions, which habitual practice has suited and 
therby recommends to us (II.21.69).”  Like other moderns,202 Locke is greatly 
impressed with the flexibility of human nature.  And what else does saying 
“human nature is really, really flexible” mean than “Custom [is] a greater Power 
than Nature” (I.3.25).203  “Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, Weariness with labour and 
Sleepiness” are pains we owe to nature, but all other forms of uneasiness are 
“fantastical” and owing somehow to “Fashion, Example, and Education” 
(II.21.45).  So the influence of custom is vast and inevitable.204
                                                 
202 “Man is the flexible being,” Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws “Preface”; see also Rousseau’s Second 
Discourse (discussion of perfectibility), Julie (“Who is daring enough to assign exact limits to Nature and 
assert: Here is as far as Man can go, and no further?” (1997, “Second Preface,” 7)) and Social Contract 
II.7, and Strauss, 1959, 42-3.  
  The question then 
becomes who or what is behind custom?  Independent practical reason or “the 
busie mind of man” (1T 58)?  In II.21, Locke emphasizes the responsibility for our 
own happiness which the flexibility of human nature imposes on us.  The most 
effective way to do this is reason in concert with habit over the long term.  Locke 
203 The work of Locke which discusses the influence of habit/custom/art on us with greatest depth is STCE 
(1, 106, 115, 164, 216). 
204 The all-powerful influence of habit/custom is also essential to Locke’s empiricist theory.  Locke says 
that the only reason why his views on the nature and origin of ideas and language seem foreign to us is that 
the process by which we form them is so habitual (II.9.10 and IV.7.11). 





wants us to focus less on how to improve our capacity to think through a present 
proposal when we are confronted with it and more on how to implant in 
ourselves the right inclinations.205
This emphasis on long term freedom we can see in an example Locke uses 
to illustrate the nature of vice, that of a crime committed while drunk (II.21.35).
 
206
                                                 
205 “Reason can pronounce on the likely consequence of action in pursuit of one or another desire and on 
the coherence of this or that action with the agent’s overall goal of happiness.  It allows in principle the 
construction of a life with an overall shape and integrity (Zuckert 2002, 11).” 
  
This seems like an odd choice-doesn’t drunken vice resemble an amoral 
phenomenon, not an immoral one?  Aren’t crimes committed while drunk more 
excusable than those committed out of calculation, with full awareness?  But 
Locke suggests we hold someone accountable for his crimes-any crimes-for the 
same reason why we hold a drunkard responsible: “he has vitiated his own 
Palate, and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death which 
follow from it (II.21.56).”  The drunkard did not expect he would do X when he 
set out to get drunk, but he knew of the morally debilitating effect alcohol has on 
him.  He made himself weak, and thus set himself up for X, which Locke implies 
is the case for all vice.  We perform vicious actions because we have made 
ourselves weak, or have been complicit in our becoming weak.  What the 
drunken criminal does over the short term is what all vicious people do over the 
long term.  Our complicity in “vitiating our palate” vindicates punishment.  We 
206 Locke also discusses drunkenness in II.21.63 and II.27.22. 





can and should be held accountable for our desires, for what we find pleasant 
and painful.207
For Locke, most men fail to attain happiness because they employ their 
judgment wrongly, not because they don’t employ it at all.  Because practical 
reason only deals with absent goods, it always deals in probabilities; judgment, 
practical reason, is calculation. “Judging is, as it were, balancing an account, and 
determining on which side the odds lies” (II.21.67; see also IV.14-15).
 
208
                                                 
207 Locke’s argument about the justness of punishing drunk men is especially interesting in light of the fact 
that he does later argue that it is not just to punish genuinely mad men (II.27.20).  Responsibility must be 
affixed to consciousness (this is the central argument of II.27) and anyone who lacks consciousness cannot 
be held accountable for their actions.  In this discussion, Locke clarifies that, in order for a “temporary 
drunkenness” defense to makes sense, a lack of consciousness on the part of the defendant would have to 
be positively demonstrated, which is a near-impossible thing to do (II.27.22).  Criminals should be assumed 
conscious, until proven otherwise. 
  Present 
goods and bads we know with certainty, not absent ones (II.21.58).  Wrong 
judgment consists in a mistaken calculation about some absent good.  We judge 
wrongly when we underestimate an absent good’s degree or certainty of 
goodness, or just reason that, since we are happy now without it, it can’t be 
necessary to our happiness.  We may judge wrongly about a good in itself, in the 
amount of happiness it will bring, or in what will follow from it: “were every 
action concluded within it self, and drew no Consequences after it, we should 
208 “Reason, [Locke] argued…following Hobbes, contains no substantive principles within it, not even such 
vague things as ‘seek the good’; reason is merely a calculative power.  Locke, Hobbes and others 
understood reason more or less as a kind of computer, a logic processor.  It has no content other than what 
is supplied from elsewhere; it requires input” (Zuckert 2002, 189; see also Zuckert 1994, 199-201).  Among 
other things, this implies that there is no such thing as conscience for Locke (See ECHU I.3 and Zuckert 
2002, 189).  For other good treatments of Locke on moral and political judgment see Grant 1987 Chapter 
One (especially 40-9), and Chapter Four 192-7, both of which place ECHU II.21 within Locke’s overall 
effort to emphasize the necessity of judgment while navigating between both absolutism and relativism. 
See also Casson 2004.  Myers 1998, Chapter Three discusses the role of judgment and probability in 
Lockean natural science. 





always infallibly prefer the best (II.21.58),” but this is not the case.  In every case, 
the result of a wrong judgment is that we do not pursue the good 
proportionately to its true goodness, that is, the amount of pleasure it will bring.   
The cause of this we have already gone through-the “weak and narrow 
constitution of our minds (II.21.64).”  We have a constitutional disposition 
towards hastiness and complacency: “Men, like spend-thrift Heirs, are apt to 
judge a little in Hand better than a great deal to come; and so for small Matters in 
Possession, part with great ones in Reversion (II.21.63).”  We are 
disproportionately susceptible to present pain, and are often tempted by the 
thought that an absent good may not turn out to be all it is made out to be (a 
mistake we cannot make about a present pain).  We wrongly judge the 
consequences of our actions because of ignorance or “blind Precipitancy 
(II.21.67).”  Usually, wrong judgment is an intellectual error about moral matters 
itself caused by a prior moral failing, such as “sloth and negligence, heat and 
passion, the prevalency of fashion, or acquired indispositions (II.21.67).”  In right 
judgment, contrarily, we “stand still, open the eyes, look about, and take a view 
of the consequence of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the 
matter requires (II.21.67).”  The consequence of wrong judgment is always 
unhappiness; right judgment does what time and experience will do otherwise-
make apparent what conduces to unhappiness.  Right judgments direct us to 
virtue and happiness and wrong ones lead us toward vice and misery. 





At this point it would be appropriate to take up one objection to Locke’s 
claim about the desire for happiness being a natural law governing human 
behavior as does gravity.  What about monks and martyrs?  Do all people 
constantly pursue happiness, regardless of what they believe they are doing?  
Aren’t there at least exceptions?  The most direct treatment Locke gives to this 
question, the form of it in which he seems to be most interested, is the case of 
consensual slavery or imprisonment (II.21.50).  But consensual slavery or 
imprisonment is not exactly the same thing as the case of monks and martyrs 
because Locke always expects that an individual who so consents will regret it 
later.  He will recognize his initial judgment as a wrong judgment because of the 
misery it will bring.  “[W]hich way ever it be, either by placing it where really it 
is not, or by neglecting the means, as not necessary to it, when a Man misses his 
great end Happiness, he will acknowledge he judg’d not right (II.21.68).”  
Consensual slavery is the (seeming) exception which proves the rule, that is, the 
natural law of Locke’s teaching on happiness, uneasiness and judgment.   
The clearest thing to say about Locke on asceticism is that he simply does 
not find monks and martyrs to be exceptions, however outrageous some may 
find this to be.209
                                                 
209 “I wonder what was the greatest present uneasiness of the martyr St. Lawrence on his gridiron.  His 
liberation rested with himself: it was to be bought with a word.  There was the pain of future remorse in the 
scale against that word of apostasy: there was the pain of actual burning fire making for it.  Which was the 
greater pain?  Some may argue from the martyr’s choice, that he found the remorse more painful.  But it is 
not a question of the agony of remorse against the agony of burning, but of a prospect of the former agony 
  Due to the flexibility of human nature and corresponding 





power of art, there is a tremendous variety amongst what human can be 
educated and habituated to find to be pleasant and painful.  Again, what can 
custom not accomplish?210
When we see men who are so strong as to be able to overcome their desire 
for self-preservation and/or preference for pleasure over pain, what we are 
seeing, what the source of that strength truly is, is passion.  Virtue is not a hexis 
or disposition, but, more simply, just a passion.  What other sort of thing could 
we be talking about?  Someone regarded as virtuous is really just someone in the 
grip of a particularly strong passion.  Virtue is passion shaped in an extravagant 




                                                                                                                                                 
against an actual endurance of the latter.  It is hard to believe that the shadow of threatened remorse 
distressed the young deacon more than did the reality of present fire.  It is a revolting philosophy which 
pictures a witness of Christ unto torments and death, as merely doing after all the pleasantest thing that he 
could do under the circumstances, seeking his greater ease and comfort in the jaws of the flames, and only 
not denying his Lord because on the whole it was less painful to confess Him.  It is not creditable to natural 
manliness, let alone to supernatural sanctity, to be driven by the prickings of uneasiness, as it were at the 
bayonet’s point, to deeds of heroism and high renown (Rickaby, 1906, 94-95).”  See also Nietzsche, 
Beyond Good and Evil 225. 
  None of these ways of accounting for asceticism are explicitly 
stated by Locke in II.21, but they are entirely compatible with his theory and 
perhaps even implied by it. 
210 1T 57-9, ECHU I.2.25, STCE 14, Pangle 1988, 216; see also Bacon, “Of Custom and Education,” 
Montesquieu Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline II, and 
Persian Letters LXXXIX. 
211 See Montaigne “Of Virtue” and “Of Cruelty” and Rahe 1994, 39.  





Whatever account we ourselves may give of why we act, and however 
striking the external forms of different actions and characters may be, the 
structure of all human desire and action is the same, according to Locke. 
With his discussion of judgment, of practical reason, Locke brings to a 
conclusion his critique of “indifferency.”  Good judgment is more important than 
moderation.   Obviously, we are apt to be less hasty in judgment when overcome 
by wild desires.  But Locke would not want us to put our hopes in achieving a 
durable state perfectly free from desire, or, what amounts to the same thing, a 
perfect balance between desire and capacity.  That’s indifferentism-the vain hope 
that we may be simply free from desire, and guided only by cool objective, 
disinterested reason and understanding.212  Not only is this vain, but it denies the 
perfection of our intellectual natures: “’tis as much a perfection, that desire or the 
power of Preferring should be determined by Good, as that the power of Acting should 
be determined by the Will, and the certainer such determination is, the greater is 
the perfection (II.21.48).”  Reason is unsuited to provide us with moderation.  
Our reason is the reason of perpetually interested, concerned beings, and it 
achieves its perfection in calculating the best route to happiness.  Our reason is 
instrumental reason.213
                                                 
212 “Nature has created men so that they are able to desire everything and are unable to attain everything.  
So, since the desire is always greater than the power of acquiring, the result is discontent with what one 
possesses and a lack of satisfaction with it (Discourses on Livy I.37.1).” 
  The indifferentists hope for a role of reason in practice 
213 “The Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies to range aboard, and to find the things Desired” 
(Leviathan VIII.14-6; see also III.3-5 and XLVI.1, Hume, Treatise on Human Nature II.3 and Machiavelli, 





for which it is patently unsuited.  Relatedly, they seek a freedom which is 
indistinguishable from arbitrariness since it is a freedom from all desire (II.21.71).   
Discrediting this conception of a perfect harmony between desire and capacity is, 
it turns out, just as important to Locke’s purpose in II.21 as discrediting the 
delusional notion of free will maintained by indifferentism.214
By now we have seen that we are free and in what way.  We are free 
because we have judgment and foresight, and we would be imperfect if we could 
not employ them in action.  How far does our liberty reach?  How much can our 
judgment about good and evil shape the content of our desire for happiness?  
After all, we are constantly beset by uneasinesses (II.21.45), some of which are so 
violent as to preclude deliberation (II.21.52).  Locke has no answer other than 
experience-experience can tell us how much liberty we have, and when we have 
it.  All he can say is do your best-if you succeed, it will look like this (II.21.52). 
 
 
II.3 Conclusion  
Locke begins from the premise that “Liberty” is meaningless except with 
reference to the will.  “Will” is a mode of thinking, that is, a simple mode-the 
simplest of all the complex ideas.  “Liberty” is more complex than “willing” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Discourses on Livy I.6 and 37, II Proemium).  Rahe is very good on early modern philosophy’s 
understanding of instrumental reason and “homo faber” (Rahe 1994, 144).  
214 Who are these indifferentists? Unclear.  Typical for Locke, he does not identify the target of his 
polemics (such as about innate ideas (I.2-4) or whether or not the soul always thinks (II.1)).  In other cases, 
the opponent he does identify is not his true target (Filmer). 





because it combines “thinking” and “action.”  We are free when we can move 
our thoughts or our bodies by our preference alone.  But our experience of 
willing reveals that we cannot attribute liberty to willing as others have argued.  
We are not free with respect to willing because desire, uneasiness, not 
understanding, determines our will.  We are, however, free with respect to 
desire, and this is because, as rational beings, we desire happiness, not just 
pleasure.  This affords us a freedom from transient, unintelligent desire, and a 
freedom for shaping our desires, our uneasinesses, over the long term, by habit 
working in concert with reason. 
In principle, freedom is something open to most humans as humans, but 
clearly it can be tainted or denied us by any number of factors beyond our 
control.  Freedom is not free, it has conditions; the possession of a perfectly 
functioning judgment and will are not guarantors of freedom.  We cannot be 
fully free, able to pursue happiness by means of our own faculties, without 
having had a decent upbringing, some level of material comfort, (“equipment” as 
Aristotle would say (Ethics I.8)), and also things like legs.  Based on this 
definition of freedom, it is difficult to imagine how we could be free without 
living in a liberal society.  First of all, we are much more likely to be able to 
“have” our wills in a tolerant society that respects private life.  Moreover, liberal 
society is more likely to provide us with the preconditions for Lockean freedom 
by educating and encouraging the exercise of our independent judgment.  To be 





molded for liberal citizenship means to receive preparation for the exercise of 
judgment later in life.  Living in a liberal society is thus an external, conventional 
requirement for freedom, part of the side of freedom which we have fairly little 
control over whatsoever.   
“Liberty” is a difficult concept.  The more inseparable human liberty is 
from human nature, the less it looks like liberty.  The traditional difficulty with 
human liberty is that it is philosophically dubious, or at least difficult, yet 
morally indispensable.  Locke’s claim in II.21 is that he can satisfy the demands 
of both science and morality.  He believes he can come up with an understanding 
of liberty that is both philosophically sound and morally acceptable.  Locke 
claims to have sacrificed the integrity of neither human nature nor freedom in his 
teaching on freedom.  An element of determinism gives coherence to freedom, 
and as long as self-determinism is possible, freedom is real.  Locke does not seem 
to view this as a redefinition of liberty.  He scrupulously adheres to certain 
standards to which he believes any concept of liberty must be held up.  First, 
liberty is unique to intellectual beings-humans, angels and God.  Reason, the 
power of abstraction, broadens our horizon and makes us restless and concerned 
for the future.  Beings lower than man lack the breadth of horizon necessary to be 
said to free in any meaningful way.  Second, liberty is a good thing (II.21.50).  It 
may not be the highest thing (happiness is higher) but it is certainly unnatural 
and perverted to desire to be a slave.  This is a major criticism Locke has of 





indifferency (along with the delusional harmony between capacity and desire 
that it implies)-who would want to be free from concern and not bound by their 
own judgments about what is necessary to their happiness?  If we can’t 
determine ourselves, surely something or someone else will and, from the 
perspective of freedom being a good thing, how desirable is that (II.21.48)?  
Third, “liberty” must be able to account for moral responsibility, the difference 
between moral vice and virtue, which for Locke comes down to the difference 
between right and wrong judgment.  Fourth, our being free is not in tension with 
our desire for happiness, far from it, since liberty and happiness are 
interdependent concepts for Locke.  “As therefore the highest perfection of 
intellectual nature, lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid 
happiness; so the care of our selves, that we mistake not imaginary for real 
happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty (II.21.51).” We would not be 
free if we did not desire happiness, and if we were not free, calling happiness the 
end of human life would be unintelligible.  We could respond to pleasure and 
pain without being free, but responding to pleasure and pain is not the same as 
being conscious of an overarching end to all of one’s pursuits.  Fifth, liberty must 
pertain to the whole person, not merely one part, like the will.  We exercise 
judgment, which means its exercise is subject to all the constraints and 
imperfections we are.  Obviously, there will be no molding our desires in accord 
with judgment if we are under some unbearable pain or just plain stupid.  





Freedom means the freedom to pursue happiness with one’s own faculties, but it 
also means (1) having the capacity to do so (which requires a certain nature and 
education) and (2) not having one’s (self-determined) will thwarted by external 
circumstances.  Living in a free country is not sufficient for freedom, but it is 
necessary.     
The uneasiness teaching plays a crucial role in Locke’s argument for 
freedom, in characterizing how we are determined.  Uneasiness is an expression 
of necessity, of the limits of persuasion and spontaneity and also of the 
limitlessness of desire.  It is not something we can change.  We can influence 
what makes us uneasy, but not the basic structural fact that “uneasiness 
determines the will.” 





Chapter Three: Property and Restlessness  
I.1 Introduction 
Tocqueville argues that the restless pursuit of material well-being is 
characteristic of modern, democratic life, not aristocratic life and not human 
nature simply.  Following Montesquieu, he believes that restlessness is an Anglo-
Saxon disease, although one which all modern peoples may expect to contract 
eventually.215
In 2T Chapter Five, “Of Property,” Locke sets out not to describe how men 
in a certain time and place have come to be disposed towards restless acquisition, 
but to give an argument as to why all men should be.  Locke gives a principled 
defense of restlessness, based on right and nature.  He argues that it is both 
prudent and moral for men to take material goods as an end, rather than a 
means.  In Tocqueville, this alchemy of changing means into ends, and orienting 
men towards the “irrationally” limitless pursuit of material well-being is 
accomplished by history.  To be sure, the Americans are partially able give an 
account of themselves and are not simply blindly fulfilling the mandate of 
  The main cause of restlessness is individualism, itself caused by 
democracy.  Equality makes men individualistic, which makes them generally 
doubtful about the good, and this tends to make them attach themselves to the 
pursuit of lower material goods, because their status as goods is more certain. 
                                                 
215 On Montesquieu’s influence on Tocqueville on this point, see Rahe 2009, 170-1. 





History.  But historical accident played a considerable role in their coming to 
embrace this particular moral outlook.  
Tocqueville and Locke’s justifications of limitless acquisition may be 
usefully contrasted with Max Weber.  The central question that Weber sets out to 
answer in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is, how did limitless 
acquisition, a mode of life condemned by all reputable pre-modern moral 
authorities, come to be accepted and even promoted as the moral good in 
modern times?  How did the pursuit of means become an end in itself?  Weber 
famously posited that the irrationality of restlessness can only be accounted for 
by locating its origins in the Protestant conception of the “calling.”  The existence 
of the modern capitalist is one of “worldly asceticism,” self-denial for the sake of 
acquisition.  The fact that it shares this form of life with Calvinist theology, as 
well as the fact that (according to Weber) Protestants tend to be better 
businessmen than Catholics, led Weber to look to Calvinism to explain 
capitalism.  This is the true reason for the behavior of the restless individual in 
modern society, because only if the true motivation is unconscious could this 
totally irrational way of life be accounted for.  The true reasons for the 
restlessness of the irrationally restless individual are completely unknown to 
him, long buried under the dust heap of history.216
                                                 
216 “a psychic hangover from a previous psychological or cultural intoxication with true Calvinism (Pangle 
1988, 18).” 
   





Locke and Tocqueville both disagree that restlessness is so irrational as to 
defy conscious justification on the part of the restless individual.  Both Locke and 
Tocqueville believe that the restless individual can live with himself.  Like 
Weber, Tocqueville affords the forces of blind history considerable influence over 
the beliefs, habits and desires of men in modern society.  The lack of complete 
understanding of the true consequences of their actions is central to Tocqueville’s 
understanding of the course of history and of how it has shaped the modern 
world.  As Tocqueville put it in his work on the Revolution of 1848, “The fate of 
this world is determined by causes and effects, but often contrary to the desires 
of all those who produce them, like the flying banner spread by the opposite 
action of wind and tether.”217  Indeed, history is perhaps even blinder and more 
chaotic for Tocqueville than Weber, in the sense that he never assigns a 
predominant influence to religion or any other factor in causing democracy.  But 
Tocqueville does believe that the Americans can give some legitimate 
justification for their beliefs and actions, including restless acquisition.218
                                                 
217 Quoted in Furet and Melanio 1998, 7.  On Tocqueville’s “ironic” view of history more generally, see 
Furet and Melonio 1998, 2-7 and Furet 1981, 1-17. 
  The 
true reasons why they are doing what they are doing are not totally unknown to 
218 A more thorough comparison between Weber and Tocqueville on this point would need to go deeper 
into Tocqueville’s belief in historical determinisim (see Zetterbaum 1965) as well as investigate the level of 
moral intentionality implied by Tocqueville’s conception of “mores.”  Mores are more than just numb habit 
but less than fully deliberate, freely-willed behavior.  On this point see Winthrop 1986, 243-4, Maletz 2005, 
5 and 14, Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws XIX, and Kelly and Masters 1992, 203-4. 





them; they are looking for something solid, a good which they are certain is a 
good, which they find in material goods.   
Locke is less interested in what history has brought us to think, desire and 
do than Tocqueville and Weber.  He is interested in what is simply true, right, 
and advantageous, and he contends, in “Of Property,” that this is the sort of 
behavior Weber thought could only be accounted for by having recourse to 
centuries-dead Calvinistic belief (Strauss 1953, 246).  As Pangle, following 
Strauss, points out, Weber insists on finding a deontological basis for the spirit of 
capitalism (Pangle 1988, 18-20).  Locke, in his philosophy, seeks to combine right 
and advantage, deontology and utilitarianism. 
“Of Property” presents an argument about the natural right to possess 
and also acquire property.  Determining this is an essential preliminary step to 
establishing why anyone would have the need and right to seek the protection of 
his possessions in civil society.  Through property we fulfill our desire for self-
preservation, but this desire cannot be fulfilled simply by possessing property.  
In order to support life, we need the right to acquire property, and, as it turns 
out, in effectually limitless quantities.  What initially appears as an argument as 
to why men enter civil society to protect their property becomes an argument as 
to why men enter civil society “not so much as to preserve as to enlarge their 
possessions” (Strauss 1953, 245; MacPherson 1962, 199). Locke argues for the 
righteousness of limitless acquisitiveness because it is grounded in both necessity 





and the consent of others.  This is the deepest connection between restlessness 
and liberalism for Locke. 
ECHU II.21 gives a universal account of human motivation, and argues 
that all men at all times are restless in the sense of being moved more by the 
pains we are fleeing than by the pleasures we pursue.  Relief and joy are 
transient states.  “Of Property” expands on the teaching in II.21 and completes 
Locke’s teaching on restlessness by illustrating the way in which restlessness, in 
the fullest sense, may also be said to be a modern condition for Locke.  The 
teaching of “Of Property” is grounded in nature, but Locke is also looking to the 
future, whose moral understanding he hopes to shape.  Lockean restlessness in 
the fullest sense combines ECHU II.21’s theory of human motivation with the 
moral direction that “Of Property” provides.  This chapter will connect “Of 
Property” and “Power” and produce a unified theory of Lockean restlessness.  
 
I.2 The argument of “Of Property”: the righteousness of restlessness 
Legitimate government in the 2T is said to protect the natural rights to life, 
liberty and property: “Of Property” derives the basis of property rights.  Unlike 
the rights to life and liberty, which are simply asserted at the beginning of the 
work, Locke does give an argument for the right to property (albeit one derived 
from the previously-asserted right to life).  How does an individual have the 





right to property in the first place?  Is there any difference between the natural 
right to property and the right as it exists in civil society? 
Locke derives the right to property directly from our natural right to self-
preservation.  If we do have the right to the end of self-preservation, then we 
must have the right to the means to it, which is property (2T 26, 1T 86).219  The 
right to appropriate is the right to stave off necessity by appropriating what we 
need to survive.  “The condition of human life, which requires labour and 
materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions (2T 35).”  Most 
originally, this refers to what we need to eat.220
In the beginning, all property was in common, and there was enough for 
all.  But also there had to have been private property, because there was 
consumption.  Man always had to consume to survive and therefore he always 
had to appropriate to survive.  When did this appropriation occur?  At the very 
latest, it must have occurred by the time the nuts and berries were consumed and 
metabolized.  Metabolism is for Locke the most certain case of appropriation.  
  Hunger is the most fundamental 
form of necessity which threatens our preservation.  The rest of “Of Property” 
builds on this original understanding of private property by expanding this right 
to alter and digest whatever of external nature is necessary to ensure our 
preservation.   
                                                 
219 “[A] right to an end is meaningless, if the right to the means necessary to that end is denied (de Cive 
I.8).” 
220 Locke first advances this claim in the 1T, in the context of a discussion of the Biblical basis for eating 
meat (1T 92).   





What we metabolize becomes our property, because it becomes part of our bones 
and flesh, in a word, our bodies (2T 26-8).  We definitely own our bodies and 
whatever is a part of them.221
Metabolism clarifies what appropriation is, but in doing so, it also points 
beyond itself to a more original form of appropriation.  The right to appropriate 
and acquire private property is the right to alter nature for our preservation.  
Before we alter nature by digesting it, we work on it to make it suitable to our 
needs: labor is the original mode of appropriation, even prior to metabolism.  
Originally, we own our selves, and this means not only that we own whatever 
becomes a part of ourselves, but that we own our labor (2T 27).  When we labor, 
we alter external nature to suit our needs.  Labor always produces something 
new, something nature did not provide us with, and which is suited for us and 
our needs.  Because we own our labor, when we work on some part of external 
nature, and mix our labor with it, we must also own that worked-upon thing.  
Thus, we own the nuts and berries long before we metabolize them, when we 
pick them, pile them up, or in any way draw a distinction between them and all 
the other unclaimed, undifferentiated nuts and berries in the common.  Just as it 
is not possible to survive without private property, it is not possible to 
appropriate in that most fundamental sense of metabolizing without first 
   
                                                 
221  Locke’s positing of ownership of our own selves and bodies is a crucial difference between Locke and 
Hobbes’ understanding of natural rights and the state of nature (Zuckert 2002, 4 and 193).  Ownership of 
self and body is simply asserted in “Of Property” but is discussed at great length in ECHU II.27.  Zuckert is 
the authority on self-ownership in Locke.  See especially Zuckert 1994, Chapter Nine. 





acquiring, meaning extracting from the original common.  This last step must 
have been in accord with right, and it was, due to the fact that we own our labor 
and that with which we have mixed our labor. 
By basing the natural right to private property in labor (2T 44-5), Locke 
can say definitively that property originates from the individual and exists prior 
to and outside of civil society.  Originally and naturally, man does not need the 
consent of others to exercise his right to private property.222
                                                 
222 “Locke cuts the origin of property loose from all connection to human agreement; he does this by 
generating a natural right to exclusive property from the altogether self-regarding right to preservation, the 
ground for the power of labor to appropriate, as itself derivative from the duty to self-preservation under 
the original no-harm principle (Zuckert 1994, 257).” 
  To require consent 
in the state of nature would have violated the right to life.  Men were isolated in 
the primitive economic state of nature, so if they had to ascertain the consent of 
others before appropriating, they would have starved (2T 28).  Locke also says 
that there was no need to solicit consent because of the abundance of the original 
state of nature.  Because there was an abundance of goods, no one had the 
motivation to appropriate at the expense of anyone else.  Originally, men did not 
have the right to take more than they needed because men did not have the desire 
to take more than they needed.  This means that there was no waste: nothing 
ever spoiled as a result of man’s appropriating it in the state of nature (2T 36, 46).  
The original, economic state of nature’s dual characteristics of abundance and the 
spoilage limitation protect the rightfulness and non-consensual character to the 
original right to private property. 





After positing these natural limits to acquisition, Locke then spends much 
of the rest of the chapter removing them.  Limits on appropriation may have 
existed in the primitive economic state of nature, where the only form of 
property was nuts and berries, but neither they, nor any other limits, exist in 
civilized economic life.  The decisive turning point comes when Locke takes up 
the right to possess private property in land (2T 32-43).  He says that our right to 
own land is simply an extension of our right to own a pile of berries.  In both 
cases, the external object becomes our property through our mixing our labor 
with it.  Land is obviously not something we can appropriate by consumption, 
but we can mix our labor, and thus our selves with it, so for that reason it is just 
as much ours as a pile of nuts or berries.  
Laboring is more than just marking our territory.  What becomes clear 
through the case of land is that when we labor, we cultivate, improve, and make 
useful.  The converse is also true: the lack of labor means the lack of 
improvement.  “Labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we 
enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be 
reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that even 
amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of 
pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find 
the benefit of it amounts to little more than nothing (2T 42).”  Labor, it turns out, 
is the only form of improvement; unimproved nature provides few external 





goods to man and is therefore at best indifferent to our survival.  That 
appropriated land is improved land and non-appropriated land is virtually 
useless had been implicit from the beginning of the argument, but the point is 
clearer now, since labor puts a wider difference between cultivated and 
uncultivated land than it does between the labored-upon pile of berries and 
those still on the branch.  Man must work harder to improve land than to 
“improve” the nuts and berries, but the payoff is equally greater.  Although it 
was always the case that we had to labor to survive, at first it seemed like we 
could get by with fairly minimal effort.  Now Locke makes clear that this could 
not have been true. 
By stressing the necessity of labor, Locke renders doubtful the abundance 
of the original common.  In any event, it soon becomes irrelevant because of 
enclosure.  Enclosure becomes inevitable when men recognize the need to make 
their existence bearable by appropriating and cultivating land.  Eventually, there 
will be no more land open to be appropriated.  What then?  What of the have-
nots, how will they satisfy their desire for self preservation? 
Well, not only is enclosure inevitable, Locke argues that it is good.  Only 
appropriated land is worth anything to man, and so the greater percentage of 
land which is appropriated and cultivated, the better.  Indeed, it is better for all, 
not just the freeholders, because, in the end, it will mean more berries, more 
goods, more everything.  “[H]e who appropriates land to himself by his labour, 





does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind…he that incloses 
land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from ten acres, than he 
could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres 
to mankind (2T 37).”  Everyone cannot own the land itself but those without land 
can benefit from someone else appropriating the land and making it productive, 
either by enjoying the more abundant harvest yielded by appropriated land, or 
by working the land for the owner in exchange for wages.  It is better for all if the 
few own all the land and the many work it for them in exchange for wages, than 
if no one owns the land and everyone just lives off of what they can pick, bear 
and hoard (MacPherson 1962, 212-3). 
Thus, the enclosed manmade plenty turns out to be more plentiful than 
the original, natural plenty.  Whoever acquires and cultivates fallow land is a 
benefactor of all mankind, by bringing more plenty into the world than existed 
before.  And whoever lives in a society peopled by acquirers is better off than 
living with others whose entrepreneurialism scarcely exceeds piling up nuts and 
berries  “A King of a large and fruitful Territory [in America] feeds, lodges, and 
is clad worse than a day Labourer in England (2T 41).” 
Everyone benefits from acquirers, and acquirers benefit from others, too. 
Locke emphasizes through his examples (especially bread-making-2T 43) the 





social dimension of labor at its most productive (Grant 1987, 112-3).223
But if the primary way by which the have-nots survive is the exchange of 
their labor, then commerce, the exchange of unlike goods of equal value, will 
become necessary.  And for commerce to exist, money, a system of commonly 
accepted abstract value, must also come into being.  Agriculture leads directly to 
money.  Money will allow the landless to acquire their necessities and also to sell 
their labor.  Money allows for the transition from a subsistence economy to a 
market economy (although in Locke’s view, only the market economy truly is a 
subsistence economy).  Money solves the problem created by enclosure by 
making the existence of the have-nots possible.   
  Labor 
brings its greatest improvements and increase when many labor together.  The 
opportunity to work together is as much a motivation to enter into society as the 
need to seek protection against common enemies. 
Money eliminates the original spoilage limitation and thereby reshapes 
the definition of “need.”  Money preserves value and doesn’t spoil, so hoarding 
it is neither irrational nor necessarily harmful to others (2T 46-7).  While men 
always did possess the natural right to hoard precious metals (since doing so 
does not violate the spoilage limitation), only after the institution of money is 
there an incentive to hoard.  Unlike the acquisition of goods from the original 
                                                 
223 On this point, contrast Manent, who argues that working and appropriating are meant by Locke to 
replace participating in social life as the distinctive and most natural activities of man.  “Man is not 
naturally a political animal; he is an owning and laboring animal, owning because he is laboring, laboring 
in order to own (Manent 1995, 42).” 





common, which required no consent, money rests on a consensual or contractual 
basis in the sense that people must consent that this amount of gold is equivalent 
to that amount of wheat or that number of hours labored.  It thus also requires a 
more developed rational capacity than would be required by asocial hoarding in 
the state of nature.  Even if consent is only indicated tacitly by its use, money 
requires rationality and the capacity for abstraction.  Only rational and social 
beings can assign mutually accepted abstract values to pieces of metal.  Money’s 
emergence is concomitant with the transition from the state of nature to civil 
society (although not necessarily civil government).  Civil society then initiates 
further employment and refinement of our rational faculties, with the result that 
need and desire will never be the same.   
Because money brings with it the development of rationality, it also 
induces a broadening of horizon and better awareness of possible future needs.  
Money satisfies previous needs or desires (the have-nots’ desire to survive) but 
also creates new ones.  Since “real plenty will not be produced if the individual 
does not have an incentive to appropriate more than he can use (Strauss 1953, 
244),” money is essential for overcoming natural penury.  Labor alone won’t do 
it.  Because of money, man may “rightfully and without injury possess more than 
he himself can make use of (2T 50),” which means he also may acquire more than 
he can make use of.  Money makes it reasonable for men to acquire more than 
what they have a defined, immediate use for; inequality and luxury come into 






But, regarding the issue of enclosure and inequality, if all was originally in 
common, won’t more for some mean less for many (Locke himself poses this 
question-see quote from Essays on the Law of Nature in Goldwin 1987, 494)?  Is the 
harmony between right and desire ruptured forever?  Locke does not think so, 
and responds to this challenge in two ways.  First of all, there is no inherent 
injustice in inequality as such, because acquisition is no longer a zero sum game.  
Acquisition by the few benefits everyone, since nothing can be improved before 
it is appropriated.  Accumulating vast inequalities of wealth is not bad for the 
same reason that enclosure of land is not bad, namely all will benefit, directly or 
indirectly.  Increase is good and necessary for all, and increase is for Locke the 
  Money makes commerce possible, which expands 
desire, thus stimulating uneasiness and leading to more industry, leading to 
improvements, and all without necessarily violating right.  At this stage in the 
argument, Locke has lifted the spoilage limitation on acquisition and he will not 
replace it with any other limitation.  He has therefore extended the right to 
private property, it would seem, to the right to unlimited private property. 
                                                 
224 See Hume’s “Of commerce” and “Of refinement in the arts.”  The advantages of a certain type of 
luxury, according to Hume, lie in stimulating desire and therefore industry.  Wise policy makers will view 
industriousness as, effectively, an end in itself, since it is essential to so many other goods such as national 
strength, knowledge and humanity.  Luxury is a means to industry.  Locke does not argue that 
industriousness leads to greater humanity, but he does agree with Hume’s conception of the “industrious 
imperative.” It is good to encourage desires to expand beyond (present) capacity.  





bottom line (1T 33, 41, 59, 2T 32, 34, 37, and 40-8).225
Second, inequality is not unjust because all recognize its advantages and 
easily consent to it.  Locke believes that, unlike freedom, people do not naturally 
desire economic equality.  Everyone consents to the possibility that others will 
have more money than them, because everyone recognizes that an economic life 
structured by the conventions of trade and money is better than a primitive 
economic life without them (2T 50).  Getting people to consent to inequality is no 
more difficult than getting them to recognize the “great inconveniences” of the 
state of nature and corresponding advantages of civil government. 
  All must be allowed to 
appropriate because without appropriation, the human race cannot both expand 
and sustain itself.  Only the efforts of man make increase possible and 
appropriation is a condition of increase. 
And to reemphasize, this means that they consent to unlimited 
appropriation by others.  No longer is necessity the primary justification for 
acquisition.  Necessity is the original motivation to acquire in the state of nature, 
but only consent justifies, in society, acquisition beyond any immediate concept 
of need.  Without consent, people, the have-nots, too, would still benefit from the 
increase which attends unlimited acquisition.  However, Locke makes clear that 
their consent is also important.  It’s not enough that the have-nots are better off, 
                                                 
225 “…the central theme of Locke’s whole political teaching [is] increase (Goldwin 1987, 493).”  See also 
Strauss 1953, 235. 





it’s important that they also recognize that they are, recognize the causes of their 
betterment, and give their consent to the whole arrangement.  And they do, or 
they will, just as much as they recognize that they are better off with civil 
government than without it.  For Locke, the justice of inequalities of wealth is 
founded on consent, and consent is granted due to a perception of increase.  
Right is therefore based on increase, it seems. 
And the goodness of industriousness is based on its necessity.  In “Of 
Property,” Locke extols the virtues of labor in many ways, but, in contrast to the 
mores of mid-19th century America and Maoist China, he does not imbue labor 
with dignity.  Nor does he anywhere argue that it (or any other moral virtue for 
that matter) is good in itself.  Industriousness is good because it’s necessary; an 
industrious people is a strong people and strength is necessary. 
 
I.3 The achievement of “Of Property” 
In “Of Property,” Locke demonstrates that certain key features of civilized 
economic life are in accord with both right and advantage: private property in 
goods and land, money, the private possession by some of, in principle, limitless 
wealth, and economic inequality.  Legitimate civil government is defined by its 
capacity to protect the “honest industry of mankind” and even, Locke says, to 
“encourage” it.  Political legitimacy requires an active interest in the self-





preservation of its members, which means, in a broad sense, economic 
development. 
Political sanction for the right of private citizens, banks and corporations 
to compile immense resources without any immediately defined purpose (this is 
sometimes referred to as “capital formation”226
Locke is not a libertarian; politics always remains prior to economics in his 
thinking and Locke clearly envisions an active role for government in 
commercial life (2T 42).
) is hugely important to modern 
economic life and modern life more generally.  Without such aggregations of 
capital, equally vast technological, architectural and military projects could not 
be accomplished, and the overall strength of any political community would be 
severely limited.  Modern economic life, and the undeniable increase it has 
produced, simply would not exist without the sort of political protections Locke 
extends to private property and acquisition in “Of Property.” 
227
                                                 
226 As in “The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain 
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” 
  Nowhere in “Of Property” does Locke imply that 
aggregations of private capital are to be held absolutely inviolate.  Inviolability is 
only a characteristic of private property in the state of nature, when property 
rights are founded purely on labor.  In civil society, the man who makes the 
thing still owns it, but his right to make and acquire limitlessly rests on the fact 
that others allow him to do so, because they recognize they will all be better off if 
227 Pangle is especially emphatic about this, in contrast to “some of the more narrow and dogmatic of 
[Locke’s] successors (Pangle 1988, 169).”  (He’s talking about libertarians.) 





he possesses this right than if he does not.  But the main point is that there is no 
inherent problem in principle with anyone’s accumulating immense amounts of 
wealth, since (1) commercial acquisition is not necessarily at some one else’s 
expense, and (2) all benefit from economic development, not just the developer 
himself.  Inequality is a condition of prosperity.   
Investigating the origins of property rights could be a highly disruptive to 
existing civil society, just like investigating the origins of any social order or 
government could be: 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination and engages 
the affections of mankind as the right of property, or that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the rights of every other 
individual in the universe.  And there are very few that will give 
themselves the trouble to consider the original foundations of this 
right…We think it enough that our title is derived from the grant of the 
former proprietor, by descent from our ancestors, or by the last will and 
testament of the dying owner; not caring to reflect that…there is no 
foundation in nature or in natural law why a set of words upon 
parchment should convey the dominion of land; why the son should have 
the right to exclude his fellow creatures from a determinate spot of 
ground, because his father had done so before him; or why the occupier of 
a particular field or jewel, when lying on his death bed…should be 
entitled to tell all the rest of the world which of them should enjoy it after 
him.  These inquiries, it must be owned, would be useless and even 
troublesome in common life.  It is well if the mass of mankind will obey 
the laws when made, without scrutinizing too nicely the reason for 
making them. (Blackstone Commentaries II.1.2, quoted in Aldrich 1988, 121) 
 
Locke is aware of this, but just as in the case of his doctrines of the state of nature 
and the right to rebellion, he does not believe that “Of Property” will disrupt the 





social order, but rather strengthen it.  This is due to the fact that the original 
justification for private property is not maintained in civil society.  Due to money 
and trade, labor does not provide the sole right to ownership, and it certainly 
does not provide the right to ownership of limitless goods.  In civil society, the 
labor-based, individualistic right to ownership is tempered by concerns for 
consent and, more basically, the good of the whole community.  This 
underscores the ultimate importance of acquisition and increase to Locke.  Did 
private property not receive its final justification from the necessity of increase 
for self-preservation, investigating its origins could very well lead to severely 
disruptive consequences.228
The pre-modern understanding of property, that of Aristotle and 
Tocqueville’s aristocrats, conceived of property as a means, the means to 
achieving the higher, truer goods such as virtue and happiness.  In the modern 
understanding, the case is much more ambiguous, because property is only a 
means to life, not higher life.  It is harder to draw the line between what must be 
done to secure one’s property and secure one’s life than between what must be 
done to secure property and pursue the highest form of life.  Originally, property 
is defined as the means to life (this is the basis for asserting its naturalness), but 
in the end, there is no difference between securing one or the other, which means 
 
                                                 
228 “The final justification of the right to property is its economic utility…the right to property is no longer 
considered man’s fundamental natural right.  It is simply the means of preserving the values that result 
from labor’s productivity, the means of production and the exchange of values (Manent 1995, 45).”   





that, if the pursuit to secure life and self-preservation is endless, so, too, must be 
the pursuit to secure property.  This is how means become ends for Locke: the 
pursuit to secure the means is shown to be virtually indistinguishable from the 
pursuit to secure the ends.  It seems absurd to pursue means, not ends, endlessly, 
but from Locke’s perspective, it is less absurd to do this than to pursue an end 
whose status as a good is far less certain than property’s, and in any case can 
only be secured by securing the means to it, namely life and therefore property. 
In “Of Property,” Locke holds that, on a practical level, acquisition may be 
divorced from purpose.  Locke never departs from his original conception of 
property/money as a means to preservation, but he does imply that it is not 
absurd to pursue this means as if it is an end, that is, without being able to give a 
precise account of its direct purpose, because who knows what’s beyond the 
horizon (2T 157)?   
 
I.4 “Of Property” and ECHU II.21: a general theory of Lockean 
restlessness 
Locke famously never explained the relation between the ECHU and the 
2T.  During his lifetime, he never even acknowledged authorship of the latter.  
Locke left the task of connecting the two works to others, generating no little 
amount of scholarly controversy in the process.  The task at hand, however, is 





more circumscribed and less daunting than solving the so-called “boundary 
problem” between the ECHU and 2T.229
The ECHU seems, in many respects, to be a more theoretical and also 
comprehensive work than the 2T.  Nothing in the 2T compares with the depth 
with which the ECHU probes the topics of virtue, the afterlife, the eternity of the 
universe, the intelligibility of substances, or the origin of all our ideas, language 
and knowledge.  But the ECHU does not answer every question.  Indeed, the 
ECHU leaves us with many unanswered questions, not least “how should we 
pursue happiness?,” which II.21 fails to answer satisfactorily.  “Of Property” is 
more specific about Locke’s moral response to the fact that “uneasiness 
determines the will.”  What does mastery of uneasiness look like?  What is to be 
done?  These questions are only answered in a very abstract way in II.21.  Locke’s 
primary intention in that chapter, it should be recalled, is to give an account of 
the mechanism of human action, to account for how human actions occur.  Locke 
does not break any promises to us in II.21, but he does leave some open 
  In order to connect Locke’s liberalism to 
his restlessness, it is only necessary to show the connection between one chapter 
of the 2T, “Of Property,” with one from the ECHU, II.21 “Power.”  In the case of 
these two chapters, there is no boundary problem.  They approach the same issue 
differently, but in ways that are mutually reinforcing, not incompatible.   
                                                 
229 For more general discussions of the boundary problem, see Mansfield 1987, 207, Kennington’s “Nature 
and Natural Right in Locke” (Kennington 2004), Laslett 1988, 92-105, and Grant 1987, Chapter One. 





questions.  How should our moral outlook be altered by this new understanding 
of human action?  “Of Property” provides an answer: we should acquire.     
The relation between acquiring property and pursuing happiness must be 
spelled out.  As was discussed in the last chapter, Locke’s discussion of 
happiness in II.21 is very abstract and simplistic, far more so than is found in 
treatments by other philosophers.  He is vague in II.21 about what life is the best, 
most enlightened or happiest.  By positing happiness as the end of all our 
striving, that is, claiming we are always pursuing it even when we don’t know it, 
and being strikingly vague about what is the best kind of happiness (even in the 
basic sense of most accessible), II.21 has the effect of de-emphasizing the 
importance of happiness.  If what Locke says about happiness in II.21 is 
juxtaposed with what he says about the necessity of acquisition in “Of Property,” 
the implication seems to be that what people actively need to concern themselves 
with is the possession and acquisition of property in this life.230
After all, Locke is not completely vague in II.21 about the content of 
happiness, in that he does say (referring to earthly happiness), “So the greatest 
Happiness consists, in the having those things, which produce the greatest 
Pleasure; and in the absence of those, which cause any disturbance, any pain 
(II.21.55)” (emphasis added).  About this passage, Pangle comments, “What most 
 
                                                 
230 Pangle describes this as the “ascent” from ECHU II.21 on happiness to the 2T on property (Pangle 1988, 
206).  See also Strauss 1953, 227 on the priority of self-preservation and property to happiness for Locke. 





comforts us, what we most desire, is not the temporary forgetfulness or 
narrowing of horizon brought about by consuming present pleasure; more solid 
and satisfying is the prospective consciousness of our power over, our possession 
of, things that we can deploy at some unspecified time in the future, whenever 
we might decide to produce pleasure or diminish pain (Pangle 1988, 185).”231  If 
the statement from II.21 is true, what could the difference be, practically 
speaking, between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of property, or 
power (Strauss 1953, 249)?232  Defining happiness as relief, and also emphasizing 
the importance of “having” to happiness, intimately links the themes of freedom, 
uneasiness, power, property and happiness in Locke’s thought.233
The importance of the moral teaching of “Of Property” can be expressed 
in the following way.  Locke could have presented II.21’s argument about the 
illusoriness of the Summum bonum, then emphasized the fact of natural scarcity, 
questioned providence, posed the question “what is to be done?,” and responded 
 
                                                 
231 Compare also Locke’s definition of joy (II.20.7) and love in “Pleasure, Pain, the Passions”: “nothing but 
the consideration or having in the mind the idea of some thing that is able in some way of application to 
produce delight or pleasure in us (Political Essays, 238).”  For this reason Locke argues there that love is 
“the principal and first [of] all passions.”  The fragment “Morality” (Political Essays, 267-8) also makes 
clear the connection between property and happiness for Locke. 
232 Pangle says that this is also how Thomas Jefferson negotiates the relation between the right to property 
and the pursuit of happiness (Locke never grants a right to the pursuit of happiness, only property): 
“Jefferson’s substitution, in the Declaration of Independence, of the attractive-sounding right to the pursuit 
of happiness for the more prosaic right to property…was a stroke against the strict letter of Locke’s 
political theory and in perfect accord with its implicit, sinuous and flexible, rhetorical instructions: declare 
the pursuit of happiness, and in the Constitution protect everyone’s right to acquire and hold property 
(Pangle 1988, 209).” For a rival interpretation of II.21 55, which asserts that it leads to relativism and also 
seeks to diminish its significance for Lockean morality and happiness see Myers 1998, 162-3.  Myers 
argues that the “having” refers not to things but some form of self-possession, which conduces to “a state of 
being or rest that supplies the moral and psychological grounding for the active, industrious life.” 
233 On the centrality of the pursuit of property to Lockean morality, see also ECHU IV.12.11-2. 





with a discussion of the necessity of conquest.  This would have been, in very 
broad outline, the path sketched out by Machiavelli.234  Although Machiavelli 
famously does not present a formal psychology like Locke does in II.21, his 
understandings of natural scarcity and the necessity of acquisition are strikingly 
similar to Locke’s, as several commentators have noted.235  But in the 2T, Locke 
argues that commerce provides a more profitable and intelligent response to 
necessity than conquest.  In Chapter 16 of the 2T, Locke attempts to provide an 
answer to the difficult question of how to distinguish wars of conquest from 
wars of security.  Locke leaves aside the question of what motivated the conflict, 
and focuses on its effects: how does the victor treat the conquered?  Although a 
tough-minded account in many ways, (for example, Locke sanctions the 
indefinite detention of enemy combatants) the chapter rules out any form of 
conquest for the sake of acquisition.236  This critique of conquest coupled with 
“Of Property” and the central role Locke gives to economic development in 
political life,237
                                                 
234 “And truly it is a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire, and always, when men can do it, 
they will be praised or not blamed (Prince III).” 
 combine to produce a truly distinctive contribution to the 
development of modern political philosophy.  “Locke [is] the first to define 
political economy as the central task of politics (Zuckert 1994, 272).” The 
235 On Locke as a follower of Machiavelli see Mansfield 1987, Chapter Eight, Orwin 1978, Strauss 1959, 
49, and Pangle 1988, 30 and 260.  
236 Locke also departs from Machiavelli by saying that our motivation towards (commercial) acquisition 
stems from its basis in right, as well as necessity (Strauss 1953, 178-9). 
237 Economics occupied a much more subordinate position in politics for Machiavelli than for Locke.  See 
his letter of April 9, 1513 (quoted in Hirschman 1977, 41) and Discourses on Livy II.10, “Money is not the 
sinew of war although this is common opinion.” 





protection and promotion of commerce is a vital function of legitimate 
government, but Locke discredits the right to wage wars of conquest, however 
much to the perceived national advantage.   
Locke is clearly following Hobbes in the development of his teaching on 
property.  Hobbes, too, contends that the desire to secure the goods of the world 
is sure to be endless. What we really want, according to Hobbes, is power, the 
power to produce or secure whatever goods might appeal to us.  We want the 
means, not the end, because the end is indeterminate but the means are certain.  
The goods of the world inevitably vary from man to man; there is no one highest, 
supreme good by which they all may be hierarchically arranged and assigned 
their true values.  But the conditions for all goods, that is, for all human life, are 
universal and certain.  We may therefore also say that these conditions, or these 
powers, are natural and we must possess a natural and unlimited right to them.  
This is Hobbes’ famous jus in omnia, which we are required to relinquish in order 
to enter civil society. 
Just as with Hobbes and power, “money is and is not the end” for Locke 
(Pangle 1988, 167; see also Mansfield 1987, 173).  With his teaching on property, 
Locke tinkers with Hobbes’ argument in two ways.  First, the power we seek 
acquires more specificity.  Locke contends that property is the most valuable 
form of power, thereby transforming Hobbes’ abstract desire for power into the 
basis for the system of capitalist political economy.  This is based in Locke’s 





contention that the original form of necessity which we must confront in order to 
preserve ourselves is not other men but hunger, and thus our most pressing need 
is “not a revolver but a square meal (Zuckert 2002, 3).”  We appropriate in order 
to eat and live, even prior to defending ourselves, and thus property is the most 
natural power or means to life, according to Locke.  Second, Hobbes says that we 
have a jus in omnia in the state of nature but not in civil society.  Since we have, in 
principle, a right to everything, there are no natural property rights in terms of 
something real, secure, and respected by others.  True private property did not 
exist until civil society.  “Outside the commonwealth every man has a right to all 
things, but on the terms that he may enjoy nothing.  In a commonwealth every 
man enjoys a limited right in security” (de Cive X.1; see also VI.15 and XII.7).  
Natural rights are simply natural liberties for Hobbes, but they are not for Locke.  
Natural rights for Locke contain some moral content due to the naturalness of 
property, which stems from the claim that “every Man has a Property in his own 
Person” (2T 27).  This places limits on what is permissible in the state of nature.  
Others do not have the right to our own bodies and property.  Conversely, of 
course, this also means that ours and others’ natural right to acquire property is 
limited.  “The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does 
also bound that property too (2T 31).”  The right to unlimited property, the 
Lockean equivalent of Hobbes’ jus in omnia, only emerges in civil society.  For 
Locke, we possess property rights prior to society, but we join society to 





transform this right to limited property to a right to unlimited property.  For 
Hobbes, we have a right to everything prior to society, but this is meaningless 
because so does everyone else, and so we enter civil society to both limit and also 
to secure our right to property.   
Earlier it was implied that Locke dismisses the question of the hierarchy of 
the goods in his rejection of the Summum bonum.  Now we see that this is not 
quite true.  The goods that are most choiceworthy-power and property-are those 
which enable us to obtain other goods.  When asked what should we wish for, 
Locke responds “a million more wishes.” 
 “Of Property” treats the themes of justice and providence, as they relate 
to restlessness, with greater depth than ECHU II.21.  “To what extent is man’s 
existence supported by nature, and what does that mean for justice?”  “Of 
Property” raises this question in a more challenging way than in ECHU II.21.  
“Of Property” depicts nature as absurd: it instills in us a powerful drive for self-
preservation, then tells us that we are on our own to fulfill it.238
                                                 
238 “Nature is utterly powerless to provide the conditions in which nature’s own main intention-the increase 
of mankind-might be fulfilled (Goldwin 1987, 494).” 
  The 2T begins by 
claiming we are God’s property (2T 6), which leads us to expect that, when Locke 
comes to the treatment of property proper, the whole subsequent argument 
about private property rights will be based on our being owned by God.  But the 
argument in “Of Property” begins with a different claim, that “every Man has a 





Property in his own Person.”  And as the argument progresses, Locke relies more 
and more on the notion that, as is claimed in ECHU II.27, we own ourselves, and 
that’s why we own our labor, and why our private property is our private 
property.239
The impression “Of Property” gives is that man is not at home in the 
world and the world is not given to him.  In order simply to support his 
existence, man’s role towards the natural world must expand far beyond that of 
warden or steward.  Man’s attitude must be more than “restraint, gratitude and 
trust.”
  At the same time, Locke gradually depicts external nature as less 
and less beneficent.  Despite the majesty of the coast of Dubrovnik and the 
radiance of autumn foliage in New England, the natural world, without vast 
improvements made by man, does not support our existence.  
240
Locke’s most probing and critical reflections on traditional, revealed 
religion and the intelligibility of the notion of God’s benevolence are to be found 
more in Reasonableness of Christianity, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. 
Paul, and other parts of ECHU, than in either “Of Property” or ECHU II.21.  But 
within the context of Locke’s teaching on restlessness, as we have termed it, “Of 
  We are only “provided” with “almost worthless materials (2T 43).”  
                                                 
239 Mansfield 1987, 194, and Zuckert, 1994, 220.  For a good discussion on how Locke “subtly shift[s] the 
ground of his argument from divine proprietorship to self-ownership (Zuckert 1994, 244),” see Zuckert 
1994, Chapter Eight and Nine.   
240 This is Zuckert’s description of the pre-modern (Biblical) attitude towards property.  See Zuckert 1994, 
143-6 and 164 on Locke’s critique of the Biblical concept of donation and of providedness more generally.  
See also Pangle 1988, Chapter 14 for further reflections on Locke’s departure from the pre-modern 
(Biblical and classical) understanding of property.  





Property” goes farther than II.21.  ECHU II.21 does not examine the extent to 
which the natural world supports our efforts to flee pain and maximize pleasure.  
II.21, to the extent that it touches on this question at all, presents the challenge 
primarily as an individual ethical one, as a question of self-mastery.  Locke 
stresses that it is hard work molding ourselves, instilling in ourselves the right 
habits and desires,241
By introducing the themes of natural scarcity and providence, Locke also 
introduces the theme of justice in “Of Property.”  Unlimited acquisition is in 
accord with right because it has the sanction of consent.  Were nature more 
providential, economic development would not be so imperative and unlimited 
acquisition would not be right.
 but the possibility that external nature might also frustrate 
the most sincere efforts at self-mastery is not discussed in II.21.  If anything, the 
argument about hedonistic Christianity towards the end of II.21 gives the 
opposite impression.  In terms of the overall structure of their respective 
arguments, the argument in “Of Property” begins with providence but gradually 
distances itself from it, whereas the argument in II.21 moves in the opposite 
direction.   
242
                                                 
241 Mastering one’s individual nature is a major theme in STCE, where it is emphasized that every 
successful education must appreciate the child’s natural genius (see, for instance, 66, 139, and 161; see also 
Bacon “Of Nature in Men”). 
  ECHU II.21 itself has little to say about right 
other than that we pursue happiness as a matter of natural law.  In the context, 
242 “The sum of Locke’s message, then, is this: so barren is nature, so difficult is it for mankind to wrest 
from nature’s materials a comfortable existence, that there is no ascertainable limit to the necessary growth 
in the productivity of human labor (Pangle 1988, 166).” 





this means nothing more than we cannot help but to pursue happiness, “the 
utmost pleasure we are capable of (II.21.42),” just like matter cannot help but be 
attracted to other matter.   
II.21 also informs “Of Property” by providing a psychological defense of 
commercial acquisition.  Often, when modern liberal society’s acceptance of 
commercial restlessness is criticized, it is done so from a psychological 
perspective.  The conception of the moral good that Locke promotes in “Of 
Property,” it is said, cannot possibly be right, because unlimited acquisition 
produces an imbalanced, divided soul for the individual acquirer.  However 
brilliantly commerce may have transformed the world, made it more civilized 
and raised our collective standard of living, our internal standard of living, our 
happiness, seems to decrease in direct proportion to economic development.  In 
II.21, Locke anticipates such criticisms and meets them on their own 
psychological ground.  II.21 argues that we are constantly moved by pains and 
have no hope of ever attaining tranquility.  We do desire happiness, and we are 
bound to pursue it, but we should seriously temper our hopes of attaining it, or 
more problematically, our belief at any given time that we have found it.  The 
binding force of pleasure and pain makes us strongly tend towards complacency, 
which is, Locke implies, at the root of all vice.243
                                                 
243 “Men, like spend-thrift Heirs, are apt to judge a little in Hand better than a great deal to come; and so for 
small Matters in Possession, part with great ones in Reversion (II.21.63).”  Locke’s concern about the 
  As Locke argues in ECHU II.27, 





we are, most essentially conscious and responsible beings, and complacency is a 
form of unconsciousness.244
Locke identifies a powerful, natural human tendency towards passivity 
and the avoidance of responsibility for our moral, theoretical, and physical good.  
  Complacency plays the same role in Lockean 
morality as pride did in traditional Christian morality: it is both the paradigm 
and cause of all vice.  All vice may be understood as a form of complacency, and 
it is all caused by complacency.  Restlessness, or in this case we could even say 
anxiety, is the paradigm and also cause of all virtue.  Both for the objective 
reasons outlined in Locke’s account of the scarcity of external nature, and the 
subjective reasons outlined in II.21’s psychology, anxious foresighted 
acquisitiveness is the wisest, most beneficial and most moral way of life.  It is 
Locke’s view that we are bound to foresight due to our rationality, but 
unfortunately, not enough so.  Our rationality makes us better suited to plan for 
future contingencies than other animals, but it also makes us suffer more than 
they do, since they don’t know of the unease of anticipation (Zuckert 2002, 13).  
Because of our fate as uneasy, rational, foresighted beings, only plenty can satisfy 
us.  The world is in motion and thus we must be in motion, or more accurately, 
we and the world are in motion so we had better strive to master these motions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
natural tendency towards complacency comes up most often in discussions of the right to rebellion and the 
need to “prick up” the populace.  See Strauss 1953, 226, Mansfield 1976, 155-6, Tarcov 1981, 211, Pangle 
1988, 258-261, Myers 1998, 155 and Faulkner 2001, 10, 16, 28, and 38. 
244 “Person is a forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit (II.27.26).”  On the centrality of the 
themes of responsibility (ownership of one’s actions) and consciousness to Locke’s philosophy, see Myers 
1998 Chapter Five, Blitz 2005, Chapter Eight, Zuckert 1994, Chapter Nine, and Josephson 2002, 44-9. 





We tend to assume ourselves to be somehow adequately provided for, by custom 
or some other authority.  Myers argues that, for Locke, even the more dangerous 
or anti-social elements of human behavior, such as vainglory and the desire for 
power, are caused by laziness or passivity (Myers 1998, 118-128).  Vainglorious 
desires have their origin in a desire to avoid labor, mental or physical, that leads 
men to look for shortcuts around an honest confrontation with necessity.  
Everyone wants security, at root, and thus everyone wants power.  Some people 
develop a desire for dominion over others out of this desire for power.  Pride 
then takes on a life of its own (dominating others becomes pleasant in and of 
itself), but it originates, according to Locke, out of the natural human desire to 
get out of work.245
A responsible agent actively engages necessity, instead of either giving up 
or looking for some quick fix through self-deception or prideful domination.  
Responsibility means being intellectually honest about necessity and the fact of 
our being determined, but also doing something about it.  In ECHU II.21, Locke 
argues that rational determination is a special form of determination, so special in 
fact that it makes more sense to define it as a condition of freedom and not 
determination.  We may be said to own ourselves, our habits and our actions to 
the extent that we, with our rationality, cause them.  Self-ownership and taking 
 
                                                 
245 This goes for intellectual labor as well: “The necessity of believing, without Knowledge, nay, often 
upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting state of Action and Blindness we are in, should make us more 
busy and careful to inform our selves, than constrain others (IV.16.4).” 





responsibility for one’s own actions, habits and desires is different from free will.  
Locke wants us to focus on molding and instilling the proper habits and desires, 
which means taking ownership of our selves.  But since reasoning is itself, of 
course, an action, it must be determined by a prior uneasiness.  We must desire 
rationality, or put differently, full self-ownership as promoted by Locke requires 
the coincidence of the desire for rationality and the desire for happiness.   
What’s the link, then, between responsibility, rationality and restlessness?  
Locke’s thesis that “uneasiness determines the will” implies that we are bound to 
suffer more desires than we have the capacity to satisfy, that we will always be 
restless and somehow playing catch-up.  Thus we are definitely determined 
beings.  But Locke also argues in II.21 that there is a difference between being 
determined and being rationally determined.  A rationally determined being is 
both determined and free, a being which may be said to be both capable of 
morality but not exempt from the law of sufficient reason.  Although we are 
restless, and therefore determined, we are yet capable of responsibility, because 
there is a difference between being rationally determined and simply 
determined. 
In sum, what is the relation between “Of Property” and II.21?  What is the 
relation between restlessness and liberalism for Locke?  Together, “Of Property” 
and “Power” argue that an enlightened attitude toward the world is one which is 





anxious about the future and constantly looking out for ways to better secure 
one’s existence against possible threats.  “Of Property” improves on “Power” in 
two ways.  One, it argues for the righteousness of restlessness; it takes the 
psychology of II.21 and recasts it as a matter of right.  Two, it makes explicit 
what the ethical conclusion of II.21 should be, namely commercial acquisition.  In 
turn, II.21 lays the groundwork for “Of Property” by demonstrating the negative 
orientation of human action and desires.  It thereby supplements “Of Property” 
by arguing that we will never be free from restlessness or necessity because we 
will always be more motivated by the evils we are fleeing than the goods we are 
pursuing. 
 






 We are now in a position to bring our investigation to a close and 
conclude with a few reflections on Locke, Tocqueville, liberalism and 
restlessness.   
Locke and Tocqueville both present the image of man as restless, 
motivated primarily by forces he is fleeing without any prospect of finding 
satisfaction or rest.  Happiness for both is something man is equally bound to 
pursue as he is bound never to achieve.  Both portray man as fundamentally self-
concerned.  Actions are taken with a conscious view of self-interest; none are 
ever taken in deliberate pursuit of pain or misery.  Both offer what we might call 
a moral psychology of capitalism, a look from the inside at the forces which 
motivate, and the understanding which guides, an individual bent on the 
effectively limitless acquisition of material goods. 
For Locke, restlessness is partly natural and partly manmade.  
Restlessness in the fullest sense emerges out of an understanding of human 
nature and the external world.  Man is not constituted such that he can survive 
without increase, and increase is only made possible by limitless acquisition.  In 
ECHU II.21, through an analysis of our constitutions and the structure of human 
action, Locke comes to the conclusion that, naturally, desire and capacity are not 
in harmony with one another.  We are determined by desire, meaning 





uneasiness, and are thus never quite free from it, which means our capacity can 
never quite keep up.  In “Of Property,” Locke shows how an accurate 
understanding of the natural world and man’s place in it brings us to a similar 
conclusion about desire and capacity, but also shows the advantages of 
encouraging desires beyond capacity.  We cannot improve our estates without 
stimulating industry, and we cannot stimulate industry without stimulating 
desire beyond our present capacity to fulfill it.  The wise, beneficent and 
legitimate policymaker will look for ways to make his people more industrious.   
Industriousness and restlessness are necessary for a longer and more 
comfortable life.  Locke gives the impression that he promotes industriousness 
for the sake of itself, because he argues for limitless acquisitiveness and is 
doubtful about happiness, but this is not quite accurate.  Later liberals do come 
along and put forth arguments about the “dignity of labor” and how there is 
some sense in which hard work is good for one’s moral character, but this is not 
Locke.  Locke is very impressed by labor’s transformative power, but not dazzled 
but it; labor remains “pain,” “toil,” and “sweat” (2T 30, 34, 37, and 42-3).  Locke 
thinks we need to labor because it is necessary, and does not promote any moral 
qualities independent of their advantageousness. 
For Tocqueville, inquietude’s emergence in modern democratic times has 
nothing to do with the external world.  The moral-psychological disposition 
towards restlessness is due to the fact that modern society is ordered in accord 





with equality instead of inequality.  Tocqueville believes that restlessness is a 
modern condition, unknown to primitives, aristocrats and slaves.  Restlessness 
befell man along with democracy: it was not quite a “natural” development, but 
it certainly was not manmade.  Tocqueville, unlike Strauss and MacPherson, 
does not hold Locke responsible for creating modern restlessness, but he does 
object to it and the Lockean conception of the moral good more generally.  
Inquietude for Tocqueville is a condition caused by history which sets us against 
our nature.  Certain natural tendencies, such as erotic longing and natural 
ambition, are weakened and frustrated by inquietude.  Tocqueville believes there 
is something patently absurd about accumulating without ever enjoying or 
resting.  Locke argues that it’s reasonable to be a miser, but Tocqueville is not at 
all sure about the moral superiority of the miser.   
Now we are in a position to see the advantage of focusing on restlessness 
and its connection to liberalism.  Restlessness helps bring into relief some 
features of modern life and their connection to liberalism, such as for example 
modern rationalism and the tension between liberalism and a belief in the 
Summum bonum.  Restlessness implies an instrumental form of reason.  It is in 
connection with his uneasiness doctrine that Locke outlines his understanding of 
practical reason as calculation.  Tocqueville discusses the Americans’ 
complicated form of rationality in terms of the effect of inquietude on both 
theoretical and practical reason.  As for the Summum bonum, it is in his 





discussions of uneasiness and property that it becomes clear why Lockean 
liberalism is premised on an orientation not towards the greatest good, but the 
low, material and common goods.  Tocqueville shows what a people orientated 
towards these goods instead of the greatest good looks like. 
Both Locke and Tocqueville connect restlessness with liberalism, but in 
slightly different ways.  Restlessness of soul and democracy are historical 
developments, and democracy causes restlessness of soul, according to 
Tocqueville.  The rise of democracy has changed men in a number of ways 
beyond just making them equal, such as by making them more individualistic 
and materialistic.  Liberal democracy must somehow learn to tolerate and manage 
this restlessness, such that it retains its connection with freedom and does not 
encourage the ever-present threat of despotism.  Any solution which looks to 
eradicate inquietude will likely be worse than the problem.  
 For Locke, it is truer to say that restlessness is the cause or justification of 
liberalism than vice versa.  Legitimate, liberal civil government is distinguished 
by its commitment to provide protection for the possession and acquisition of 
private property against the “great inconveniences” of the state of nature.  
“Uneasiness determines the will” is an inherent, ineradicable fact of human 
nature, a law of nature.  But as with many natural phenomena for Locke, even if 
it cannot be eradicated, it may be mastered.  Uneasiness is not a modern 
condition but restlessness, understood as the proper response to it, is a modern 





condition, or Locke hopes to make it one.  As we recall, the uneasiness teaching 
may be understood as nothing more than preparation for Locke’s teaching on 
how we are free, the true overarching purpose of II.21.  The question of what to 
do with this freedom is then given content and form by the 2T and especially 
Chapter Five, “Of Property.”  Though Locke is more associated with 
determinism/materialism, he, not Tocqueville, is the one who gives a larger role 
to art, at least when it comes to restlessness.  We are freer from nature in the case 
of Locke than we are free from history in the case of Tocqueville.   
Nature, for Locke, endows us with our hedonistic constitutions, and 
makes it difficult for us to mold our habits and desires in accord with reason.  
Nature makes us oriented towards fleeing evils, not pursuing goods.  External 
nature is also scarce and forces us to work, work hard, in order make our 
existence in the given world tolerable.  And we won’t survive, at least not for 
very long, until we also work intelligently.  Full Lockean restlessness requires 
that we put some distance between ourselves and the primitive economic state of 
nature.  It requires sociality, trade, and abstract systems of exchange, all of which 
serve both to satisfy fundamental desires and also expand them.  It also requires 
the political institutions which provide protection for restless acquisition.     
Orienting men towards self-preservation and material prosperity, as 
Locke tries to do with his teaching on property in the 2T, also has the effect of 
better attaching them to legitimate authority by giving them a clear intelligible 





stake in their government and civil society.  Locke very much had in mind the 
sort of self-interested attachment to freedom through private property that 
Tocqueville describes the Americans as exhibiting.  As with Tocqueville’s 
Americans, Lockean man realizes that free government and commercial 
prosperity go together.   
Tocqueville is much warier towards commerce and the threat it poses 
toward freedom than Locke is.  Only with reluctance is Tocqueville willing to 
accept that political freedom be reduced mostly to a means towards the end of 
greater material well-being.  There is more and cleaner overlap between the 
goods of commercial prosperity and political freedom for Locke than for 
Tocqueville. 
Locke’s endorsement of restlessness and all its aspects-materialism, the 
excess of desire over capacity-is less qualified than Tocqueville.  This may be 
accounted for by two differences, the first of which is the fact that Locke in “Of 
Property” gives restlessness the sanction of right.  For Locke, justice is protecting 
life and this means protecting property.  We cannot find any corresponding 
effort in DA.  Even though Tocqueville does think democracy more just than 
aristocracy, and claims that inquietude is a distinguishing feature of democracy 
over against aristocracy, he is unwilling to give it the sanction of justice.  It may 
not be unjust, but it is not as central to his concept of justice as for Locke.   





 The second is the fact that Locke and Tocqueville diverge on the 
coincidence of right and advantage.  For Locke, right and advantage-understood 
primarily as preservation-overlap.  For Tocqueville, one cannot define 
“advantage” without taking greatness into consideration, and greatness does not 
necessarily overlap with right.  Tocqueville’s liberalism is vexed by the tension 
between justice and greatness.  Right and preservation are closer for Locke than 
right and greatness are for Tocqueville.   Locke doesn’t see the tragedy 
Tocqueville does; Locke’s philosophy may be dark and cynical in parts, but it is 
not tragic.  
In other words, though Tocqueville is wary of stressing the justice of 
restlessness, its lack of accord with justice is not necessarily Tocqueville’s biggest 
objection to restlessness.  He is probably more concerned with the risk it poses 
towards greatness.  Tocqueville’s concern for justice is qualified by his concern 
for greatness, and more so than Locke’s is by his respective concern for 
preservation.  Arguably, justice comes off looking less “strange” for Tocqueville 
than it does for Locke, despite, or perhaps because his commitment to it is more 
qualified than Locke’s is. 
This is the simplest way to express the difference between restlessness in 
the political philosophies of Locke and Tocqueville.  Locke believes restlessness, 
properly understood, is a way of life which combines the attractions of both right 





and advantage, and Tocqueville believes that no way of life combines right and 
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